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REGULATION OF LIFE INSURANCE IN TEXAS: A STUDY
OF THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY POLICIES ON 
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, BEHAVIOR 
AND PERFORMANCE
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Purpose of the Study and Importance of 
the Industry
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the effect 
of administrative regulation on the life insurance industry 
in Texas. Although the industry is a very significant part 
of the private sector of our economy— particularly in Texas—  
it has been largely ignored in economic analysis. As a result 
of several unique characteristics, the industry is subject to 
comprehensive regulation, yet this regulation differs consid­
erably from that found in other industries. The products of 
the industry are almost ubiquitious^ yet even their costs
^At the end of 1972, some 140 million persons, or one 
out of every three people in the country, were insured by some 
form of policy issued by a legal reserve company. Life Insurance 
Fact Book, 1973, (New York: Institute of Life Insurance, 1973),
p. 9. A survey made in 1959 revealed that eighty per cent of 
the total adult population had some form of life insurance.
Ibid., p. 14.
2are not clearly understood by a large proportion of those 
who buy them.
The study will examine the structure, behavior, and 
performance of the industry, and, when possible, will use 
microeconomic theory as a tool of analysis. But because 
of the nature of the industry, conventional analytical 
methods will not always be practicable. Empirical study 
will be used to help explain the industry and the impact of 
its regulation.
Based on the analysis made, the thesis will determine 
whether or not regulation in Texas has significantly changed 
the organization of the individual life insurance firm, as 
well as the structure of the entire industry. Since it is 
almost certain that regulation will continue, recommendations 
will be made for changes in regulatory policies. Throughout 
the study cognizance will be taken of the "political" factors, 
i.e., the influence of interested parties, which cannot be over­
looked if one is to understand the operation of the industry.
Importance of the Industry
Every year 140 million consumers in the United States 
spend about $25 billion for various types of life insurance.^ 
When all other sources of income of the life insurance companies 
are included, the total is close to $50 billion.^ In addition
^United States, Congress, Senate, Committee on the 
Judiciary, The Life Insurance Industry, Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. Ninety-third Congress, 
First Session, 1973, p. 1.
2bife Insurance Fact Book 1973, p. 7.
to the number of people involved as policyholders, the life
insurance industry is important in other ways. At the end
of 1972 the life insurance in force in the United States was
$1,627,985,000,000.^ According to one of the standard texts
in the insurance field, "Individual insurance represents the
2
oldest economic security system."
Life insurance companies are also a significant source 
of loanable funds, supplying seven per cent of the total funds 
flowing into financial markets.^ In January of 1974 the total 
assets of the industry were $253,531,000,000. Approximately 
half of these assets consisted of business securities— stocks 
and bonds— and almost a third were real estate mortgages.^
This investment position contrasts with the idea held by some—  
and certainly true at an earlier time— that insurance companies 
were ultraconservative in their investment practices. One 
recent study of financial institutions summarizes the situation, 
"Life insurance companies are dynamic investors who assume 
reasonable investment risk, and thereby contribute to the 
growth of the American economy.
^Ibid.
^S. S. Huebner and Kenneth Black, Jr., Life Insurance, 
7th ed., (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), p. xxxiv.
^Life Insurance Fact Book, 1973, p. 69. The only 
sources which supplied greater amounts were: commercial banks,
34 per cent; savings and loan associations, 18 per cent; and 
state and local funds, 8 per cent.
^Federal Reserve Bulletin 60 (May, 1974): Table A3.
^Murray E. Polakoff, et al.. Financial Institutions 
and Markets (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970), p. 158.
4The life insurance industry is singularly important 
in the State of Texas. The Chairman of the State Board of 
Insurance, Joe Christie, speaking before the Amarillo Rotary 
Club on February 7, 1974, characterized it as the largest 
industry in the State. At the end of 1972, the life insurance 
in force in the State was $87,069,000,000, with $9,460,000,000 
having been sold in Texas that year.  ^ Former Governor Price 
Daniel expressed his belief in the importance of insurance 
to the individual in a special message to the Fifty-fifth 
Legislature on February 12, 1957, "It involves the financial 
security of most of our people, rich and poor alike. Insur­
ance is the primary safeguard which our people have against
p
possible future loss and disaster."
Neglect of the Industry in Economic Analysis
Despite this seeming importance, economists have paid 
little attention to the industry. There is a great volume of 
literature dealing with the "selling" of life insurance and 
with reasons for its purchase. This is obviously aimed at 
life insurance agents, but much of it is consumer oriented.
In beginning this study the author wrote several well-known 
economists to seek their help in locating pertinent analytical 
material about the industry. Among the replies were the follow­
ing; From Professor George J. Stigler of the University of
^Life Insurance Fact Book, 1973, pp. 7 and 23. 
^Quoted in Amarillo Globe-Times, April 17, 1972.
Chicago, "I haven't done any work nor indeed followed the work 
of others in the area of life insurance . . . . From the 
Chairman of the Department of Economics of Columbia University, 
Professor Donald Dewey, "I regret that I cannot be of a signifi­
cant help to you on your doctoral research. There has been an 
astounding neglect of the insurance industry by economists in 
recent years as you have painfully discovered."
One well-known text in the field of industrial organi­
zation mentions the industry, only to dismiss it from consid­
eration, "We shall have very little to say about . . . the 
banking, finance and insurance industries, which belong con­
ventionally to the fields of money and banking.
A recent study by Professor Paul L. Joskow of M.I.T.
makes this comment about such an attitude:
Scherer's relegation of the industry to the "money and 
banking" field may be justified in the context of past 
research work available, but it seems unfortunate that 
such an important private sector of the U. S. economy 
has not undergone more intensive study and analysis 
in the context of the structure-behavior-performance 
rubrick of industrial organization.^
Although Professor Joskow's analysis is directed 
primarily to the property-liability sector of the industry.
^George J. Stigler, letter to the writer, dated 
October 12, 1973.
^Donald Dewey, letter to the writer, dated October 22,
1973.
^F. F. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic 
Performance (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1971), p. 2.
4paul L. Joskow, "Cartels, Competition and Regulation 
in the Property-liability Insurance Industry." The Bell Journal 
of Economics and Management Science 5 (Autumn '73): 375-5.
the letters quoted above would indicate there has been a 
similar scarcity of study in the life insurance field. In 
1969 there was published a rather comprehensive study of 
industrial regulation entitled. The Reaulators-Watchdog 
Agencies in the Public Interest.^ The book has no chapter 
on insurance, and the two references in the index are quite 
insignificant.
Spokesmen for the business community also seem to 
ignore or overlook the life insurance industry when the per­
vasiveness of government regulation is being expounded. The 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the First National City 
Corporation, writing in the conservative National Review, 
failed to mention insurance, though his list was not all- 
inclusive ;
The American bureaucracy regulates the utilities which 
produce heat, light and power; the railroads (or what's 
left of them); trucking companies, airlines, broad­
casters, drug firms, dry cleaners, automobile manufac­
turers, meat packers, film makers, farmers, brokers, 
banks, and a host of other enterprises. Most of these 
industries are highly competitive, but government has 
decreed that they serve a variety of objectives other 
than selling their products at the lowest possible
price.2
There is a similar lack of attention to the industry 
in current economic literature. A rather concentrated search
^Lewis M. Kohlmeier, The Regulators— Watchdog Agencies 
in the Public Interest (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).
While this study deals primarily with federal regulations, it 
includes areas of concern to the State, such as intra-State 
telephone rates.
^Walter B. Wriston, "Whale Oil, Baby Chicks, and 
Energy," National Review, June 7, 1974, p. 645.
7of economic and political science journals for the last fev» 
years was made in two general areas: industrial organization
and governmental regulation; and in publications specifically 
in the insurance field. Except for the last category, very 
little was found that was applicable.
In the field of governmental regulation, most of the 
articles dealt with transportation or utility rates, although 
one relatively new field— the regulation of cable television—  
received some attention.^ There were several articles dealing 
with barriers to entry, both as a regulatory device and as 
evidence of market imperfection. More specific reference to 
these will be made in the section of Chapter II dealing with 
Behavior in the Industry. In publications such as the Public 
Utilities Fortniqhtlv were several articles dealing with the 
theory of differential rates. Primarily their purpose was 
to use orthodox price theory as a defense against the idea 
of an "inverted" utility rate structure to cut down usage for 
environmental reasons. As will be shown in the next chapter, 
there is differential pricing in life insurance, but rates 
are not specifically regulated.
In such trade publications as The Journal of Risk and 
Insurance there were, of course, articles dealing with the 
industry. Several of these addressed the question of solvency.
The American Economic Association includes papers on 
about twenty topics at each annual meeting. In only one of 
the last several years has more than one of these dealt with 
industrial organization or public regulation. None dealt 
with the life insurance industry.
8and one dealt at length with concentration in the industry.
In both economic and political science journals there 
were articles dealing with antitrust actions. Since insurance, 
as a regulated industry, is largely exempt from antitrust, 
these were not applicable to the study at hand.
Current Interest in the Industry 
Despite the lack of analysis by economists, the 
insurance industry has received increasing attention from 
other sources in recent years. In the movement which has 
come to be known as "consumerism" there is a great deal of 
interest in the industry. Herbert S. Denenberg, a former 
Professor of Insurance at the University of Pennnsylvania, 
served for several years as Commissioner of Insurance in the 
State, and was a vigorous exponent of what he considered to 
be the consumers' interests.^ He published in 1972 and 1973 
A Shopper's Guide to Life Insurance, A Shopper's Guide to 
Term Life Insurance, and A Shopper's Guide to Straight Life 
Insurance.^ This latter includes, for instance, the follow­
ing charts : 1) Ranking of $10,000 and $25,000 participating
policies of the 35 largest companies, 2) Ranking of 10 Highest 
and Lowest cost $10,000 participating policies of all companies
^Commissioner Deneberg resigned to seek the Democratic 
nomination for United States Senator in the spring of 1974, 
but was defeated in the Primary election.
n
Harrisburg, Pa.: Pennsylvania Insurance Department.
The Department also published Guides to hospitals, surgery, 
dentistry and mobile hoirie insurance.
9in Pennsylvania, 3) Ranking of $10,000 and $25,000 non-partic­
ipating policies of the 20 largest companies, 4) Ranking of 
Lowest and Highest Cost $10,000 non-participating policies of 
all companies in Pennsylvania.
In the foreword to the Second Edition of the Shopper's 
Guide to Straight Life Insurance (June, 1972) Commissioner 
Denenberg reported:
These Guides have become part of one of the most 
successful consumer education programs ever launched.
The Insurance Department has printed and distributed 
over 500,000 of these Guides, and several million of 
our Guides are in circulation. We have granted per­
mission to reproduce these Guides to various consumer 
organizations, unions, government agencies, large 
employers. Blue Cross and insurance companies, and 
many others.
Reaction to the Guides has been varied.^ Best's
Weekly News Digest, Life/Health Insurance Edition of June
12, 1972, reported:
Seven weeks after publication, the Pennsylvania Shopper's 
Guide to life insurance has not had much impact on the 
sales in that State of companies included on the Guide 
lists of the ten highest and lowest cost companies, nor 
has it caused any wide-spread alarm among agency depart­
ment heads at companies in the high-cost category.
Subsequent to that time the Pennsylvania Insurance
Department has been involved in some litigation concerning
2
the accuracy of some of the figures used. There seems to
^Insurance Commissioner Joe Hunt of Oklahoma has said 
they were "worthless." (Southwest Insurance Regional, July 31, 
1973, p. 1).
^According to The National Underwriter, Life and Health 
Insurance Edition, February 9, 1974, "A commonwealth court judge 
has ordered Commissioner Herbert S. Denenberg of Pennsylvania to 
stop releasing information from a draft of his Shopper's Guide 
to the 100 Insurance Companies That Consumers Complain About 
Most." (p. 1.)
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be rather general agreement in the industry, however, that this 
sort of activity will continue, and that all companies must 
be prepared to provide accurate and adequate cost information.
The activities of Commissioner Denenberg have stimu­
lated similar ventures on a commercial basis. A New York 
publisher of paper backs, Davis Publications, Inc., put out 
A Davis Compact Guide, How To Save Money on Life Insurance 
(1972 Edition). On the title page is the statement, "Grate­
ful acknowledgement is made to the Insurance Commission,
State of Pennsylvania, and to the Press and Editorial Division, 
Institute of Life Insurance, for certain material that appears 
in this book.
The year 1972 also saw the issuance of a Revised 
Edition of the Consumers Union Report on Life I n s u r a n c e .^ in 
the Introduction it is reported that the November, 1937, issue 
of Consumer Reports (one year after the organization's found­
ing) began a ten-installment discussion of life insurance.
In 1967 a four-part series reported again on the industry, 
and this was expanded into the 1972 book.^ Consumers Union 
reported, however, that the expanded study proved somewhat 
of a failure as "a large representation of insurance companies.
^How to Save Money on Life Insurance, A Davis Compact 
Guide, (New York: Davis Publications, 1972).
2
The Consumers Union Report on Life Insurance. Revised 
Edition (Mount Vernon, New York: Consumers Union of the United
States, Inc., 1972).
^Ibid., p. 7-8.
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including all the biggest ones (were unwilling) to cooperate 
by supplying needed d a t a . A l t h o u g h  their Guide supplies 
much helpful information, they conclude, "Like so many major 
buying decisions, the purchase of life insurance is much more 
difficult than it ought to be.
In an effort to make the buying of insurance easier 
for the consumer— and to meet some of the concerns which 
have brought forth the Pennsylvania Shopper's Guides— several 
states have issued orders that new types of cost information 
must be supplied at the time of purchase of life insurance.
The actual premium paid is a very inexact measure of the cost 
of life insurance, and there are a number of methods which 
attempt to express the cost more exactly. The so-called 
"interest-adjusted" method (which will be explained in Chapter 
II) has more support than others, but it is by no means uni­
versally regarded as a measure of the true cost of insurance.
In October, 1973, the Insurance Department of Arkansas 
issued an order (to take effect February 1, 1974) that the 
"Life Insurance Interest Adjusted Cost Comparison Index" must 
be used.^ A similar order was issued in Texas to take effect 
April 1, 1974,^ however, representatives of the industry have
^Ibid.
2Ibid., p. 11.
^Arkansas Insurance Department, Rule and Regulation 
17, October 19, 1973.
^Texas State Board of Insurance Order No. 26809.
12
urged that its implementation be suspended for further study, 
and the Texas order is now scheduled to take effect September 
15, 1974.1
These efforts are intended to help the consumer
arrive at the true cost of his insurance, but, as will be
brought out more clearly in the next chapter, cost is not
the only consideration in buying insurance. A spokesman for
the industry wrote this in 1972:
Even the most dedicated consumerist— and we have 
talked to more than a few of them— will admit that 
less than 5 per cent of the permanent life insurance 
policies sold in the United States and Canada are 
purchased on the basis of cost. The figure is prob­
ably closer to 2 per cent to 3 per cent.
Joseph M. Be1th, professor of insurance at Indiana 
University, and the man who must be given a large 
part of the credit for the donnybrook in which the 
industry finds itself, repeatedly points out in his 
book. The Retail Price Structure in American Life 
Insurance, that he does not intend to suggest that 
price is the only factor that should be considered 
in the purchase of life insurance.2
A major inquiry into the operations of the life 
insurance industry was conducted by Senator Philip A Hart 
of Michigan. As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Antitrust 
and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, he conducted 
hearings in February, 1973, which, together with Material 
Received for the Record, covered 2216 pages in a three-part 
report.
^Texas State Board of Insurance Order No. 27022.
n
William McFarlane, "Consumerism: No Longer a Non-
Word," The National Underwriter, Seventy-fifth Anniversary 
Edition, 1972, p. 36.
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In his opening statement Senator Hart set out several 
concerns which he and others had about the life insurance 
industry, and which he hoped the Hearings would help to 
resolve. These included the lack of knowledge on the part 
of consumers as to what part of their premiums went into 
savings and what part into death protection, an antitrust 
concern over the way the life insurance market operates, 
proliferation of types of policies, the fact that . . . the 
average family gets little money when the breadwinner dies," 
and "restrictions on the competition which comes from State 
laws and regulations, and perhaps from industry activities."
Senator Hart announced on March 5, 1974, that he was 
drafting a "Truth in Life Insurance" bill. He said that 
hearings by the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee 
and information gathered since from more than 200 companies 
convinced him consumers are not getting "clear, accurate, 
reliable and adequate information about the cost and value 
of the policies they buy." An additional feature of the bill 
would provide "some protection for agents" in allowing them 
to sell for more than one company. A requirement that "the 
summary measure of price show a breakdown between the pro­
tection element of the policy and the savings element" is
The Life Insurance Industry, Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on 
the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-third Congress, 
First Session, Part 1, February 20, 1973, p. 1.
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sure to be one of the most controversial provisions of the 
bill.^ Industry spokesmen oppose this strongly, saying it 
would violate the concept of level premium life insurance.
As would be expected, much of the concern about life 
insurance covers the possibility of company insolvency. A 
few states, including California, Illinois and Texas, have 
been working for several years on the possibility of "early 
warning" tests which would give an indication of pending 
trouble well before any crisis becomes apparent. The pro­
cess of full examination of a company may take many months. 
If the company is in trouble, much damage can take place 
during that time. As with the rumor of a failing bank, 
the actions based on the rumor may well create a condition 
which had not theretofore existed.
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
in 1973 contracted with the management consultant firm of 
McKinsey and Company at a cost of $500,000 to conduct a 
study of insurance regulators, and to try to devise a finan­
cial condition surveillance system to reveal early clues to 
potential insurance company insolvencies. The Wall Street
Press Release, Office of Senate Antitrust and Mono­
poly Subcommittee, March 5, 1974 (mimeographed). Information 
received from Senator Hart's office in late June, 1974, indi­
cated the bill had not yet been introduced.
2
Appendix "F" contains a statement explaining this
concept.
^Suzanne T. Turner, Press and Community Relations 
Specialist, The Mutual Life Insurance Co of New York, letter 
dated March 14, 1974.
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Journal of May 24, 1974, states that the McKinsey report is 
very critical of present regulatory practices, and singles 
out dishonesty as the primary cause of insolvency. The news­
paper further reports that a representative of the NAIC 
challenges this finding, saying, "The McKinsey statistics 
are different from what our observations have been. I think 
dishonesty in the insurance business is minimal. There are 
about 1800 United States life insurance companies in operation 
today, and I think you could logically expect that some of 
them aren't going to make it.
Methodology
The items cited in the previous section show the 
concern which various groups have about the life insurance 
industry. Each is valid in its own way, but none approaches 
the problem from the viewpoint of this study, which will 
attempt to look at the institutional realities of the life 
insurance industry in the light of microeconomic theory. The 
study will be empirical, with no construction of a model and 
testing of hypotheses.
An industry embracing a segment of the economy of 
the magnitude of the life insurance industry certainly merits 
investigation. Its importance as a means of saving as well 
as a source of funds are significant in our economy. The
"Dishonesty is Said to Cause Insolvency Among Life 
Insurers," The Wall Street Journal, May 24, 1974, p. 3. The 
part of the McKinsey Report dealing with Early-Warning tests 
will be discussed in Chapter V.
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regulatory practices obviously have much impact on the nature 
of the industry. Certain aspects of life insurance operations 
will need to be considered on an industry-wide basis, as econo­
mic theory recognizes no state boundaries. However, insurance 
is one of the few regulated sectors of the economy which comes 
under state rather than federal control, so the state is a 
logical unit (market segment) for study. The impact of régula-* 
tion in Texas will be of prime concern.
Former Insurance Commissioner Denenberg and two members
of the faculty at the University of Pennsylvania have made a
study of concentration in the life insurance industry, in
which they indicate the relevancy of the State as the proper
market segment for study. They point out the such a study must
concern itself with relatively homogeneous market segments:
(Such a study) seems particularly vulnerable in the 
problems associated with aggregation because of the 
inherent heterogeneity of the insurance products in 
the market place. . . . However, there is a consid­
erable justification for choosing the state as a rele­
vant market segment for the measure of concentration.
Three major reasons may be noted: (1) the insurance
industry is a state regulated industry; (2) the market­
ing of life insurance is essentially a regional endeavor; 
and (3) buyers of insurance can be more readily classed 
into relatively homogeneous groups on a state basis than 
on a national basis.I
They further point out that since the influence of 
the State is so pervasive in the sale of insurance, "It thus
J. David Cummins, Herbert S. Denenberg and William 
C. Scheel, "Concentration in the U. S. Life Insurance Indus­
try," Journal of Risk and Insurance 39 (June, 1972): 177.
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has a vested interest in assuring the successful operations 
of insurance companies within its borders.^
In many ways operations of Texas companies are quite 
similar to those of companies in other states, but where 
there are differences because of Texas regulations, an 
attempt will be made to explain them. There is ample support 
for the process of using theory as a guide to regulation, 
even though it has been largely ignored in the life insur­
ance field. Professor Alfred E. Kahn of Cornell University 
follows this approach.
Microeconomic theory provides regulators with a 
set of principles that, if followed, will produce 
optimum results, by widely accepted criteria of 
optimality. The principles are at one and the same 
time behavioral rules describing how prices should 
be set, investment decisions guided and so forth, 
and descriptions of the ideal results that those 
rules are supposed to produce— notably the use of 
society's limited resources in such a way as to 
maximize consumer satisfactions.2
Professor George W. Stocking cautions against follow­
ing theory which has become outmoded:
To classical and neoclassical economists markets fell 
into two relatively simple categories, competitive and 
monopolistic, and they developed a lucid and logical 
explanation as to how price was determined in each 
and how it functioned in the allocation of resources 
and the distribution of income. As their theories 
gained in refinement and precision, they lost in 
reality. Edward Chamberlin was the first in this
^Ibid., p. 179.
^Alfred E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Prin­
ciples and Institutions, 2 Vols., (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, Inc., 1970), Vol. I: Economic Principles, p. 17.
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country to give systematic expression to a logic 
better adapted to the market structure of contem­
porary industrial society.1
This study will attempt to deal both with the insti­
tutional realities and the theoretical concepts in the manner 
described by Professor Kahn:
What institutional incentives, compulsions and 
arrangements will play the same role where the 
"invisible hand" of competition is for one reason 
or another infeasible? "The visible hand of 
regulation" is not a sufficient answer . . . .  In 
view of the historic controversies in economics 
between "theorists" or, more precisely "classical 
economists" on the one hand, and "institutionalists" 
on the other, it is important to emphasize that we 
intend to imply no such dichotomy . . . .  On the 
contrary, the micro theory that is divorced from 
institutional realities is sterile. The essential 
task of useful theory is precisely to identify the 
important institutional determinants of economic 
behavior— such as number of sellers, barriers to 
entry, complexity of product, shape and character 
of the production cost function, or the presence 
of regulation— and to formulate hypotheses about 
their impacts on the various aspects of performance. 
Conversely, the "institutional economics" that is 
informed by no theory . . .  is no science at all.^
Sources of Information 
The original inspiration for this study came from a 
series of articles in the Amarillo Globe-Times in the spring 
of 1972, by its Nobel Prize-winning Editor, Thomas H. Thompson. 
These articles were quite critical of insurance regulation in 
Texas. Mr. Thompson subsequently left the newspaper to 
enter the academic world, and turned his files over to the
^George W. Stocking, Workable Competition and Anti­
trust Policy. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1961),
p .  V .
^Alfred E. Kahn, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
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writer of this study. At that time the writer and Mr. Thompson 
counselled with Jose Rael, an Amarillo agent of the Equitable 
Life Assurance Society. Mr. Rael has earned the Chartered 
Life Underwriter diploma, and has studied the insurance field 
extensively. He has been very helpful throughout the investi­
gation. Furthermore, as a stockholder in both successful and 
unsuccessful insurance companies who has attended annual 
meetings and studied their annual reports, the writer has 
some personal knowledge on which to build.
At West Texas State University in the spring of 1973 
the writer taught the Economics Section of the course 
designed for the Chartered Life Underwriter degree of the 
American College of Life Underwriters. The members of the 
class were Branch Managers and leading agents who aspired 
to the professional designation of Chartered Life Underwriter. 
The subject material was from a standard economics text,^ 
supplemented by material from the American College of Life 
Underwriters especially pertinent to the industry. This 
course provided the writer with a unique opportunity for 
acquiring knowledge about the industry and its operating 
problems.
Early in the summer of 1973 the writer spent about 
ten days in Austin, Texas, interviewing and using library 
resources. Some of the interviews were arranged through
Ipaul A. Samuelson, Economics, 8th Ed. (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1970).
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friends in Amarillo who were well acquainted in Austin; 
Lawrence Hagy, independent oil operator, former mayor, and 
former President of the Texas Research League;^ Wales Madden, 
attorney and former Regent of the University of Texas; and 
Representative Ben Bynum, Chairman of the Insurance Committee 
of the House of Representatives. Representative Bynum was 
extremely helpful in explaining the insurance problems which 
had come before the Legislature in the then just-concluded 
Sixty-third Session.
Interviews in Austin began with Joe Christie, Chair­
man, State Board of Insurance; Durwood Manford, Member of 
the Board; and Clay Cotten, Insurance Commissioner. Next 
was Stuart Long, Publisher of the Austin Insurance Report, 
issued weekly with information of interest to all phases of 
the industry. (There is also a Legislative Edition, pub­
lished while the Legislature is in session to provide current 
information in greater depth than the regular report.) The 
files of these publications for the last several years were 
examined and studied. Mr. Long has been a Capitol Correspon­
dent for almost thirty years, and has an extensive knowledge 
of all phases of state governmental activity.
^A privately financed organization for studies of 
governmental operations. It made a comprehensive study of 
the State Board of Insurance in 1958, Regulation of Insurance 
in Texas; The Job Being Done, The Needs to be Met (Austin; 
Texas Research League, 1958). The writer also had access 
to supporting Memoranda Nos. 1-19, (mimeographed) from the 
files of the Texas Research League.
21
Forrest C. Roan, Chief Clerk of the Insurance Committee 
of the House of Representatives, was very helpful in supplying 
copies of insurance bills passed in the recent legislature 
and in explaining why some had passed and some had not. Sam 
J. Winters, Attorney for the Texas Life Convention, explained 
the part his organization had taken in the Guaranty Bill, 
just passed, as well as the overall interests of the organi­
zation he represented (some of the larger companies in the 
State.) Professor Robert C. Witt of the University of Texas, 
a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania with doctoral 
research in insurance, provided copies of some of his own 
publications, as well as guidance in literature that was 
available.
In October, 1973, a second visit was made to Austin 
to inquire more specifically about certain aspects of Board 
operations. Don Dunham, Deputy Assistant Administrator, 
supplied this information. A very brief conversation was 
held with Ned Price, the third member of the State Board.
On this visit, Dave Smith, Executive Secretary of the Texas 
Legal Reserve Officials, was interviewed. This is an organi­
zation of representatives of medium-sized life insurance com­
panies. The interview with Mr. Smith was arranged by Don J. 
Willmon, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer 
of the United Bankers Life Insurance Company.
The writer was formerly a stockholder and policyholder 
of that company, and has talked with Mr. Willmon about insurance
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problems on numerous occasions— more specifically in the last 
two years as a part of this study. Mr. Willmon, on his own 
initiative, sought information for the writer from officials 
of several other companies.
In August, 1973, the writer interviewed Joe Hunt, 
Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner, Gerald Grimes, Deputy 
Commissioner and Eva Pogue, Chief Actuary. All were extremely 
helpful in providing information.^
There are two others who have been continuing sources 
of information and guidance. Dr. Zeke Marchant, Professor of 
Insurance and Head, Department of Business Administration,
West Texas State University, has been a great help in many 
ways. He has experience in both the business and academic 
worlds, and provided a number of books and periodicals which 
were not otherwise available. E. Jay O'Keefe, President of 
Western National Life Insurance Company of Amarillo, was 
formerly the company's actuary. He has been most helpful in 
explaining the concept of the "interest-adjusted cost index,"
and many other aspects of the industry.
During the summer visit to Austin, the reports of
the Texas Research League which pertained to the State Board
of Insurance were studied, as were reports in the Texas Legis­
lative Library. The University of Texas Library was used
^Commissioner Hunt issued the writer a Commission as 
an "Honorary Deputy Insurance Commissioner of Oklahoma."
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extensively, including a number of doctoral dissertations 
and some master’s theses.
The University of Oklahoma and West Texas State Uni­
versity libraries were also used in these studies. The 
facilities of Interlibrary loan were used on several occasions 
to secure books and periodicals from the University of Indiana 
and Southern Methodist University. Copies of five disserta­
tions were purchased from University Microfilms, and micofilm 
copies of twelve were ordered for the writer by the Univer­
sity of Oklahoma Library (through the courtesy of the Chair­
man of his Committee).^
The libraries were used extensively for books, period­
icals and government documents. Textbooks for courses in 
price theory, industrial organization, government regulation 
and insurance were used, along with professional journals in 
all these fields. Trade journals for insurance agents and 
executives are prolific, and many were examined. There are
^The University of Pennsylvania has been the source of 
the greatest amount of doctoral research in the insurance field, 
Obviously this is influenced by the presence there of the S. S. 
Huebner Foundation for Insurance Education. The University of 
Indiana has also engendered a good bit of research in this 
field. Professor Joseph M. Belth, Professor of Insurance at 
that University, has written extensively about insurance, and 
will be quoted a number of times in this paper. The Univer­
sities of Texas and Wisconsin have each had several disserta­
tions dealing with insurance in recent years. Most of the 
balance have come from the other large Midwestern State uni­
versities .
In the main, these have dealt with specific operating 
problems, or with hypothetical models, of operations under 
various assumptions. None has dealt in an overall way, how­
ever, with the use of economic theory as a guide to understand­
ing the operations of the life insurance industry.
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many insurance company histories, ■ together with histories 
of the industry both in the United States and England.
Several of these are "Centennial Histories," and they pro­
vided much information about both operations and regulations. 
Studies of regulation in other industries were examined for 
possible application to the insurance industry. Government 
documents of various kinds were also used; such as reports 
of the Temporary National Economic Committee, Congressional 
hearings and reports, and reports of various state agencies.^ 
There is quite a variety of information published for 
the industry, and various types of reporting and rating 
services about companies and policies. Some of the better- 
known publications are: National Underwriter; Life, Insur­
ance Advocate, Weekly Underwriter, Best's Review; Life/ 
Health, Insurance Magazine, CLU Journal, Life Association 
News and Journal of Risk and Insurance.
^There are several books which are extremely critical 
of the entire life insurance industry. While they should not 
be overlooked, they have contributed little to an understand­
ing of the industry. Among those examined by the writer were: 
Edward Berman, Life Insurance; A Critical Examination (New 
York: Harper and Bros., 1936); Mort Gilbert, Life Insurance;
A Legalized Racket (Philadelphia: Marlowe Publishing Co.,
1936); Ralph Hendershot, The Grim Truth About Life Insurance 
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1957); Jay Douglas Kidder,
Life Insurance, America's Greatest Confidence Game (Seattle: 
George E. Minor Press, 1938). Generally the life insurance 
industry has ignored such attacks, but the Institute of Life 
Insurance prepared a rebuttal to the Hendershot book. It was 
a nine page mimeographed booklet, "Memorandum Concerning Back­
ground Facts Pertaining to the Book, The Grim Truth About Life 
Insurance by Ralph Hendershot, published by G. P. Putnam's 
Sons," This was published in 1957.
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Chapter Outline 
The remainder of this study will be organized as 
follows: Chapter II, The Nature of the Life Insurance Indus­
try. Beginning with a definition of insurance, and a brief 
early history of the industry, the chapter will explain the 
structure, behavior and performance of the life insurance 
industry. It will show how economic theory can be helpful 
in understanding these various aspects of the industry.
Chapter III, History of Industry Regulation, will consider 
the characteristics which have created a demand for regula­
tion and will outline the legal basis for regulation. It 
will examine two major investigations of the industry: the
Armstrong Investigation in New York in 1905, and the study 
conducted by the Temporary National Economic Committee in 
1939 and 1940. Chapter IV, Thé Life Insurance Industry in 
Texas, will describe the industry in Texas, particularly as 
its companies and policies differ in part from those in other 
states. Chapter V, Regulation in Texas, will tell of the 
influence on the industry of the Robertson Act of 1907, and 
will describe the current procedures of the State Board of 
Insurance, including the types of disciplinary action avail­
able to the Board. The Chapter will also describe the latest 
types of "early-warning" tests which have been devised in a 
study sponsored by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners. Chapter VI, Conflicting Purposes of Regulation,
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■will 1ist some of the various goals of regulation and show 
how they can conflict in theory and practice. The ways in 
which the Texas regulatory system places strong emphasis on 
certain goals which are but lightly regarded in other states 
will be explained. In Chapter VII the writer's conclusions 
from the study will be summarized, and recommendations will 
be made for modifications in state regulations and company 
operations.
CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF THE LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
The previous chapter has indicated something of the
importance of life insurance, and the neglect it has faced
at the hands of economists. This chapter will first define
insurance and briefly recount its early history. The major
portion of the chapter will seek to analyze the industry on
the basis of its structure, behavior and performance. A
good definition of these terms has been given in an article
addressed to attorneys seeking help in determining whether
or not an industry is competitive.
The term "structure" refers to, at a minimum, the 
industry's (1) concentration ratio, (2) the degree 
of product differentiation present in it, and (3) 
the height of any additional entry barriers around 
it. "Conduct" refers principally to the behavior 
pattern employed by the industry's firms in arriving 
at their price, product and output decisions, par­
ticularly whether they make those decisions independ­
ently, collusively, or interdependently. The term 
"performance" refers to the ultimate economic results 
produced by those structural features and conduct 
patterns, that is, to its (a) efficiency, (b) price 
stability, and (c) technological progressiveness, 
and (d) contribution to the general goal of equity 
in the distribution of income.^
^Charles E. Mueller, "Lawyer's Guide to the Economic 
Literature on Competition and Monopoly: An Introduction to
the Doctoral Dissertations (II)," Antitrust Law and Economics 
Review 5 (Fall, 1972): 72.
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This chapter will seek to cover these points, and 
others, particularly in the structural area. A more complete 
description of companies and types of products will aid in 
understanding the industry.
Definition of Insurance and Early History
In a very broad sense the key characteristic of 
insurance is the substitution of certainty for uncertainty. 
Life Insurance is concerned with the uncertainty of pre­
mature death, and with financial loss which might be suffered 
as a consequence. One leading textbook describes it this 
way:
From the community standpoint life or health insurance 
may be defined as that social device for making accumu­
lations to meet uncertain losses resulting from pre­
mature death or disability which is carried out by the 
transfer of risks of many individuals to one person or 
a group of persons.1
The text further defines life insurance from an indi­
vidual standpoint as:
Consisting of a contract, whereby for a stipulated 
consideration, called the premium, one party (the 
insurer) agrees to pay the other (the insured), or 
his beneficiary, a fixed sum upon the occurrence of 
death, disability, or some other specified event.2
The Texas Insurance Code of 1969, As Amended, defines 
a life insurance company as follows :
^S. S. Huebner and Kenneth Black, Jr., Life Insurance, 
7th ed., (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), p. 3.
Zibid.
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A life insurance company shall be deemed to be a 
corporation doing business under any charter involving 
the payment of money or other thing of value, conditioned 
on the continuance or cessation of human life, or 
involving an insurance, guaranty, contract or pledge for 
the payment of endowments or annuities.!
This seems a very straight-forward definition, with
little posibility of misunderstanding, yet a different point
of view may call for a different idea. As expressed by Irving
Pfeffer in Insurance and Economic Theory, "the economist, the
historian, the legislator, and the businessman each has a
2
different idea as to the nature or scope of the term."
An even more forward-looking analysis is presented 
in a 1969 study published for the S. S. Huebner Foundation 
for Insurance Education:
What will be considered "insurance," and thus be 
legitimate within this part of the economy? Only such 
activities as are "insurance" will be subject to insur­
ance regulation. Variable annuities fall in the shadowy 
borderland between insurance and securities. What new 
forms of "securities" will have to be fitted into a 
dual regulatory scheme as both insurance and securities?
Or will the one regulatory scheme squeeze out the other? 
What warranties, expanded beyond current concepts, will 
be subjected to control as "insurance"? How will new 
and old forms of insurance stricto sensu be encouraged, 
circumscribed or forbidden by the application of the 
regulatory machinery? What kinds of insurance, yet to 
be created, will be sanctioned or prohibited?^
^Texas Insurance Code 1969 (Austin: State Board of
Insurance, 1969), Sec. 1, p. 49.
Irving Pfeffer, Insurance and Economic Thsory (Home­
wood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1956), p. 9.
^Spencer L. Kimball and Herbert S. Denenberg, eds.. 
Insurance, Government and Public Policy, Studies in Insurance 
Regulation (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1969),
p. 486.
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The current study will not attempt to answer all the 
above questions, but they are enumerated to indicate the 
overall scope of the insurance field. For the purposes of 
this study, the definition given in the Texas Insurance Code 
will be followed.
Early History of the Industry 
The concept of life insurance has existed for many 
centuries. As an organized business, however, it is generally 
traced to England in the 17th century. The first life insur- . 
ance company in America was founded in 1759 by the Presbyterian 
Synods of New York and Philadelphia. It was known as the 
Corporation for the Relief of Poor and Distressed Presbyterian 
Ministers and for the Poor and Distressed Widows and Children 
of Presbyterian Ministers. It is now known as the Presby­
terian Ministers Fund, and ranks among the fifty largest 
mutual companies from the standpoint of assets.^ By 1804 
there were forty insurance companies of all types, with a 
total capital of $10,000,000.^
In Texas the first two insurance companies were organ­
ized in 1840, and chartered by the Congress of the Republic
Best's Insurance Reports, Life/Health, 1973, p. 1340, 
At the end of 1972 its assets were $139,366,561 and insurance 
in force was $642,897,638.
n
'Samuel Blodget, Economica; A Statistical Manual for 
the United States of America (Washington, 1806). Quoted in 
Douglass C. North, The Economic Growth of the United States 
1790-1860 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1966), p. 54.
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of Texas. Under statehood the first companies were chartered 
by a special Act of the Second Legislature in 1848. The Fifth 
Legislature in 1854 chartered the Red River and Texas Insur­
ance Company— a combined fire, marine casualty and life insur­
ance company— with a capital stock of $75,000.  ^ By 1874 there 
were twelve life insurance companies licensed in the State.2
Organization
Despite its long history, the operations of the insur­
ance industry are understood by very few persons. Following 
the analysis outlined above, the first area of study will be 
the structure, or organization, through which these operations 
are conducted. The questions which this paper will seek to 
answer are well outlined by George W. Stocking.
By an industry's structure economists refer to 
an industry's makeup, how it is put together, how its 
parts are interrelated. How many firms are in it?
What is their relative size? Does a single firm domi­
nate it? How difficult is the movement of resources 
into and out of it? What are the limits of its market?
How sharply is it differentiated from other "industries" 
producing rival products readily substitutable for the 
products it makes? Economists believe that the answers 
to such questions will throw some light on the effec­
tiveness or workability of competition.3
Micro Aspect
With a few minor exceptions the life insurance business
^George L. Curry, General Insurance for Texas (Houston: 
Southwest Educational Publications), p. 1.
2lbid.
^George W. Stocking, Workable Competition and Anti­
trust Policy (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1961),
p. 122.
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in the United States today is carried on through corporations.^ 
These are of two basic types; the stock insurance company and 
the mutual insurance company. The stock company is owned and 
controlled by the stockholders, whose interest is in making 
a profit through providing service to the policyholders. Any 
excess of income above needs for losses, expenses, reserves 
and surplus may be paid in dividends to the stockholders.
Some stock companies provide for a return of some of their 
gain to their policyholders, and are known as participating 
stock companies.
A mutual insurance company is owned, and, in theory, 
controlled by its policyholders. Any excess gain above 
losses, expenses, reserves and surplus must be returned pro 
rata to the policyholders- In some cases policyholders of 
mutual companies may be called upon to share in the company's 
losses if its assets are not adequate.^
The Texas Insurance Code 1969, As Amended, makes pro­
vision for unicorporated Fraternal Benefit Societies (Chapter 
10), Local Mutual Aid Associations (Chapter 12), Burial Asso­
ciations (whose benefits may be paid partly in merchandise 
and services— Chapter 12), and Statewide Mutual Assessment 
Companies (if authorized under a preexisting law— Chapter 
13). The author does not have information on similar plans 
in other states. Another type of operation is the State Life 
Insurance Fund of Wisconsin.
^This paragraph and the next are based on material in 
George G. R. Lucas and Ralph H. Ifherry, Insurance Principles 
and Coverages (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1954), pp.
30-31. Similar information is found in any standard insur­
ance textbook.
30ne of the continuing controversies in the life insur­
ance field concerns the relative advantages of stock and mutual 
companies. Each position has strong support, but that partic­
ular question will not be covered in this study.
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Considerable disparity in average size of the two 
kinds of companies is revealed in the fact that in mid-year 
1972, of the 1,829 companies then in business, 1,676 were 
stock companies and 153 were mutuals. Yet the mutuals, 
which are generally older, had about two-thirds of the assets 
of the United States life companies, and slightly over half 
of the life insurance in force.^
Both types of companies perform similar functions,
which can be classified in three broad areas: selling,
servicing and investing. Among the professional skills needed
are those of the actuary, the lawyer, the doctor and the
accountant— plus, of course, the agents in the field. One
standard text lists the following as the major functional
areas through which a life insurance company operates:
actuarial, agency, accounting and auditing, investments,
2law, underwriting, and administration.
A distinctive characteristic of life insurance com­
panies is the field organization, or agency force. In our 
nation today, most life insurance is not "bought," it is 
"sold." The customer does not seek out the agent, rather 
the agent seeks the customer— and may aggressively pursue 
him! Agents also render other services such as changes in 
insurance plans or beneficiaries, policy loans, assistance 
in preparing death claims.
^Life Insurance Fact Book 1973, p. 91 
^Huebner and Black, op. cit., pp. 653-4.
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Most textbooks list two types of agency systems—  
the General Agency System, and the Branch Manager. A third 
way of writing (selling) life insurance is through a broker. 
The General Agent is an independent contractor who hires 
writing agents on such terms as he thinks best. His com­
pensation is the difference between what he receives from 
the company and what he pays his agents.
The Branch Office, or manager's approach, is a newer 
system, but is growing in importance, especially among the 
larger companies. The branch manager is a salaried employee 
of the company who hires and trains writing agents. The 
manager may be paid a bonus either for increasing the amount 
of business or adding to the number of agents.^
Insurance may also be written through a broker. He 
holds contracts with several companies, and can place the 
business he writes where he sees fit. It is not uncommon 
for a General Agent to hold a brokerage license with another 
company which offers different kinds of policies, for example, 
health and accident insurance, or fire and casualty lines.
The various types of agents must all price their 
products as directed by their company. For this purpose a 
Rate Book is issued by each company with the exact price of 
each policy for each age group. The company has considerable
This information is based partly on Huebner and 
Black, op. cit., pp. 658-61, and partly on a conversation 
with E. Jay O'Keefe, President, Western National Life Insur­
ance, Amarillo, on May 14, 1974, in Amarillo.
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leeway in establishing those prices, however. Unlike fire
and casualty rates, life insurance rates are not controlled
by regulation. A company may vary its rate structure to try
to make certain policies more appealing to particular age
groups. Professor Joseph M. Belth of the University of
Indiana, who has probably studied life insurance rates as
extensively as anyone in the United States, makes this
comment about company pricing actions:
Life insurance literature in general, and actuarial 
literature in particular, abound with discussions of 
the various elements involved in life insurance pricing. 
Thus, extensive studies have been published concerning 
mortality rates, the effect of physical impairment and 
occupational hazards on mortality rates, methods of 
allocating divisible surplus among policyholders, and 
so forth. Conspicuously absent from the literature, 
however, are studies of the general price structure 
that has emerged as a result of the combined effect 
of the companies' practices with respect to each of 
the various elements of price.1
Macro Aspect
Just as there are distinctive characteristics of the 
firm, so are there of the entire industry. Table II-l shows 
the estimated number of legal reserve life insurance compan­
ies^ for selected years from 1759 to 1972.
^Joseph M. Belth, The Retail Price Structure in 
American Life Insurance (Bloomington: Bureau of Business
Research, Graduate School of Business, Indiana University, 
1966), p. X .
^"A life insurance company operating under state 
insurance laws specifying the minimum basis for the reserves 
the company must maintain on its policies." Life Insurance 
Fact Book 1973, p. 121. See also p. 80 of this study.
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TABLE II-l
N U m E R  OF UNITED STATES LEGAL RESERVE LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANIES, SELECTED YEARS, 
1759-1972
Year Number Year Number Year Number Year Number
1759.. ___ 1 1850.. . .48 1925___ 379 1963...1,490
1760.. ___ 1 1860.. . .43 1930___ 438 1964...1,552
1770.. ___ 2 1870.. .129 1935___ 373 1965...1,635
1780.. ___ 2 1880.. . .59 1940___ 444 1966...1,712
1790.. ___ 3 1890.. . .60 1945___ 473 1967...1,725
1800.. ___ 4 1900.. . .84 1950__ 649 1968...1,775
1810.. . o . . 2 1905.. .126 1955..1,107 1969...1,787
1820..__ 6 1910.. .284 1960..1,441 1970...1,801
1830.. ___ 9 1915.. .295 1961..1,449 1971...1,805
1840 ...15 1920.. .335 1962..1,469 1972...1,810
Source : Life Insurance Fact Book 1973, p. 89.
The number of companies domiciled in each state is 
shown in Table 11-2= Texas ranks second to Arizona in number 
of companies, with third-place Louisiana having a little less 
than half as many.
Despite the number of companies in the top three 
states, the insurance companies based in New York, New Jersey 
and Connecticut account for the greatest proportion of life 
insurance in Force.^ As set out in Chapter I, this total was 
$1,627,985 million at the end of 1972, Of this, $87,069 
million was in force in Texas.
Many Texas companies are active in other states, just as 
many "foreign" companies are active in Texas. The pervasiveness
iLife Insurance Fact Book, 1973, p. 90.
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TABLE II-2
NUMBER OF UNITED STATES LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANIES, BY STATE, MID-YEAR 1972
(Legal Reserve)
State Number State Number State Number
Alabama 52 Louisiana 99 Oklahoma 54
Alaska 2 Maine 4 Oregon 8
Arizona 388 Maryland 16 Pennsylvania 66
Arkansas 27 Massachusetts 17 Rhode Island 5
California 54 Michigan 18 South Carolina 35
Colorado 30 Minnesota 24 South Dakota 8
Connecticut 12 Mississippi 16 Tennessee 20
Delaware 29 Missouri 42 Texas 219
D. C. 10 Montana 4 Utah 14
Florida 28 Nebraska 31 Vermont . 4
Georgia 30 Nevada 2 Virginia 16
Hawaii 9 New Hampshire 3 Washington 22
Idaho 5 New Jersey 15 West Virginia 4
Illinois 93 New Mexico 5 Wisconsin 25
Indiana 55 New York 62 Wyoming 4
Iowa 27 North Carolina 22
Kansas 22 North Dakota 11 Total U. S. 1,829
Kentucky 18 Ohio 43
Source: Life Insurance Fact Book 1973, p. 90.
of State regulation makes the State a logical unit for analysis, 
yet much economic analysis of life insurance must deal with the 
industry as a whole.
A fundamental concern in analyzing the structure of an 
industry is its concerntration, that is, the extent to which 
a small number of companies account for a large proportion of 
an industry's output. The life insurance industry does not 
lend itself to the usual type of analysis of concentration 
because firm size is more commonly measured by assets or
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insurance in force than by output in a given year. Such 
measures will be used in the discussion that follows:
Fortune magazine publishes annually a list of the 
fifty largest life insurance companies in its directory of 
the largest non-industrial companies in the nation. The 
latest such list (July, 1974) includes three Texas companies: 
American National (Galveston), No. 24; Southwestern Life 
(Dallas), No. 29; and Southland Life (Dallas), No. 50. Texas 
Parade publishes a list of the top fifty life insurance com­
panies in the State, with its latest list also being July,
1974. Thie information in the Tables below is taken from these 
publications (except as noted otherwise).
An additional measure of concentration was reported 
by one of the leading insurance publications in May of 1973:
Ninety per cent or more of the new business written, 
the insurance in force and the assets of the life insur­
ance business in the United States are in the hands of 
the 100 leading companies in each of these categories.
In 1972, the 100 top companies issued $195 billion of 
new business; the 100 leaders in insurance in force 
had nearly $1.5 trillion of business on the books, and 
the assets of the first 100 totaled $228 billion.^
The study on which this article was based also revealed 
that of the $196.2 billion of new business issued (exclusive of 
increases, revivals, additions and reinsurance assumed) by the 
100 leaders, 30 per cent was accounted for by the top five 
companies.2
^"Leading Life Companies," Best's Review, Life/Health 
Insurance Edition, May 1973, p. 40.
^Ibid.
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TABLE II-3
LARGEST UNITED STATES LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANIES, 1973
Company 
and Location
Assets
($000)
Premium & 
Annuity 
Income ($000) in
Life 
Insurance 
Force ($000)1
Prudential 
(Newark)^
34,963,969 4,732,097 197,428,389
Metropolitan 
(New York)2
31,985,447 4,478,848 198,184,955
Equitable Life Assurance 
(New York)2
17,152,473 2,280,839 97,508,226
New York Life^ 12,471,793 1,553.406 62,842,603
Top four 96,573,682 13,045,190 555,964,173
John Hancock Mutual 
(Boston)2
11,447,249 1,536,536 75,056,201
Aetna Life (Hartford) 
Northwestern Mutual
8,933,987 2,010,617 71,506,611
(Milwaukee)^ 
Connecticut General
7,096,113 689,507 25,721,934
(Bloomfield) 6.622.110 1,231.069 41,428,713
Second four 34,099,459 5,467,729 213,713,459
Top eight 130,673,141 18,512,919 769,677,632
Top twenty 172,139,303 25,162,736 1,006,836,475
Top fifty 204,848,629 31,860,578 1, 274,729,126
Industry total^ 252,436,000 48,668,000 1, 778,300,000
The question may arise as to how a company can be solvent 
when Life Insurance in Force (a liability) exceeds Assets by such 
a great amount. The life insurance in force represents total future 
liabilities. Using the principle of the law of large numbers, the 
larger the number of separate, but like, risks combined, the less 
uncertainty there will be as to loss in a given period. Life insur­
ance companies are required by the law of the state in which they 
operate to set up reserves; - described as, " . . . that amount, which 
together with future premiums, interest and benefit of survivorship, 
will be sufficient, according to the valuation assumptions, to pay 
future claims." (Huebner and Blake, op. cit., p. 358).
^Mutual Company. Source: The Fifty Largest Insurance
Companies," Fortune, July, 1974, pp. 116-117.
^Life Insurance Fact Book 1974 (galley proof); based on con­
versation with Barbara Felicia, Research and Statistical Services, 
Institute of Life Insurance, New York, July 22, 1974 (telephone).
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TABLE II-4
LARGEST TEXAS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
1973
Company and 
Location___
Assets
($000)
Premium & 
Annuity 
Income ($000)
Life 
Insurance 
In Force ($000)
American National 1,583,873 
(Galveston)
Southwestern Life 1,255,037 
(Dallas)
Southland Life 594,226
(Dallas)
Republic National 478,135
(Dallas) __________
Top four 3,911,271
216,138
148,424
95,299
284,359
744,220
11,251,565
6,534,946
4,256,008
10,959,326
33,001,845
Great Southern 
(Houston) 
American General 
(Houston) 
Fidelity Union 
(Dallas)
Variable Annuity 
(Dallas)
Second four 
Top eight 
Top twenty 
Top fifty 
State Total
392,292
298,906
272,668
247,722
1,212,588
5,123,859
6,333,407
7,045,162
7,377,057
40,231
52,837
61,794
63,839
218,701
962,921
1,296,409
1,569,862
1,736,316
2,462,300
2,655,123
3,724,566
9,210
8,851,119
41,853,044
55,909,318
66,736,987
71,393,806
Source: "The Top Fifty Life Insurance Companies." Texas Parade,
July 1974, p. 72. Also, Letters, Joe Christie, Chairman,
State Board of Insurance, August 1, 1974 and August 22, 1974.
The purpose of examining such measures of concentra­
tion is to determine the effect on market behavior and market 
performance. This concern on the part of the public was 
expressing by a Washington attroney, addressing other attor­
neys who would be dealing with cases involving measures of 
concentration.
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TABLE II-5
LIFE INSURANCE IN FORCE BY SIZE 
CLASS OF LARGEST COMPANIES, 
1973 
($000,000)
Size Class United States Texas
Amount Per Cent Amount Per Cent
Top 4 555,964 31.30 33,001 46.20
Top 8 769,677 43.30 41,853 58.62
Top 20 1,006,836 56.60 55,909 78.31
Top 50 1,274,729 71.70 66,736 93.47
Total 1,778,300 100.00 71,393 100.00
Source : Summary of Tables II-3 and II-4.
But how high is "high"? How high does concentration 
have to get before all these ill effects the Supreme 
Court has told us about will probably start to appear? 
How does one go at translating the theory into prac­
tice? Economists have spent a lot of time trying to 
identify the structural "boundary line" between effec­
tive competition and effective monopoly. The sub­
stance of their findings seems to be something like 
this: If a particular industry is sufficiently
unconcentrated that its four largest firms hold no 
more than about 40 per cent of its total sales, no 
competitive problems are likely to appear. Prices 
will tend to remain low, quality and service will 
tend to remain high, and all the other virtues of 
competition mentioned by the Court will tend to 
remain in evidence. If, on the other hand, the 
four largest firms in a particular industry or mar­
ket account for more than 50 per cent, the proba­
bilities start to go the other way . . . .  Below 
that 40 per cent point on the 4-firm concentration 
scale, we tend to have pretty effective competition; 
above the 50 per cent point on it, the symptoms of 
monopoly tend to start showing up.l
Samuel A. Smith, "Price Discrimination, Sales Below 
Cost, and Antitrust Vulnerability," Antitrust Law and Econo­
mics Review 6 (Winter 1972-1973): 71-72.
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Why should this be so? Economic theory tells us that 
economies of scale serve as a barrier to entry, and thus 
enable the firms in the industry to be more "monopolistic"—  
to have greater control over price and output. One of the 
earliest studies of the effects of concentration was con­
ducted by Professor Joe S. Bain, and published in 1954. It 
dealt specifically with selected manufacturing industries, 
but some of the principles enunciated have wider application. 
His study tended to show that, "If a plant or firm needs to 
supply only a negligible fraction of industry output to be 
reasonably efficient, economies of scale provide no deterrent 
to entry other than those of absolute capital requirements."^
If the life insurance industry "too" concentrated?
Not "legally" according to the definition of lawyer Smith.
But obviously there is a tremendous variation in size between 
the top few firms and the vast majority. Yet there are 
profitable firms in all size ranges. A recent study reported 
in the Journal of Risk and Insurance  ^ concluded that the most 
profitable size for life insurance companies is probably in a 
range beginning at $100 million of annual premium income, and 
extending to the very largest companies. The author asked
Ijoe S. Bain, "Economics of Scale, Concentration, and 
the Condition of Entry in Twenty Manufacturing Industries," 
American Economic Review 44 (March 1954); 16.
^S. Travis Pritchett, "Operating Expenses of Life 
Insurance Companies, 1961-70: Implications for Economies of
Size," Journal of Risk and Insurance 40 (June 1973): 157-165.
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E. Jay O'Keefe, President of Western National Life Insurance
Company of Amarillo, Texas, to comment. After discussing
several factors affecting profitability, he stated;
A research of history would probably disprove 
Professor Pritchett's optimum size beginning at 
$100 million of annual premium income. There 
must be several hundred companies which have 
reached profitability long before reaching this 
level, and maintained it thereafter. Western 
National's premium income for 1973 was a little 
over $16 million, and we have been operating at 
a profit for years. My conclusion is that it 
would be very difficult to pick a size as a 
rule of thumb.1
If there are no significant economies of scale to
serve as barriers, a greater degree of competitiveness will
exist. The situation postulated by Professor Joskow in the
study previously cited would not prevail:
Substantial cost advantages for the very large 
scale operations could indicate substantial barriers 
to entry and the possibility that large firms could 
set prices substantially above marginal cost without 
provoking competitive entry. At the same time the 
presence of a large number of small, high cost fringe 
firms may indicate that the large companies . . . have 
succeeded in keeping prices above the competitive 
level, thus protecting inefficient producers. This 
latter phenomenon will most likely occur only if 
entry at optimum size is difficult.^
If the situation described above did exist, an 
industry might normally be expected to be in violation of 
antitrust laws. Life insurance is partially exempt, however.
^Letter, June 13, 1974.
2paul L. Joskow, loc. cit., p. 384.
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as will be described in the next chapter.^ Some would justify 
this exemption on economic grounds, while others would explain 
it politically. Fritz Machlup is among the latter.
Some vested interest groups have been able to 
persuade the Congress that they should be exempt 
from the antitrust laws because of the special 
circumstances prevailing in their industries or 
trades . . . .
The case of insurance is especially interesting 
because the courts had long held that insurance was 
not a part of commerce and hence not covered by the 
antitrust laws. After the Supreme Court declared 
the insurance business was subject to the Federal 
antitrust laws (U. S. vs. Southeastern Underwriters 
Association, 322 U. S. 533 (1944)). Congress was 
high-pressured into passing a law exempting it again 
for all practical purposes.2
On this basis, perhaps Professor Machlup would agree 
in part with the conclusions of a study by Louis M. Kohlmeier, 
Jr., who wants to do away with regulatory agencies and rely 
on antitrust actions when consumers are not satisfied with 
the discipline of the market place, "Antitrust is, as regula­
tion attempted to be, a political policy addressed to indus­
trial economies. The policy of antitrust is to foster
^One student of government regulation has stated: 
"There are certain collusive practices, such as agreements 
among insurers not to file lower rates and boycotts denying 
reinsurance privileges to those who do so, which can still 
be prosecuted under the Sherman Act. And mergers of insur­
ance companies located in different states, being beyond 
state control, can probably be prevented under the Celler- 
Kefauver Act." Clair Wilcox, Public Policies Toward Busi­
ness , 4th ed. (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
1971), p. 610.
^Fritz Machup, The Political Economy of Monopoly; 
Business, Labor and Government Policies (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press, 1952), pp. 212-13.
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competition; the policy of regulation, formal or informal, 
is to suppress competion."^
As a regulated industry with firms of widely varying 
sizes, life insurance is obviously not of an atomistic 
nature. The few large firms might seem to indicate oligopoly, 
but the lack of effective barriers to entry (other than regu­
latory requirements), and the independent pricing policies • 
rule this out. Thus, it seems clear that the market struc­
ture most closely conforms to monopolistic competition as 
first described by Edward Chamberlin. A key factor is 
indicated by Professor Peter Asch of Rutgers College, "The 
notion of monopolistic competition may be seen to follow
from the observation that one particular market imperfection
o
is almost universal: product differentiation."" Chamberlin
had described this as follows:
A general class of products is differentiated if 
any significant basis exists for distinguishing 
the goods (or services) of one seller from those 
of another. Such a basis may be real or fancied, 
so long as it is of any importance whatever to 
buyers, and leads to a preference for one variety 
of the product over another.3
^Louis M. Kohlmeier, Jr., The Regulators; Watchdog 
Agencies and the Public Interest (New York, Harper & Row, 
Publishers, 1959), p. 294.
2peter Asch, Economic Theory and the Antitrust 
Dilemma (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1970), p. 39.
^Edward H. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic 
Competition, A Re-orientation of the Theory of Value, 7th 
ed., (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 56.
(italics added).
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As will be brought out in the next section, the pro­
ducts of the life insurance industry are highly differen­
tiated.
There are other characteristics of the life insur­
ance industry which might be mentioned, but the above should 
serve to define it sufficiently so that its behavior and 
performance can be analyzed. Two relatively new develop­
ments will be mentioned, however, although it is too early 
to tell just what their impact will be.
One of these, which began around 1967, is the forma­
tion of insurance-oriented holding companies. According to 
Best's Insurance Reports-Life/Health, the purpose of this 
movement is to gain greater flexibility of operation. "These 
holding companies in some cases have established goals of 
meeting all the financial needs of their customers."^ There 
is a danger that such an organization would allow companies 
to "move their assets around" and make effective regulation 
more difficult.
A related movement has been " . . .  the establishment
of relationships with mutual funds by more than 200 life
2
insurance companies." This has been motivated by a desire 
to "regain that portion of the consumer savings dollar that 
in recent years has gone into other forms of savings.
^Best's Insurance Reports, Life/Health 1973 (Morris­
town, New Jersey: A. M. Best Co., 1973), p. ix.
2lbid.
3Ibid. See also p. 206 of this study.
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Undoubtedly new patterns of organization will develop 
in the future. The life insurance business is often thought* 
of as very conservative and slow to change because of the 
long-term nature of its contracts. Yet the volume of funds 
which it handles demands that it be ever alert to changing 
conditions in order to remain a viable part of the economy.
Behavior
Behavior, or conduct, is a very broad term, yet it
can have much to do with the competitiveness of an industry.
To some it may mean the vigor with which a firm's officers
pursue a goal, and the nature of the goal— profit maximization,
increased sales or a certain share of the market. To others
it may mean a trade-off between quality and price. Or, as
George W. Stocking uses the term in Workable Competition and
Anti-trust Policy, it may mean;
The strategy resorted to by a firm in seeking to protect 
an advantage it already has . . . .  Strategy is the 
weapon of a firm operating in an imperfectly competitive 
market, but resort to strategy is not necessarily incon­
sistent with workable competition . . . .  it may lead 
to improvement of processes and products . . . (or) it 
may serve to isolate a producer from the impact of 
competition . . . .^
Behavior can only be evaluated in the light of struc­
ture, and in turn it is reflected in performance. What are 
some of the unique behavioral characteristics of the insur­
ance industry?
^George W. Stocking, op. cit., p. 124-5.
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Varieties of Policies
As mentioned above, the products of the industry are
highly differentiated. Looking at the Texas companies alone,
the tremendous variety of policy provisions would seem to
indicate almost endless types of life insurance. All of
them can be classified into one of three main types, however:
term insurance, whole life, and endowment.^
Term insurance policies give protection for a
2
"definite and limited period of time." If death occurs 
during the policy period, proceeds are payable to the bene­
ficiary. If the insured survives the term, the policy 
expires and the contractual relationship is terminated.
There are many varieties of term insurance, and it is often 
used in combination with other types of insurance. There is 
a school of belief that this is the least costly form of 
insurance— and therefore the most desirable. In the 1973 
session of the Texas Legislature a bill was introduced which, 
if passed, would have prohibited the sale of any other type 
of life insurance within the State.^
■ The following descriptions are adapted from Davis W. 
Gregg, ed.. Life and Health Insurance Handbook, 2nd ed. (Home­
wood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1953), Chapters 4, 5,
and 6.
^Ibid., p. 37.
^Forrest C. Roan, Chief Clerk of Insurance Committee, 
House of Representatives, Interview, June 8, 1973, Austin, 
Texas.
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A more prevalent type of insurance is whole life. 
Unlike term insurance, it provides permanent protection, 
and the insurer promises to pay the face value of the con­
tract when the insured dies. According to the Life Insur­
ance Fact Book, whole life contracts represent almost one- 
half of the life insurance in force in the United States.^ 
This type of insurance is composed of ordinary or straight 
life contracts, under which premiums are paid for the 
balance of the insured's life; and limited payment contracts, 
under which premiums are paid for life, or until the expira­
tion of a stated period, if the insured is living at that 
time.
The third general type is endowment insurance. It 
provides for the payment of the face amount of the policy 
upon the death of the insured within a specified period, 
and also for the payment of the face amount at the end of
the period, if the insured survives. It is a "combination
2
of savings and protection," as is the whole life policy, 
explained above, but has a greater emphasis on savings. The 
whole life policy has a greater emphasis on protection.
There is another set of classifications used which 
relates more particularly to the market than to the product. 
These categories are: ordinary life, group life and indus­
trial life. Under this classification, ordinary life is a
^Life Insurance Fact Book 1973, p. 27. 
2
Davis W. Gregg, op. cit., p. 63.
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product sold to an individual, whereas group life is sold 
to an organization. Group life may be paid for either by 
the insured or the organization, or some combination of the 
two. Industrial life is of declining importance in our 
nation, though at one time it was quite significant. These 
policies are relatively small, but the distinguishing charac­
teristic is that the premiums are usually collected weekly 
by agents at the homes of the policyholders rather than 
being paid monthly, or less frequently, by mail or bank 
draft.
These classifications reveal little of the almost 
endless varieties of life insurance policies. In Texas all 
policy forms must have the approval of the State Board of 
Insurance, and one member of the Board stated that "hundreds" 
come each week for approval.^ Of course, many of these may 
be similar, or even identical. Mrs. Freda Pogue, the Chief 
Actuary of the Oklahoma Insurance Department, pointed out 
that much of the similarity arises because of the desire of 
a company to be "competitive." She stated that an agent will 
frequently make a copy of a policy issued by a competitor 
and send it to his home office with a request for a similar 
policy to s e l l .2 Probably Texas agents follow a similar 
practice.
^Durwood Manford, Interview, June 21, 1973, Austin, 
Texas. Not all of these are life insurance forms, as will be 
brought out in Chapter V.
City.
^Mrs. Freda Pogue, Interview, August 6, 1974, Oklahoma
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The extent to which a company can go in differen­
tiating its product is illustrated in a pamphlet issued by 
Southwestern Life of Dallas, one of the largest Texas com­
panies. Under the heading, "We Offer Help in 100 Ways" is 
the following list:
For people in search of exactly the right pro­
tection Southwestern Life offers more than 100 modern, 
flexible plans. Plans for individuals. Families. 
Businesses. Employee Groups.
Basic policies that provide cash for final expenses, 
monthly income for dependents, for full payment of the 
home mortgage.
Educational policies for college.
Retirement policies that guarantee a lifetime 
monthly income.
A single family policy that insures father, mother 
and children.
Business and estate protection plans.
Annuity plans that guarantee a lifetime income.
Employee benefit plans with a wide range of bene­
fits to choose from.
And if your search extends to mutual funds and 
variable annuities, we can still help. They are avail­
able through our agents who are registered representa­
tives of Southwestern Management and Research Corpora­
tion, an affiliate company.1
When all the optional features are considered, the 
variety of life contracts must be very extensive. One lead­
ing authority in the life insurance field gives this explana­
tion for such a variety, "There are many so-called specialty 
policies. These usually are designed to fit an elaborate
^"Search," Southwestern Life Insurance Co., Dallas,
Texas.
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sales presentation, rather than perform a real service for 
the buyer.
Such a proliferation of policy types will obviously 
be confusing to the customer. Elizur Wright, often called 
the "Father of Life Insurance" in the United States, wrote 
in 1873;
It would be easy, for one possessing the gift, to 
write a highly comic chapter on the various schemes 
adopted by the companies to attract business and 
get ahead of each other . . . the business, a mix­
ture of insurance and accumulation in all possible 
and ever variable proportions, was as incomprehensible 
to the simple customer as the marketman's sausage or 
the boarding-house keeper's hash. All the more for 
this reason was it susceptible of no end of tricks 
variations, short cuts and mirages.2
The situation which Commissioner Wright perceived 
continues today, in the sense that the insurance contract 
is complicated and difficult to understand. The average 
customer is unwilling, or unable, to take the time and effort 
to see exactly what the policy provisions mean. Robert Dorfman 
points out the results of such inability to make a reasoned 
choice :
If the consumer has no basis for judging the satis­
faction that a commodity will give him, or if he is 
easily misled, then he cannot be expected to attain 
the highest indifference curve that his budget per­
mits, and no claim can be made for the efficiency of 
relying on consumer's choice. Indeed, there is likely 
to be a positive inducement to mislead consumers when
^Joseph M. Belth, Life Insurance, A Consumer's Hand­
book (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 180.
^Elizur Wright, Politics and Mysteries of Life Insur­
ance (Boston: Lee and Shepard, Publishers, 1873), pp. 185-6,
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they are unable to appraise the quality or serviceability 
of commodities offered.!
Such a situation normally induces a demand for govern­
ment intervention in the market. Professor Dorfman's analysis 
continues, "Society is likely to intervene in those markets 
either by requiring disclosure of information or by substi­
tuting the appraisal of competent judges for those of indi- 
vidual consumers." This intervention can come in the form 
of government restriction on what can be sold, or on who is 
allowed to sell. Both are in evidence in the field insurance 
field.
The Hearings before Senator Hart's committee men­
tioned in Chapter have included much criticism of the 
industry for failure to provide needed information to con­
sumers. The importance of this information was emphasized 
by the Federal Trade Commissioner, Mary Gardner Jones, speak­
ing to the Life Office Management Association in 1970:
There is no other industry where the need for com­
plete, factual information is more vital than in 
the insurance industry. If a consumer misconceives 
the type of insurance coverage he thinks he is pur­
chasing, his very livelihood can be threatened.
She stated that the industry's record in meeting its 
responsibilities had been "uneven," and further stated that
^Robert Dorfman, Prices and Markets (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 140.
2Ibid., p. 141.
^See pp. 12 and 13,
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most state insurance regulatory authorities did not have the 
expertise and resources to provide adequate protection for 
insurance-buying consumers.^
The theoretical consequences of this inability of 
buyers to make reasoned judgements are described by J. 
Hirshleifer in discussing the costs of searching for infor­
mation. He describes the typical situation as asymmetrical 
in that the seller knows the quality of the product, but the 
buyer does not. He says such a situation,
. . . may lead to what is called "adverse selection" 
in insurance jargon. Suppose that buyers can only 
judge quality by the average level in the market.
Then sellers with inferior products are encouraged 
to offer them for sale— while those with superior 
products are correspondingly discouraged . . . .
(There is) a temptation to sellers to deliberately 
degrade the quality of the product in response to 
buyer ignorance.2
To the extent this might be done, there is some 
justification for governmental regulation and intervention. 
This regulation must deal with a market where there is not 
only a complicated product, but a number of market imperfec­
tions.
Market Imperfections 
Based on Alfred Marshall’s description, the fore­
going analysis would seem to indicate clearly that the market
^Mary Gardner Jones, quoted in Joseph Diamond, "FTC 
Official Hits Gyps in State Control," The National Under­
writer, Life and Health Insurance Edition, October 10, 1970, 
p. 20.
p
J. Hirschleifer, "Where Are We in the Theory of 
Information?" American Economic Review 43 (May, 1973): 37.
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for life insurance is far from perfect; " . . .  the more 
nearly perfect a market is, the stronger is the tendency for 
the same price to be paid for the same thing at the same 
time in all parts of the market . . . ."^ In classical 
economic theory such a market would be characterized by:
(a) a large number of buyers and sellers, (b) a homogeneous 
product, (c) free entry of firms into and exit from the 
industry, (d) perfect mobility of factors of production, 
and (e) perfect knowledge on the part of buyers and sellers. 
Obviously, there would be only one price in the market for 
each product.
Many persons are of the opinion that there are no 
price differentials in life insurance. While this may be 
true within a company (except for such things as quantity 
discounts for larger policies, or a differential based on 
the payment period), it is far from true within the market 
as a whole. From the published information on premiums some 
comparisons were made, and are summarized here. (It is not 
suggested that the premium is an exact representation of the 
cost, but it is used as an approximation.)
Companies whose rates reflected additional features, 
such as insurance paid-up at age 85, 90, or 95; endowment
^Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, 8th ed. 
(London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1920), p. 325.
^Premiums for most "ordinary life insurance" are pay­
able during the entire life of the insured (or to the age of 
100).
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TABLE II-6
COMPARISON OP PREMIUMS OF PARTICIPATING POLICIES 
ISSUED BY 137 COMPANIES AND NON-PARTICIPATING 
POLICIES ISSUED BY 143 COMPANIES 
Ordinary Life Policy Per $1,000 on $10,000 Policy
Males, Age 35
Premium Number of Companies
Per $1,000 Participating Non-Participating
$15.00 - 15.99 3
16.00 - 16.99 3
17.00 - 17.99 1 27
18.00 - 18.99 2 74
19.00 - 19.99 3 33
20.00 - 20.99 5 3
21.00 - 21.99 16
22.00 - 22.99 32
23.00 - 23.99 43
24.00 - 24.99 21
25.00 - 25.99 4
Total No. of
Companies 137 143
Mean $22.88 $18.47
Standard Deviation 1.17 1.31
Source; Best's Flitecraft Compend 1974 (Morristown, New
Jersey; A. M. Best Co. , 1974).
at 96; or waiver of premium in case of disability, were not 
included. As many of the Texas companies were in this cate­
gory, no separate calculation was made for them. If discounts 
for larger policies were included, the variations would be 
much larger.
In comparing the life insurance market to the classi­
cal model a number of differences are apparent. There are a 
large number of buyers and sellers, but the product is highly
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differentiated.- There may be perfect knowledge on the part 
of the sellers, but it is available to buyers only at con­
siderable cost. As will be shown more explicitly in the 
next chapter, there are specific regulatory barriers to 
entry (including capital requirements). From the stand­
point of mobility of factors of production, labor and capi­
tal are the most critical. Labor, in the form of agents, 
is continually moving into and out of the industry. The 
long-term nature of many insurance investments restricts 
the movement of capital very considerably.
With discriminatory pricing of a highly differen­
tiated product, there is a great deal of non-price competi­
tion.^ Is there price competition? The figures cited in 
Table II-o above would seem to indicate that there is. 
Professor Belth states in one of his studies, "The author 
does not object to price differences. He does object, how­
ever, to the widespread ignorance about those price differ- 
ences." He further makes several suggestions for helping 
overcome this ignorance, but acknowledges that;
Each . . . would involve substantial organizational 
problems, all stemming from the fact that it is 
impractical, if not impossible, to perform a reliable 
price analysis without the aid of an electronic com­
puter and agents and buyers do not have ready access 
to such equipment.3
^The newspaper and magazine advertisements listed in 
the Bibliography make this very clear.
2joseph M. Belth, "A Report on Life Insurance," 
Research Report No. 4, Bureau of Business Research, Graduate 
School of Business, Indiana University, 1967, (Mimeographed) 
p. 92.
3lbid.
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As mentioned above, the premium paid may be regarded
as the "price" of life insurance, but is is a very inexact
measure of the "cost" to the consumer. A number of ways of
determining the "true cost" have been proposed,^ but none
is satisfactory to all the industry and the regulatory
authorities. The so-called "interest-adjusted" method is
currently receiving the most support. William H. Abell, a
former Chairman of the Institute of Life Insurance, writing
in the January, 1974, issue of Insurance, states.
In recent months the ALIA, the Institute and NAIC 
(National Association of Insurance Commissioners) 
endorsed the use of interest-adjusted cost index, 
until a better method of cost comparison was 
devised. This was at least a partial response to 
the consumer request for more realistic cost 
figures.2
In 1973, Arkansas began requiring the use of this 
index, and it is now (after two postponements) to be 
required in Texas beginning September 15, 1974.^
Each company will need to furnish the information 
to its agents— probably through an additional column in the 
rate book. It is not something the agent could calculate 
easily, as shown by the following exerpt from the Texas
^Joseph M. Belth, The Retail Price Structure in 
American Life Insurance (Bloomington; Bureau of Business 
Research, Graduate School of Business, Indiana University, 
1966), p. X. (This book contains a very extensive analysis 
of various ways of computing costs.)
^William H. Abell, "The Set of Our Sales," Insurance, 
January 1974, pp. 18-19.
^Orders No. 26809 and 27022, Texas State Board of 
Insurance.
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State Board of Insurance Order No. 26809.
Section 4. INTEREST ADJUSTED COST COMPARISON INDEX DEFINED, 
(a) The interest adjusted cost comparison index for level 
premium plans of insurance shall be calculated by applying 
the following steps:
1. Select the 5 year, 10 year or 20 year period 
over which the analysis is to be made.
2. Determine the cash value (and terminal divi- 
dent, if any) applicable at the end of the 
period selected.
3. For participating policies, accumulate the 
annual dividends at 4 per cent interest com­
pounded annually to the end of the period 
selected and add this accumulation to the 
result of step 2.
4. Divide the result of step 3 (step 2 for non­
participating policies) by an interest factor 
that converts it into a level annual amount 
accruing over the period selected in step 1.
If the period is 5 years, the factor is 5.633;
if the period is 10 years, this factor is 12.486; 
and if the period is 20 years, the factor is 
30.969.
5. Subtract the result of step 4 from the annual 
premium payable.
6. Divide the result of step 5 by the number of 
thousands of the amount of insurance to arrive 
at the Life Insurance Adjusted Cost Comparison 
Index.1
The use of such an index of cost is too new for its 
effects to be judged with any degree of accuracy. Prospec­
tive purchasers may not even ask for it, or it may become a 
crucial factor. Based on this study, the writer has found 
that there are reasons other than price for buying a partic­
ular policy which have been important in the past, and will 
continue to be so in the future. Among these, confidence 
in the agent and confidence in the company play an important 
part.
Iprder No. 26809, Texas State Board of Insurance.
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As an indication of the relative interest in price 
and other factors when purchasing life insurance, an informal, 
unscientific poll was made of the 206 members of the Amarillo 
Rotary Club by means of the letter in Appendix A. Usable 
replies were received from 156 members, or 75.7 per cent.
The replies are tabulated in Table 11-7.^
These business and professional men were not partic­
ularly price- conscious. . As shown in Table II-7, less than 
twenty per cent indicated price as a reason for purchase.
It is entirely possible that some of those who checked the 
category "the provision of that particular policy," had 
price in mind, but it must not have been foremost in their 
thinking. A majority of those who checked the category 
"other" gave as their reason "need for additional coverage," 
or something similar.
TABLE II-7
REASONS EXPRESSED BY MEMBERS OP AMARILLO ROTARY 
CLUB FOR PURCHASING LIFE INSURANCE
Reason
Reason Two
Multiple Reasons 
Three Four Total
Per
Cent
The Cost 13 8 5 2 28 17.9
Policy Provisions 24 16 6 3 49 31.4
The Agent 21 10 5 3 39 25.0
The Company 2 8 5 3 18 11.5
Other 17 3 2 0 22 14.2
77 45 23 11 156 100.0
^Some answers indicated more than one reason for pur­
chase. They were counted as one-half, one-third, or one-fourth, 
respectively, for each reason, in order that the total answers 
would agree with the number of replies received.
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The principal conclusion to be drawn from this seems
to be that many life insurance customers are not primarily
interested in price. Professor Belth said in this regard:
Life insurance should never be purchased solely on 
the basis of price. It is vitally important that 
the insurance be fitted to the individual's needs, 
that the financial strength of the company unques­
tioned, and that the claims integrity of the com­
pany be beyond reproach.!
Confronted with such a situation, regulatory efforts 
might be more properly directed to other aspects of the 
business. There will be further elaboration of this point 
in Chapter VI.
It is also possible that consumers behave in this
way because they lack knowledge about the product, and rely
on the agent or the reputation of the company. Tibor Scitovsky
calls this the "uniformed market," and lists it, together with
economies of scale, as a means of restraining competition by
limiting entry.
A market is uninformed when the average buyer in 
the market has an incomplete idea of the goods or 
services he buys, and judges their quality not by 
his own standards but on the basis of advertising 
and indexes of quality. By indexes of quality, 
we mean trademarks; the reputation, size, nation­
ality, and age of the manufacturing or distributing 
firm; inessential but eye-catching features of the 
good itself; the price of the good— in short, any­
thing by which the uninformed buyer is likely to 
judge quality.2
!joseph M- Belth, "A Report on Life Insurance," Research 
Report No. 4, Bureau of Business Research, Graduate School of 
Business, Indiana University, 1967, (Mimeographed), p. 37.
^Tibor Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition: The Economics 
of a Fully Employed Economy (Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
1951), p. 333-4.
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This would seem to be a fairly accurate portrayal of
the market for life insurance. Scitovsky comments further
about competition in such a market:
When, however, competition is restricted by the 
uninformed nature of the market, the price maker's 
behavior and the nature of restricted competition 
assume additional aspects . . . .  First of all,
. . . in the uninformed market there is a tendency 
for competing products to become similar to each 
other; second, advertising assumes special impor­
tance in the uninformed market and contributes to 
keeping the market uninformed; and finally . . . 
prices tend to become an index of quality in such 
markets, which in turn leads to price discrimina­
tion. ^
In the insurance market advertising and other forms 
of non-price competition certainly take on special impor­
tance- They are extensively used. Prices may not generally 
be taken as an index of quality, but some agents whose pro­
ducts are priced higher than others are known to claim that 
as a mark of quality.
Problems of Cost Determination and Accounting
The sellers of life insurance, though generally much 
better informed than buyers, are far from having "perfect 
information" about the market, or even about their own costs. 
Life insurance companies face an even more complicated prob­
lem than that which Fritz Machlup says confronts all sellers;
Quite apart from the problems of calculating the 
unit cost of production, the mere adding up of 
expenses to obtain a total cost figure contains 
many controversial issues. It may be easy to add
^Ibid., p. 398.
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the total outlays made over the lifetime of the 
firm; but if a shorter period is taken it is 
difficult to decide how much of the past outlays 
should be charged to the period in question, how 
much of the outlays during the period should be 
charged to future periods, and how much of the 
future outlays should be charged to the production 
of the given period.1
Many students of the industry have acknowledged the
unique difficulty of determining costs of life insurance. A
doctoral dissertation presented at the University of Wisconsin
summarized some of the thinking as follows:
The various cost components of an insurance rate are 
not as readily determined and measured by management 
for their marketing and pricing decisions as the 
situations of other industries. For the insurance 
firm, the determination of direct and indirect costs 
and losses is not merely an intellectual exercise in 
cost accounting, but involves highly subjective, and 
in some cases sophisticated, mathematical techniques 
which attempt to minimize the error on the decision 
making effort rather than pinpoint exact quantities 
and values.2
A doctoral dissertation at the University of Texas 
examined insurance accounting practices in greater detail, 
and illustrated the uniqueness of such practices by recount­
ing the experience of a CPA with one of the large stock life 
insurance companies. He resigned three years after receiving 
his CPA, saying that "in order to make use of the accounting 
theory he had learned, it was necessary to seek employment
^Fritz Machlup, The Economics of Sellers Competition 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1952), p. 17.
^Halim Iskander Bishara, "An Analysis of Insurance 
Company Financial Insolvencies and the Public Interest" 
(Ph.D. dissertation. The University of Wisconsin, 1961), 
p. 4.
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somewhere other than in the life insurance industry."^
A textbook in life insurance accounting pinpoints
one of the strange features of the established procedures:
We find ourselves, for example, with an established 
method of annual statement accounting which says, in 
effect, that the new business of a given year repre­
sents a loss irrespective of the soundness of the 
business written. We know that this is not so, or 
we would not devote so much time and effort to our 
vital job of selling insurance.%
Sales Maximization as a Goal
In courses in principles of economics students are
taught that maximization of profits is the primary goal of
economic enterprise. More advanced study reveals additional
motivating forces.
Most marginal analysis of the equilibrium of the 
single firm rests on the assumption that the busi­
ness firm attempts to maximize its profits. To 
make this assumption is not to deny that the men 
who run a business may be motivated also by other 
considerations.^
In the life insurance field the other consideration
is primarily size— measured by the amount of insurance in
^Dale Ellsworth Armstrong, "An Examination of External 
Financial Reporting Practices and Underlying Accounting Prin­
ciples Applicable to Life Insurance Companies" (Ph.D. disser­
tation, The University of Texas, 1952), p. 17.
^Joseph C. Noback, Life Insurance Accounting (Home­
wood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1969), p. 302. This
situation arises because it takes about $15 to $20 of surplus 
funds to put $100 of new business on the books. The bulk of 
the agent's commission is paid out of the first year's pre­
mium, fixed expenses must be paid, and unearned premium 
reserves must be set up as well as reserves to cover policy 
liabilities.
3pritz Machlup, The Economics of Sellers Competition,
p. 47.
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force. Economists of various points of view have endorsed
such a goal. Joan Robinson stated it this way:
What is the aim of the entrepreneur . . .  ? It is 
for the firm first to survive, and secondly to 
grow. To this end he must pursue profit, but he 
must avoid action which, though profitable in the 
present, will damage his future position . . . .1
Growth as a goal has also been supported by William
2
Baumol. His position has been endorsed by John Kenneth
Galbraith, as explained in a recent article in Modern Age
by Harold Demsetz:
One of the more clearly stated of Galbraith's 
beliefs is Professor William Baumol's hypothesis 
that large corporations willingly sacrifice pro­
fits in order to grow more rapidly. This proposi­
tion plays a central role in the logic of the New 
Industrial State, because it provides a pattern of 
corporate behavior that is consistent with Galbraith's 
judgment that technostructure oriented firms increase 
output too rapidly.3
The tremendous effort which most companies put into 
selling would seem to bear out this hypothesis. And proper 
cost accounting for the new business, as brought out in the 
previous section, is very difficult. In the very short run 
a life insurance company can increase output significantly 
solely with an increase in selling expense. This is done
^Joan Robinson, Collected Economic Papers, 2 vols. 
(Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1964), 2:225.
^William J. Baumol, Business Behavior. Value and 
Growth (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1959), Chapter 6.
^Harold Demsetz, "Advertising in the Affluent 
Society," Modern Age 18 (Winter 1974): 16.
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by most companies once or twice a year with a "Salute-the- 
President Month," or some similar promotion among the agents. 
The increased business will require use of additional sur­
plus, and a little extra work in the home office. But the 
only other direct expense would be the prize for the winning 
agent or agents. This could be as expensive as a trip to 
the Company Convention, or as modest as a plaque to hang in 
the agent's office.
The contrast of such a situation with that found in 
other types of industry has been analyzed by Paul L. Joskow 
of M.I.T.:
The comparison of sales concentration ratios for 
insurance firms with those for manufacturing enter­
prise probably overstates the relative degree of 
control of the firms in the insurance industry.
Insurance firms can easily expand output in the 
short run with little or no increase in "capacity," 
and both output and capacity in the long run by 
obtaining more equity capital if such expansion is 
desirable to compete with a particular company which 
gets out of line in terms of price. Particular firms 
can vary output and "capacity" much more quickly and 
with less cost than could a steel or automobile firm.l
Specific Marketing Problems 
There are some problems in making those sales, however, 
which are unique to life insurance. Perhaps the most perva­
sive is the cost of distribution of the product. The Seventy- 
Fifth Anniversary Edition of The National Underwriter contains 
a report of a speech by management consultant Peter Drucker 
on this point:
Ipaul L. Joskow, loc. cit., p. 381.
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You have the highest selling costs of any industry 
. . . .  A hell of a lot of money spent in selling 
is always an indication of not thinking, especially 
when it shows that the demand is there . . . .  What 
does all this in effect indicate? You have substitu­
ted selling for marketing. You have built up a huge 
selling staff, and you are getting marginal results.
It is high pressure selling which is exactly what 
you don't need.^
Another problem peculiar to the industry is "twist­
ing." This involves the efforts of an agent to induce a 
customer to drop the insurance he is carrying and take out 
a new policy with the agent's company. There is more 
involved here than there would be in selling a Ford to buy 
a Chevrolet. All the "Guides" of the Pennsylvania Insur­
ance Department contain this warning;
If you are going to switch policies (that is, 
drop one policy to pick up the policy of another 
company), you should be especially careful in 
making your decision.
Many switches are not advantageous to the 
policyholder, and merely produce extra commissions 
for the agent.
Regulations of the Pennsylvania Insurance 
Department require that before you switch policies, 
you get expert advice in writing from the agent 
involved so that the switch will, in fact, be 
advantageous. You should also discuss the pro­
posed switch with the agent who sold you the policy.
The Texas Insurance Code 1969 prohibits, as an 
Unfair or Deceptive Act, the making of any derogatory state­
ment about the financial condition of any insurer, or state­
ment to injure any person engaged in the business of insurance.2
^Reported in William Macfarlane, "Consumerism: No
Longer a Non-Word," The National Underwriter, Seventy-Fifth 
Anniversary Edition, 1972, p. 224.
2code, Chapter 21, Article 21.21, Section 4(3).
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There are various reasons for such a rule. A per­
son's age or condition may have changed so that the insur­
ance would be more costly. The two-year period during which 
suicide is not covered may be a factor. Likewise, after 
two years the policy becomes incontestable.^ And, most
critically, the insured may not understand all the factors 
2
involved.
A letter in The Wall Street Journal states that 
much of the insurance business of Equity Funding was of 
this nature;
Long before its explosive collapse. Equity Funding 
was known as the prostitute of the life insurance 
business. Why? Because its sales were largely 
replacement sales. Their techniques preyed on the 
ignorance of policyholders . . . .
The practice is universally condemned in the industry,
but it crops out most often with representatives of new
^"By this provision of the contract, the company agrees 
not to set up as a defense any error, concealment, misstate­
ment or even fraud, on the part of the insured after the policy 
has been in effect a certain length of time." (Huebner and 
Black, op. cit., p. 168.)
2lt should not be overlooked that proscription of 
twisting can be viewed as an anti-competitive device. It 
was so viewed in the Study under the auspices of the Temp­
orary National Economic Committee in 1940. "In fact, many 
life companies have made a determined effort to eliminate 
competition among themselves . . . .  The so-called replace­
ment agreement to which the great majority of American com­
panies have subscribed is another effort in this same direc­
tion in that the signatory companies have in effect bound 
their agents not to disturb for any reason insurance already 
in force in another company." (Investigation of Concentra­
tion of Economic Power, Monograph No. 28, "Study of Legal 
Reserve Life Insurance Companies." Senate Committee Print,
76th Congress, 3d Session, Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1940, p. 235.)
3John M. Hazlett, Letter, The Wall Street Journal 
April 29, 1974, p. 9.
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companies trying to compete with the "image"— and the well- 
trained agents— of the established companies.^
The industry suffers, as do some others, from decep­
tive and misleading advertising. In the case of life insur­
ance the particular problem is with mail solicitation. The 
critical factor is that if a customer buys through the mail 
a policy from a company not licensed to do business in his 
state, he has little recourse in case of unsatisfactory 
service.^
Insurance companies, of course, face all the prob­
lems that any business encounters. Those listed above 
deserve special mention, however, because they are somewhat 
unique to this industry. To determine how well the industry 
meets these problems, and others, some analysis will be made 
of the results of the industry behavior, operating within 
its organizational structure.
Performance
Economists are concerned with the effectiveness with 
which an industry jusifies its existence. Many questions are
iThese problems are outlined in a doctoral dissertation 
from the University of Pennsylvania. "Among the difficulties 
that a new insurance carrier faces are: competition from old
established companies to obtain business; difficulty in writ­
ing the better class of risks; and competition for agents, 
with the resulting need to pay higher commissions than those 
paid by the old established companies." Archie John Nichols, 
"The Liquidation of Insurance Carriers in the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Pennsyl­
vania, 1961), p. 2.
^The Deputy Commissioner of the Oklahoma Department 
of Insurance, Gerald Grimes, stated in an interview in Okla­
homa City, August 6, 1973, that the greatest problem in this 
area is with companies domiciled in Pennsylvania.
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asked concerning prices, profits, rate of innovation, evi­
dence of monopoly activity, and overall benefits to society,
Benefits to Consumers and Society as a Whole 
The literature of the life insurance industry is 
replete with references to its benefits to society. On the 
first page of statistics in the Life Insurance Fact Book is 
a listing, "Benefit Payments in the United States." The 
1973 edition shows these figures_,for..1972:
Payments to Beneficiaries $8,007,000,000
Payments to Policyholders
and Annuitants 10,567,000,000
Total $18,574,000,000
Health Insurance
(paid by Life Companies) 9,675,000,000
Statistics concerning the numbers of policyholders 
and amount of insurance were given in Chapter I of this 
paper. An additional figure of interest is employment. 
During 1972 an average of 1,530,000 people were employed 
in the insurance business in the United States.^
The industry is naturally concerned with the pro­
longation of life and has supported much research in this 
field.
The focus of individual company contributions and 
research grants has been in the areas of biomedical 
research, delivery of health care services, and pre­
ventive medicine . . . .  A Medical Research Advisory
^Life Insurance Fact Book 1972, p. 7. 
^pp. 2-3
^Life Insurance Fact Book 1973, p. 9,6.
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Committee has recently been established by the
Association of Life Insurance Medical Directors
of America in cooperation with the Institute of
Life Insurance.!
Critics of the industry take an entirely different 
approach. In this field, as others, Ralph Nader has become 
a leading spokesman. He was called as the first witness 
before Senator Hart's Subcommittee in its study of life 
insurance in 1973, and listed the following points as an 
overview of "the findings of our present testimony." He 
did not make any statement about the process which led to 
these findings.
1. Life insurance tragically fails to suffi­
ciently protect its ultimate consumers— the 
widows and children— from the financial risk 
of premature death of the breadwinner . . . .
2. Through deceptions and inadequate information, 
the life insurance industry dupes husbands into 
shortchanging their wives and children by buying 
too much of the wrong kind of insurance (or too 
little of the right kind) at excessive prices.
3. Because there is little or no communicated price 
competition, the high expenses of the life insur­
ance industry— virtually all borne by the con­
sumer— are a national disgrace.
4. The "quiet" concentration of economic power by 
this industry has been substantially ignored by 
Congress, by the academic community and by citi­
zens who are mistakenly asked to believe that 
competition over agents and empty advertisements 
is value competition.
5. The SEC has bended to the will of insurance giants 
to block or delay accounting reforms that would 
put life insurance profit reports on an equal 
footing with other industries.
6. Criticism of the industry is responded to with 
collateral irrelevance, semantic nullities or
llbid., p. 105.
72
private attempts to remove academic critics from 
their teaching positions. Instead of rational 
argument, company or trade association spokesmen 
use pompous pointification or a kind of patronizing 
insurance patriotism with roots deep in the indus­
try's chauvinistic past.
7. Vietnam veterans and other servicemen and women are 
being victimized by an on-going military-insurance 
interlock at the Veterans '■ Administration and the 
Department of Defense.1
Impact of Regulation 
Several of these statements represent value judgments 
about which reasonable men may disagree. The point of most 
interest to economists it the matter of price competition.
Are there the sort of "abuses" traditionally associated with 
monopoly— high prices and restricted output? Because of the 
difficulty of classifying costs, it is not really possible to 
say at what point on its average cost curve the industry 
operates. The expense of distribution (selling) is high, as 
noted, yet if this cost were substantially reduced, would 
output similarly decline? Again, the information is not 
available to answer this question. Overriding this whole 
question is the difficulty of ascertaining what costs really 
are— both to the company and to the consumer. Certainly con­
tinued study is needed.
The opposite side of the price question is perhaps 
a little more easily answered— has there been "cut-throat"
^U.S. 93rd Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary. 
The Life Insurance Industry, Hearings Before the Subcommittee 
on Antitrust and Monopoly. Cong., 1st Sess., 1973, p. 7.
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competition which produces inferior products and drives firms 
out of business? No doubt there has been some, but the advan­
ces in actuarial science are helping to buttress companies 
against this danger. A report by the Staff of the Texas 
Legislative Council in 1954, listed the following as most 
frequent causes of insolvency (This study included life, 
fire and casualty companies, and covered all types of 
fraternal and mutual aid companies, which are a very insig­
nificant portion of the industry):
Questionable Agency Balances 
Abnormal commissions and allowances 
Insufficient business volume
Possible falsification of cash and investments 
Unauthorized withdrawals or use of funds 
Questionable premium receivables^
A doctoral dissertation at the University of Texas
in 1961 discussed life insurance company insolvencies under
these headings;
Inept management
Improper management practices
Law violations
General lack of insurance knowledge
Bad faith by company management and agents
While these studies may cover conditions which are 
not representative of the industry as a whole, there is little 
indication that "cut-throat" competition has been a major
^Texas Legislative Council, "Insolvency in the Texas 
Insurance Industry, 1939-1954," Table XXV, p. 182.
^R. E. Thomas, "A Study of the Causes of Recent Texas 
Insurance Company Failures" (Ph.D. dissertation. University 
of Texas, 1961).
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cause of company failure.
Impact of Regulation on Insolvency 
Any company failure is a cause for concern on the 
part of regulatory officials. Some of the fault may lie with 
them as well as with the company. This section will consider 
the impact of regulation on insolvency. Even though recent 
legislation will mitigate adverse effects of company failure 
on policyholders; stockholders, creditors, and employees 
will suffer losses.
The whole question of insolvency is important in 
judging the performance of the industry. The State Commission­
ers have indicated their concern by sponsoring a study to 
devise more adequate early-warning tests of impending finan­
cial trouble.^ The use of these tests should enable regula­
tory officials to detect much impending trouble before it 
reaches a stage sufficiently critical to cause insolvency.
Thus, more regulatory effort can be devoted to prevention of
2
company failure rather than to dealing with its aftermath.
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
contracted with McKinsey & Company, Inc., to study all aspects 
of State regulation. One of their reports deals with such 
tests, "Improving the Life and Health Early Warning System," 
April 12, 1974. See also pp. 169-171.
^The Texas Insurance Commissioner, Clay Cotten, stated 
in an interview in Austin on June 21, 1973, that he had spent 
several years trying to work out the problems of Girard Life 
(see pp. 178-179, infra), and also a great deal of time with 
Century Life. Professor Belth described the latter situation 
and concluded, "Presumably the Texas Insurance Department did 
the best it could with a bad situation." Joseph M. Belth,
Life Insurance: A Consumer's Handbook (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1973), pp. 177-8.
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The cost accounting problems of the industry, coupled 
with the long-term nature of its obligations, make it diffi­
cult to determine actual solvency conditions. Professor Belth 
concludes the report of one of his studies with this summa­
tion, "It is impossible, at least in the absence of an effec­
tive crystal ball, to determine the amount of assets that a 
life company should possess at any given time in order that 
it will certainly be able to meet its future obligations."^
Innovations
Another traditional measure of industry performance—  
and the last to be considered here— is the rate of innovation. 
There are three aspects which might be considered; company 
administration and management, investment practices, and 
industry products. The first of these is not significantly 
different for the life insurance industry from the practices 
found in other industries, and will not be considered in 
this study.
Changes in our economy have spurred changes in both 
of the other aspects— perhaps more slowly than needed, but 
more than many have realized. There was a time when the 
industry, traditionally conservative in investment pattern, 
regarded common stocks as too risky. Prior to World War II,
Joseph M. Belth, "Observations on Solvency in the 
Context of Life Insurance Regulation," Journal cf Risk and 
Insurance 34 (December 1967): 557.
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such investments were prohibited in many states. From
slightly more than two per cent of company assets in 1945,
common stock investments had risen to over 11 per cent at
the end of 1972.^ Some of this increase has come at the
expense of investment in real estate mortgages. In 1972
this form of investment had declined to thirty-two per cent
of assets from a high of thirty-eight per cent in 1967.
There are new features in many of these investments, however:
To an increasing degree, equity participations in 
the form of warrants or other profit-sharing arrange­
ments (equity "kickers" in the jargon of the invest­
ment officer) are linked to bond and mortgage invest­
ments acquired by life insurance companies. The 
object is clearly to compete more effectively with 
mutual funds and private noninsured pension plans.^
Regulation has undoubtedly slowed this whole process—
whether wisely or not is a value judgement which cannot be
fully answered here. The existence of such regulation has
in some cases stimulated structural changes in the industry.
But not all legislators have moved fast enough to 
suit the more ambitious insurance companies. Stock 
companies like Aetna, Connecticut General and National 
Life and Accident of Nashville have found a solution 
in using the holding-company umbrella. The life com­
pany and the real estate subsidiary are no longer 
directly connected; both are now subsidiaries of the 
holding company. Since the real estate subsidiary is 
divorced from the life company, it is unregulated and 
can operate without interference from the insurance
examiner.4
iLife Insurance Fact Book 1972, p. 70.
Zibid.
^Murray E. Polakoff, et al., Financial Institutions 
and Markets (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970), p. 145.
^Sanford Rose, "The Future Largest Landlords in 
America," Fortune, July 1970, p. 134.
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In the product line there have also been changes, 
with the variable annuity receiving the most attention. The 
increasingly close relationships between life insurance com­
panies and mutual funds has already been mentioned. This 
relationship reflects the attempts of the industry to meet 
the problems of inflation, and to meet the competition of 
other savings institutions.
One study of innovation in the field concluded that, 
"The most common source of new products for a life insurance 
firm is an analysis of competitor's products, which means 
that the idea is new to the firm but not to the industry.
To the extent that this is true, there will be little 
or no impediment from regulatory authorities. But genuine 
innovations will usually require regulatory approval, with 
its attendant delay. In the next chapter the history of 
this regulatory process will be reviewed, based on the 
industry characteristics which have created a demand for it. 
The groundwork will be laid for specific discussion of the 
Texas regulatory system in Chapter V.
^William Rudelius and Glenn L. Wood, "Life Insurance 
Product Innovation," Journal of Risk and Insurance 39 (June 
1970): 180.
CHAPTER III
HISTORY OF INDUSTRY REGULATION
The previous chapter has examined the structure, 
behavior and performance of the life insurance industry. 
During the discussion, numerous references were made to the 
regulation of the industry. Therefore, this chapter will 
consider the characteristics which created a demand for 
regulation, and examine briefly the early forms in which 
it was expressed. Following a survey of the changing legal 
basis for regulation, two investigative activities which 
had a significant impact on the industry will be examined: 
the Armstrong Investigation of 1905 in New York, and the 
study conducted by the Temporary National Economic Committee 
in 1939 and 1940. The present elements of State regulation 
will be listed, and the chapter will close with a considera­
tion of some of the issues in the continuing controversy 
between advocates of State and Federal regulation.
Characteristics Which Created A 
Demand for Regulation 
In a very broad sense, regulation in any industry 
comes about when the discipline of the marketplace does not
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produce results which are satisfactory to a sufficient body 
of consumers. The dissatisfied group may be large or small, 
but must have enough interest— and influence— to substitute 
some form of political (administrative) decision-making for 
that which the market would create. Professor Kahn identi­
fies this segment of the economy in the following way;
There are at least two large chunks of the economy 
that the competitive model obviously does not des­
cribe or even purport to describe. These are the 
huge and growing public sector, the allocation of 
resources to which is determined not by the autono­
mous market but by political decisions, and the 
public utilities, in which the organization and 
management is for the most part (in the United 
States— not in most other countries) private but 
the central economic decisions are subject.to 
direct governmental regulation.^
With rather limited exceptions^ the life insurance 
business is in the regulated category, yet it is not usually 
considered to be a "public" utility. The boundaries of 
public utilities are not rigidly fixed, but they are gener­
ally assumed to include: (1) local and interregional trans­
portation, (2) light and power generation and distribution, 
(3) telephone service, and (4) municipal facilities for 
water and sanitation. The public utility status imposes
^Alfred E. Kahn, op. cit., 1:2.
^In 1911, the State of Wisconsin, in order to pro­
vide low-cost insurance, and a "yardstick" for regulation, 
set up a State Insurance Fund. It has never become a large 
operation, and has not been copied. (Spencer L. Kimball, 
Insurance and Public Policy (Madison: University of Wiscon­
sin Press, 1960), p. 58). The various programs of the Federal 
Government for military personnel, though large in dollar 
amount, are a very small proportion of the life insurance 
business. These and the Federal Social Security program are 
outside the scope of this study.
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certain obligations; (1) to serve all in the market area 
who desire service and are willing to pay for it, (2) to 
render adequate service in a safe manner, (3) to serve all 
customers without undue discrimination, and (4) to charge 
only a "fair" price. The public's need for these services 
constitutes a justification for limiting entry and control­
ling rates.1
Radio and television services are sometimes included 
in the public utility category, as these industries are 
closely regulated, although regulation of these services 
does not impose all of the above obligations.
Spencer L. Kimball, writing in 1969, said some of 
the regulatory developments " . . .  gave an indication of 
how little difference remained between insurance and the 
classic public utilities." However, he said the process of 
development in this line, " . . .  was not yet complete in 
mid-twentieth c e n t u r y . A t  the three-quarter century mark 
it is still not complete.
One difference is the absence of a legal obligation 
to supply its product to all who demand it (although there 
is an approach to this in states where automobile insurance 
is complusory). Another difference is the lack of a "need"
lAmong recognized works dealing with public utilities 
are: Elmer E. Smeed, Governmental Promotion and Regulation
of Business (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), and
Clair Wilcox, Public Policies Toward Business, 4th ed. Home­
wood, 111: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1971.
^Spencer L. Kimball, op. cit., p. 305.
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test for the chartering of a life insurance company. A 
former Insurance Commissioner of Wisconsin describes this 
very clearly:
Some states have, it is true, attempted to use 
the need for a new insurer as a criterion in deciding 
whether to allow a new company to be admitted. But 
no insurance law that I know of gives the commissioner 
the right to deny a license to an insurer on the 
grounds that the people of the state are already ade­
quately served in that branch of insurance and that 
there is no need for a new company. It should be 
noted that this criterion, so far inapplicable to 
insurance, is one of the prime bases used for deny­
ing permission to organize a new bus line, electric 
company or other public utility in most parts of the 
country. Even in banking, a branch of business 
which shares many of the financial characteristics of 
insurance, a new bank may not normally be opened in 
a given community unless there seems, in the view of 
the authorities, to be a need for it.
Perhaps the greatest difference between regulation 
of public utilities and of life insurance companies is lack 
of rate control. For this reason control is exercised 
through different channels, and the public is perhaps less 
aware of the controls which are exercised.
The special position of the life insurance industry 
was recognized as early as the middle of the last century in 
England.
The nineteenth century efflorescense of laissez-faire 
seemed to divest chartered enterprise of its funda­
mental identification with the public interest. But 
the belief persisted— if anything, grew— that the 
business of insurance had special responsibilities.
An English parliamentary committee decided in 1853
^Allen L. Mayerson, "An Inside Look At Insurance 
Regulation," Journal of Risk and Insurance 32 (March 1965): 
56.
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that the public function of insurance transcended the 
generally accepted principle of (governmental) non­
intervention in matters of trade.1
Various reasons have been advanced to support the 
reasons for this special consideration. In a 1945 book 
which is very favorable— almost laudatory— to the life 
insurance industry, the trust, or quasi-fiduciary concept 
was outlined:
Even if we consider a single company, one of 
many, the financial hopes, the financial salvation 
of hundreds of thousands or even millions of persons 
depend upon the integrity and competence of its 
directors and officers . . . .
Security is not due solely to the nature of 
the business (i.e. actuarial and investment 
principles commonly followed); ignorance, cupidity 
and mismanagement have in the past wrecked more 
than one company. But gradually there has developed 
on the part of life insurance directors and officers 
a trust fund conception of the nature of the busi­
ness which is one of the main reasons for the safety 
it enjoys.2
The behavior of the industry in the way it charges 
for its products helps to explain this concept. The use of 
a level premium builds up an excess of dollars above current 
protection (mortality) costs during the early years of a 
policy. These must be adequate to make up the difference in 
later years when costs of protection are greater because of 
higher mortality rates. Sometimes this money is said to be
Morton Keller,The Life Insurance Enterprise, 1885- 
1910. A Study in the Limits of Corporate Power (Cambridge:
The Balknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 5-6.
^Albert W. Atwood, The Great Stewardship. A Story of 
Life Insurance (New York: Harper and Bros., 1945), p. 135.
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held in a quasi-fiduciary capacity. Spencer L. Kimball, 
whose studies and writing in the field are very extensive, 
states that there is no sort of "trust" involved, however. 
"There is nothing but an ordinary debtor-creditor relation­
ship, just as in most contractual relationships."^
Other characteristics of life insurance sometimes 
cited as justifications for control are the long-term con­
tracts, the complexity of the contracts and the large sums 
of money involved. None of these is sufficient in itself 
to evoke the comprehensive regulations in existence through­
out the nation, but neither can any of them be overlooked.
Former Chief Justice Hughes stressed the long-term
nature of the insurance contract in one of his addresses:
Ordinarily when a man buys an article or commodity 
of some kind he is not particularly concerned if the 
company that sells it subsequently fails. But when 
he buys life insurance he pays premiums over a period 
of years, often a protracted period of years. Thus, 
the safety of the company is of paramount importance 
to him, because the benefits he receives are all in 
the future.2
The complexity of the insurance contract was illus­
trated in the previous chapter with a listing of the many 
types of policies. Anyone who has read a life insurance 
policy form will acknowledge the difficulty of understanding
^Spencer L. Kimball, "The Regulation of Insurance," 
in Insurance, Government and Public Policy, Spencer L. Kimball 
and Herbert S. Denenberg, eds. (Homewood, 111.: Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., 1964), p. 4.
^Albert W. Atwood, op. cit., p. 7.
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ali its provisions. One basic life insurance text describes
the problem in this way:
Since the insurance product is a contract, by its 
very nature it is technical. In most cases the 
insured is asked to purchase a product in which 
he becomes a party to a contract which he has not 
read, and which he would not understand if he did 
read it. The complicated nature of most insurance 
contracts makes them appear to be formidable objects 
to the public, but this is so simply because as con­
tracts, they are enforceable by law and must be pre­
cisely drawn. If the insurance company wishes to 
insure against loss by a specified peril, it must 
make certain that the contract limits coverage to 
that peril. In order to do this, it is often 
necessary to devise a complicated document.1
It may logically be assumed that the insured is less 
knowledgeable about the contract provisions than the company 
which had them prepared. A desire to protect him may well 
serve as an additional justification for regulation.
In the last chapter the listing of assets of some of 
the larger companies gave a clear indication of the amount 
of money involved in life insurance. Spencer Kimball pointed 
out in 1950 that these sums could not be ignored.
In mid-twentieth century, the law faced new prob­
lems arising out of the growth of the business. There 
was vast increase in insurance company assets. How to 
regulate the investment of such assets without dis­
torting the financial structure of American business 
was a new problem for the law. Pressure of such assets 
encouraged a relaxation of the investment regime from 
strict limitation to fixed-dollar investments toward 
greater freedom to invest in equities.2
^Emmett J. Vaughn, General Insurance Fundamentals 
(Iowa City, Iowa: Sernol, Inc., 1965) p. 57.
p. 308.
^Spencer L. Kimball, Insurance and Public Policy,
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From the administrative viewpoint, a study published 
in 1927, which was long regarded as the seminal work in the 
field, stated:
The insurance business is peculiarly one 
"affected with a public interest," in that it 
combined with vast opportunities for social 
welfare, exceptional opportunities for abuse.
It has the glittering lure of "easy money" for 
the unscrupulous and adventurous promoter, and 
the mystery of an unknown technique for the unwary 
insurant. That the activities of the commissioner 
kept out many a small and unsound insurance enter­
prise, many a dishonest or an incompetent agent 
or broker, can scarcely be doubted.1
These reasons have been combined in various ways by 
legislative bodies to justify insurance regulation. Yet the 
statement of William Jennings Bryan, speaking to the National 
Convention of Insurance Commissioners in 1914, serves as a 
good summary:
There is a principle in insurance that is . . . 
fundamental . . . and that is security is the one 
thing that is important above all others . . . All 
the efforts of the State are directed toward the 
security of the insured . . .  .2
Early Regulation
Long before these special provisions came into effect, 
however, there was some type of regulation. The very earliest 
was through provisions of the company's charter. In 1795
^Edwin W. Patterson, The Insurance Commissioner in 
the United States. A Study in Administrative Law and Practice 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927), p. 12.
^William Jennings Bryan, "The Purposes of Insurance 
Regulations," in Insurance, Government and Public Policy, 
Kimball and Denenberg, op. cit., p. 19.
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certain restrictions on investments were placed in the char­
ter of the Insurance Company of North America. In 1799 the 
State of Massachusetts, in a re-incorporation charter, 
required the publishing of financial condition, and made the 
common stock assessable if losses exceeded capital. The 
charter of Aetna Insurance Company in Connecticut in 1819 
contained restrictions on investments and prescribed cer­
tain corporate activities such as election of directors and 
rules concerning the annual meeting.^
Gradually these charter provisions gave way to 
special legislation; sometimes as part of overall corporation 
regulation, and sometimes directed specifically to insurance 
problems. As brought out by Morton Keller's extensive study, 
" (There was) a flow of legislation, especially in the West 
and South, from 1895 to 1903 . . . .  But the practice of 
state control did not necessarily put these instruments to 
effective use.^
The first general life insurance law was passed in 
New York in 1840. It pertained to amounts of insurance which 
could go to a widow free from claims for creditors, and to 
certain rights of children.^ The first states to create
1These items taken from original sources are cited 
in Peter Robert Kensicki, "History of Insurance Regulation in 
Ohio, 1804-1879" (Ph.D. dissertation, Georgia State University 
1972), p. 30. Other significant actions are listed under 
"Historic Dates," in Life Insurance Fact Book, 1973, p. 112.
^Morton Keller, op. cit., p. 199.
^Life Insurance Fact Book, 1973, p. 112.
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-supervisory agencies through boards of Insurance Commissioners 
were New Hampshire (1851) and Massachusetts (1852).^ The 
New York Department of Insurance was created in 1859," . . . 
but did not have the vigor that Elizur Wright bequeathed to 
Massachusetts supervision."^ Mr. Wright, who had been 
appointed one of that State’s Commissioners, was a former 
abolitionist. Apparently he put the vigor of his former 
cause into this new field, for he was subsequently forced 
out of his position by pressure from those in the industry 
who favored more lenient regulation.
From the end of the Civil War till the turn of the 
century there were increasing efforts of the states to regu­
late the insurance industry. Yet they were frustrated in 
many instances through political power, outright bribery and 
incompetence.
Supervisory challenges from Texas, Kansas and Wisconsin 
most keenly tested the companies' political prowess.
Under the influence of Texas Populist Governor James S. 
Hogg, insurance commissioner John E. Hollingsworth 
attacked "the present craze for volume" in 1893 and 
declared that "the trend of insurance legislation of 
late years has been in the interest of the premium 
receiver rather than the premium payer." Charles A. 
Cullberson, Hogg's successor and no Populist, never­
theless inherited his predecessor's hostility toward 
the Eastern insurance firms. In 1895, in the wake of 
Bryan's defeat, he sent off a questionnaire asking 
companies for data on their officers salaries, their 
political contributions and their dinner and wine costs.
^Davis W. Gregg, ed. Life and Health Insurance Hand­
book, 2nd ed. (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1964),
p. 1075.
2
Morton Keller, op. cit., p. 200.
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The Mutual refused to answer— "This is insult. It 
is tyranny," McCurdy (Richard D. McCurdy, President, 
Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York., 1885-1906) 
blustered— and, in harness with the Equitable, engaged 
former Governor Hogg himself as counsel.^
Legal Basis for Regulation 
The influence and attention of the companies was
focused on the states because of a decision of the U. S.
2
Supreme Court in 1869, Paul v. Virginia. Samuel B. Paul 
was attorney in Virginia for the New York Underwriters 
Agency, which was writing insurance in many states. The 
Company instructed Mr. Paul not to comply with a Virginia 
law which required that both a company and its agents 
soliciting business secure a State license. Mr. Paul was 
indicted, convicted and fined $50. The conviction was upheld 
in the State Supreme Court and in the United States Supreme 
Court on the grounds that insurance was not commerce, but a 
local transaction to be covered by local laws.
This decision stood for seventy-five years, during 
which time the rights of states to regulate various business 
activities was strengthened. Among the key cases generally 
cited are the following:
Munn V. Illinois.^  This case is often thought of as 
the foundation on which much public regulation legislation 
has been constructed. Chief Justice Waite cited the English
^Ibid., pp. 210-11.
^8 Wall. 168 (1869). 
^94 U.S. 113 (1876).
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common law doctrine of "private property affected with a
public interest" as a basis for this decision.^
German Alliance Insurance Company v. Lewis, Superintendent
2
of Insurance of the State of Kansas. By this case (fire)
insurance companies were specifically held to be "affected
with a public interest" and thus subject to State control.
Justice Kenna, for the majority, said:
Is the business of insurance so far affected with a 
public interest as to justify legislative regulation 
of its rates? . . .  We have shown that the business 
of insurance has very definite characteristics, with 
a reach of influence and consequence beyond and differ­
ent from that of ordinary business . . . .3
U. S. V. South-eastern Underwriters Association.^ Follow­
ing this line of reasoning, it was generally believed that 
insurance was exempt from the provisions of the Federal anti­
trust statutes. It became common practice for fire insurance 
companies, through their trade associations, to agree on 
common rate schedules. Then, in 1942 the Department of Justice 
secured an indictment against the South-eastern Underwriters
^"This brings us to inquire as to the Principles upon 
which this power of regulation rests, in order that we may 
determine what is within and what without its operative effect. 
Looking, then, to the common law, from whence came the right 
which the Constitution protects, we find that when private 
property is "affected with a public interest, it ceases to be 
juris privati only." This was said by Lord Chief Justice 
Hale more than 200 years ago in his treatise De Portibus 
Maris, 1 Harg. Law Tracts, 78, and has been accepted without 
objection as an essential element in the law of property ever 
since." 94 U.S. 113, 125-6.
^233 U.S. 389 (1914).
3233 U.S. 389, 406,414.
*322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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Association, (which included 198 stock fire insurance companies) 
on the grounds that this Association (acting as a rating 
bureau) constituted a combination in restraint of trade.
The Association (and the individuals included) were 
indicted for two alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act; (1) a conspiracy to restrain interstate commerce by 
fixing and maintaining arbitrary and non-competitive premium 
rates on fire and allied lines of insurance (Section 1), and 
(2) conspiracy to monopolize trade and commerce in the same 
lines of insurance in and among the same states.
Justice Black acknowledged that the Court had upheld
Paul V. Virginia^, but pointed out that those cases had
upheld State statutes, whereas the present case involved an
Act of Congress. His opinion recognized the basis on which
the District Court had acted;
Looking at all the transactions charged, it felt 
compelled by previous decisions of this Court to 
hold that despite the interstate character of many 
of them, "the business of insurance is not commerce," 
and that as a consequence this business, contracts 
and all, could'not be "interstate commerce" or 
"interstate trade.
Justice Black further elaborated on the concept of
"commerce" and the intention of Congress in the Sherman Act:
Ordinarily courts do not construe words used in the 
Constitution so as to give them a meaning more narrow 
than one which they had in the common parlance of the 
times in which the Constitution was written. To hold
^Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 654, 655 (1895). 
New York Life Insurance Company v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 
495, 503-4, 510 (1913).
^322 U.S. 533, 537.
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that the word "commerce" as used in the Commerce 
Clause does not include a business such as insurance 
would do just that . . . .
We come then to the contention, earnestly pressed 
upon us by appellees, that Congress did not intend 
in the Sherman Act to exercise its power over the 
interstate insurance business.
Certainly the Act’s language affords us no basis 
for this contention.!
Justices Reed and Roberts did not take part in the 
hearing or the decision of this case, and it was decided by 
a "majority" of four. Chief Justice Stone wrote a dissenting 
opinion, with Justice Frankfurter concurring substantially, 
but Justice Jackson disagreed partially in his dissent. Thus, 
this case, which changed seventy-five years of practice and 
belief in the industry, was itself the subject of consider­
able difference of opinion. Yet the decision was binding, 
and precipitated new legislation for control of the insurance 
industry.
During the time the South-eastern Underwriters case 
was in the Courts, there was considerable activity in the 
industry directed at the Congress. Bills were introduced 
which would have exempted the insurance industry from the 
provisions of the anti-trust laws, but none passed in that 
form. Others sought exclusive State jurisdiction. The 
objection to this approach is outlined by Elmer E. Smeed:
I3 2 2 U.S. 533, 539, 553.
^Emmet J. Vaughan, op. cit., p. 59.
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An important obstacle, however, was the widespread 
distrust of the ability and inclination of the states 
to regulate effectively. This skepticism was strength­
ened by the fact that the states in the South-eastern 
Underwriters case had not, for many years, controlled 
a monopolistic concentration of economic power which 
was extremely predatory in its conduct. As a result. 
Congress did not go the whole way; new legislation 
provided that the federal antitrust laws should apply 
to insurance "to the extent that such business is not 
regulated by State law.
The bill which finally passed was drafted by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners. It was 
submitted to a conference committee as a compromise between 
those who advocated complete exemption from the antitrust 
laws (the House bill), and those supporting substantial 
regulation (the Senate bill).3 This was the McCarran- 
Ferquson Act, Public Law 15, Seventy-ninth Congress, 1st 
Session. It became law on March 9, 1945.
The key provision was the so-called "moratorium" to
give the states time to enact adequate regulatory legislation.
Sec. 2(b) provided, in part.
That after January 1, 1948, . . . the Sherman Act, . . .
the Clayton Act, . . . (and) the Federal Trade Commission
Act, shall be applicable to the business of insurance to 
the extent that such business if not regulated by law.3
President Roosevelt, in giving his approval to the 
bill, stated his position about the moratorium;
lElmer E. Smead, Government Promotion and Regulation 
of Business (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), pp. 79-80,
^Emmett J. Vaughan, op. cit., p. 59.
^Public Law 15, 79th Congress, 1st Session.
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It is clear from the legislative history and the 
language of this act, that the Congress intended no 
grant of immunity for monopoly, or for boycott, coercion, 
or intimidation. Congress did not intent to permit 
private rate fixing, which the Antitrust Act forbids, 
but was willing to permit actual regulation of rates 
by affirmative action of the states.
This bill is eminently fair to the states. It provides 
an opportunity for the orderly correction of abuses 
which have existed in the insurance business and pre­
serves the rights of the states to regulate in a manner 
consonant with the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the antitrust laws . . .
The question arises as to the "extent" to which State
law must go to conform to the provisions of Public Law 15.
This has been answered in the courts: the effectiveness of
state regulation is not to be considered. The enactment of
a regulatory statute is sufficient.^
This survey of the legal basis for regulation has
dealt with the framework only. The brief references to
political and economic power and pressure cover actions which
were lauded by some and deplored by others. Prior to the
passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act there were two occasions
when interest in the life insurance industry captured national
atttention: The Armstrong Investigation in 1905, and the
investigation under the auspices of the Temporary National
Economic Committee in 1939 and 1940. The circumstances
^Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1944-45 Volume, (New York: Harper &
Bros., 1950), p. 587.
2
American Hospital & Life Insurance Co. v. FTC, 243 F. 
(2d) 719 (1957); National Casualty Co. v. FTC, 245 F. (2d) 883 
(1957); affirmed, 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
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surrounding these two investigations will be considered, as 
evidence of areas of conflict which have arisen around the 
industry.
The Armstrong Investigation, 1905 
The Armstrong Investigation marked a real turning 
point, both in regulatory actions and insurance company 
operations. Prior to that time the larger firms in the 
industry, while generally regarded as sound and conservative, 
were heavily involved in financial power politics. Subse­
quently, though subject to greatly intensified regulation, 
they grew to record size in assets and business in force.
The biographer of Charles Evans Hughes, Chief Counsel 
for New York State Senator Armstrong's committee, described 
the earlier practice in these colorful terms:
It was a triangular arrangement. The "interests" 
controlled the bosses by paying them "boodle"; the 
bosses controlled the legislature by use of this 
money in campaigns; and the legislature protected 
the "interests" in their exploitation of the public.
A study published in 1955 states that assets of U.
S. insurance companies doubled between 1890 and 1900, and
that "This expansion was achieved by a ruthless drive for
more and new business, in the course of which the best
2
interests of policyholders were forgotten." One of the
^Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, 2 vols. (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1951), 1:162.
^George Clayton and W. T. Osborn, Insurance Company 
Investment, Principles and Policy (London: George Allen and
Unwin, Ltd., 1965), p. 192.
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keys to the situation was, according to Spencer L. Kimball,
" . . . the intricate network of interlocking directorates 
by which large financial institutions exercised control of 
much of American economic life."^ This led to a "fractional­
izing" of interest. For example, there was a divided loyalty 
and sense of obligation on the part of a director who served 
both a life insurance company and the bank in which its 
account was kept, or the investment company through which it 
purchased bonds. "This involvement was in sharp conflict
with the industry's need for sound and conservative manage-
2
ment of what were essentially trust funds."
Excellent accounts of the Armstrong Investigation 
are given by Shepard B. Clough^ and Martin K e l l e r .^ A more 
personalized account is found in the biography of Cliarles 
Evans Hughes by Merlo J. Pusey.^ What began as an internal 
difference among the management of Equitable Life spread to 
the entire financial community,^ and led to a full-scale
^Clarence L. Kimball, Insurance and Public Policy 
(Madison; The University of Wisconsin Press, 1960), p. 309.
Zibid.
^Shepard B. Clough, A Century of American Life Insur­
ance; A History of the Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York,
1843-1943 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), Chap. XII,
^Op. cit.. Chapter XV.
5op. cit.. Chapter 15.
G"The fight for the control of Equitable, in short, was
a major battle in a bigger war, the biggest war there was in
the banking and railroad world . . . the railroad fight between 
Messrs. Harriman and Morgan for the control of the Northwestern 
transcontinental railroad companies." (Mark Sullivan, Our 
Times, The United States 1900-1925, 4 vols. (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1930), vol. 3, Pre-War America, p. 42.
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investigation under the Chairmanship of State Senator Armstrong,
and largely dominated by Chief Counsel Charles Evans Hughes.
From the beginning (Hughes) made it clear that 
his primary concern was with the organization and 
government of the companies, with their structure and 
nature as corporate institutions. He recognized that 
this, rather than individual acts of wrongdoing was 
the source of the public's unease.1
The Report of the Committee in February, 1906, recom­
mended specific remedial legislation, including proposals:
1. Relating to the organization of companies, election 
of directors, and conversion of stock into mutual 
companies.
2. Limiting the right to hold real estate, prohibiting 
investment in stocks, and forbidding syndicate 
participating in security transactions.
3. Limiting the amount of new business, expenses of 
operation, and amount of surplus and contingency 
funds that may be accumulated.
4. Forbidding tontine^ dividend plans by requiring 
that mutual insurance companies must distribute 
surplus annually and not otherwise.
5. Dealing with the contents of policy forms and the 
rights of policyholders.
6. Prescribing the detail to be reported in annual 
statements.3
iMerlo J. Pusey, op. cit., p. 252.
2An arrangement whereby a group of persons share cer­
tain benefits or advantages on such terms that upon the death 
or default of any member a part or all of the advantages 
enjoyed by him are distributed among the remaining members 
until on the death of all but one the whole goes to him, or, 
as in most modern insurance tontines, on the expiration of a 
given time (called the tontine period) the whole goes to those 
then remaining in the group. (Webster's New International 
Dictionary, 2nd ed., (1968), s.v. "tontine.")
^Report of the Joint Committee of the Senate and the 
Assembly of The State of New York, Appointed to Investigate 
the Affairs of Life Insurance Companies, in Exhibits. Reports 
and Index of Legislative Insurance Investigating Committee 
(Albany, 1906), Vol. VII.
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stimulated similar legislation in many other states. New 
Jersey, the home of Prudential, conducted a similar investi­
gation about the same time. Reform ardor cooled after a few 
years, and some of the new laws were repealed, but the Arm­
strong Investigation had a lasting impact on the U. S. life 
insurance industry.
The difficulty of translating recommendations into 
action is illustrated by subsequent events in New York. In 
1906 Charles Evans Hughes was nominated by the Republican 
Party for Governor of New York, and was elected. In his 
Autobiographical Notes he tells of the difficulty he encoun­
tered in carrying out his own recommendations;
But I struck a snag in connection with the 
Insurance Department. Otto Kelsey had been appointed 
Superintendent in the preceding May, after the insur­
ance investigation. He was honest but ineffective.
Though he had been in office for seven months, and 
Senator Armstrong and I, in an interview with him 
shortly after his appointment, had stressed the 
necessity for making changes, he had utterly failed 
to clean house. It was plain enough that if the 
state supervision were not wide awake and competent, 
we should have despite the new laws, a recurrence of 
evil practices.!
Governor Hughes asked for Kelsey's resignation, but 
the latter refused. The Governor then asked the Senate to 
remove him, but a close vote after a bitter fight kept the 
Superintendent in office. The next year charges were brought 
against Kelsey, and, after investigation the Governor again
^The Autobiographical Notes of Charles Evans Hughes, 
ed. David J. Darelski and Joseph S. Tulchin (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 136-7.
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asked the Senate to remove him, but the decision was the 
same. Only after Hughes was reelected in 1908 did Kelsey 
resign.^
Temporary National Economic Committee
National attention was drawn to the life insurance
industry a second time during the hearings of the Temporary
National Economic Committee in 1939 and 1940. President
Roosevelt sent a Message to the Congress on April 29, 1938,
in which he made several recommendations for strengthening
the antitrust laws. Included was this passage about the
insurance industry:
The tremendous investment funds controlled by our 
great insurance companies have a certain kinship to 
investment trusts, in that companies invest as trustees 
the savings of millions of our people. The Securities 
and Exchange Commission should be authorized to make 
an investigation of the facts relating to their use as 
an instrument of economic power.2
To implement the President's recommendation, the Con­
gress, on June 16, 1938, passed a resolution.
Authorizing and directing a select committee to make 
a full and complete study and investigation with respect 
to the concentration of economic power in, and finan­
cial control over, production and distribution of 
goods and services.^
As requested by the President, the Securities and 
exchange Commission, through its Chairman, William 0. Douglas,
^Ibid., pp. 137-8.
^U. S. Congress, Temporary National Economic Committee, 
Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power. Hearings 
Before the T.N.E.C., Part 1. "Economic Prologue," 75 Cong.,
3d Sess., 1938, p. 190.
^Public Resolution No. 113, 75th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
June 16, 1938.
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directed the presentation to the Committee of material rela­
ting to the life insurance industry. This began on February 
6, 1939. (Mr. Douglas was a member of the Temporary National 
Economic Committee, which was composed of equal numbers from 
the Executive and Legislative branches of the Federal Govern­
ment. )
At the beginning of the presentation concerning the 
life insurance industry, Mr. Douglas called attention to the 
Armstrong Report, and urged the other Committee members to 
read it. He pointed out that "similar hearings were begun 
in other states, and there resulted a general tightening of 
state regulation of insurance c o m p a n i e s . T h e  first 
specific problem investigated was "insurance company manage­
ments and how they are elected. This is a logical point of 
approach," he said, "since management formulates investment 
policy."2
During the course of the Hearings information was 
gathered from persons representing all phases of the indus­
try; officers and directors, attorneys, management, agents, 
consumers and regulatory personnel. When the Final Report 
was presented to the Senate on March 31, 1941, twelve 
specific recommendations were made about the life insurance 
industry.
^U. S., T.N.E.C., op. cit., February 6, 1939, p. 1162. 
^Ibid., p. 1163.
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The first eight of these recommendations called for 
strengthening of state supervision through more adequate 
financing and better qualified personnel, in order to improve 
examination procedure and give closer regulation and super­
vision of agents and agency practice.
The ninth called for fewer and simpler policy forms, 
and the tenth urged closer supervision of "competence and 
activities of company management." The eleventh urged that 
"The life insurance business should be conducted on a com­
petitive basis, with emphasis on management efficiency rather 
than sales promotion." The last called for changes in the 
conduct of industrial insurance (partly because of great 
losses to consumers through high lapse r a t e s ) A s  mentioned 
in Chapter II, this form of insurance is of declining impor­
tance today.2
In addition to the above, which were adopted unani­
mously, Commissioner Sumner T. Pike of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission,
Personally recommended(ed) a liberalization of 
investment laws to permit life insurance companies 
to invest a relatively small percentage of their 
funds in common stocks which would stimulate 
healthier financial structures and have a whole­
some effect on the economy.3
lu.S., T.N.E.C., Final Report and Recommendations, 
March 31, 1941, pp. 41-2.
2see p. 50.
3Ibid. (These recommendations for liberalization of 
investment laws have largely been accomplished since World 
War II.)
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Commissioner Pike also made a separate statement 
(concurred in by two other members) in which he called for 
"a designated Federal Agency" to have certain powers of 
gathering information and of prohibiting "paying surrender 
values during a limited period" in times of "serious economic 
stress." He also called for an Insurance Advisory Council, 
to advise both Congress and appropriate state agencies, and 
"to assist the states whenever possible in strengthening 
their own regulatory a c t i v i t i e s . T h i s  difference of 
opinion as to the relative merits of state and federal con­
trol continues to the present. The next section will dis­
cuss the usual elements of state control, and will be 
followed by a brief consideration of the Federal-State con­
troversy .
State Regulation 
Each state determines its own requirements for the 
organization of an insurance company. It prescribes certain 
operating procedures for those companies and for foreign
llbid., p. 45. The presentation of the Final Report 
of the T.N.E.C. came at a time when the nation had already 
begun to organize as the "arsenal of democracy." The concen­
tration of defense contracts in four states and "six clearly 
interrelated corporate groups" was accentuating the very 
thing the Committee's study was designed to prevent. (T.N.E.C. 
Final Report, p. 4.) The initial portion of the Final Report 
closed with these words: "Our recommendations are intended
to enable the individual to maintain himself freely, both 
economically and politically. They are not intended to 
extend the power of Government over business or over the indi­
vidual. The purpose of the committee is to suggest such poli­
cies as seem calculated to restrain the continued progress of 
concentration which so obviously is undermining the foundations 
of both free enterprise and free government." Ibid., p. 10.
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(out-of-state) companies desiring to do business within the 
State. These requirements are concerned basically with 
financial integrity (solvency) and with equity, or fairness, 
in operation.
Under the first category, states set minimum require­
ments of capital and surplus necessary for the organization 
of a company. These vary widely, as will be shown in Chapter 
IV.^ Reserves are required for protection of policyholders, 
and acceptable types of investments for those reserves are 
specified. The usual administrative procedures of required 
reports and periodic inspections encompass a variety of 
actions among the states.
The marketing of insurance is regulated by require-
2
ments for policy approval and for licensing of agents. Some 
states have comprehensive regulations pertaining to advertising 
and business conduct; others devote more attention to policy 
provisions. According to one well-known text in the field of 
business regulation, "An effort is made to assure fairness 
in the settlement of disputed claims, some states seeking to
^p. 134.
2
In Texas on August 31, 1973, there were 41,575 Group 
I licenses (legal reserve agents. Art. 21.07-1 Code), and 
20,855 Group II licenses (non-legal reserve agents. Art. 21.07) 
in effect. These figures represent increases of 11 per cent 
and 7 per cent, respectively, over the number in force at the 
end of the previous fiscal year. (Texas, State Board of Insur­
ance, Ninety-Eighth Annual Report for the Year Ending August 
31, 1973, p. vii).
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avoid the time and cost of litigation by providing machinery 
to arbitrate disputes.
In general, life insurance rates are not controlled 
by regulation. Texas follows this pattern, however, rates 
for fire and casualty insurance are not only controlled, 
but are set by the State Board of Insurance. This is a very 
time-consuming function.
As might be expected, the quality of state insurance 
regulation varies considerably. In contrast to some who 
deplore this fact, Clair Wilcox believes" . . . the policy­
holder is protected by the fact that his company must meet 
the standards in every state— and thus in the strictest 
state— in which it operates." He further believes, "On the 
whole, state regulation has operated to assure financial 
soundness and to discourage unfair practices."^
Current Status of Federal-State Controversy 
The controversy has existed for over a century, and 
even if a change were made to Federal control— which the 
writer thinks unlikely— the differences of opinion would not
^Clair Wilcox, Public Policies Toward Business, p. 611. 
The Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner is very diligent in atten­
tion to any claims which policyholders have against the com­
panies, or the Insurance Department, and is widely recognized 
for this in the State and in the insurance industry. During 
an interview in Oklahoma City, August 6, 1973, he provided 
figures for the activity of the Claim Department for 1972, 
showing: incoming mail-16,798, outgoing mail-22,002, tele­
phone calls-13,915 and personal calls by claimants-1,917, 
for a total of 54,632 claims.
2ciair Wilcox, op. cit., p. 611.
104
be reconciled. In 1885 Insurance Commissioner Elizur Wright 
of Massachusetts advocated Federal supervision and regula­
tion:
Inasmuch as insurance is a general interest, and 
every insurance institution should be secured as much 
as possible against the adverse operation of local 
causes, it is difficult for us to perceive why the 
supervision of all insurance companies of every sort 
intended to operate beyond the limit of State lines 
should not be a function of the general government.
There seems to be no less reason for regulating it by 
a national bureau than for taking the census of 
encouraging agriculture or invention by one. Sim­
plicity and economy seem to require it.l
On the eve of the Armstrong Investigation, Senator 
John F. Dryden of New Jersey (1902-1907), the founder and 
President of the Prudential Insurance Company of America, 
introduced a bill for federal regulation of insurance. 
Speaking on November 22, 1904, to the Boston Life Under­
writers Association, he advocated "The Regulation of Insur­
ance by Congress." He spoke of the time and expense involved 
in furnishing to "some fifty (sic)different supervisory auth­
orities or insurance departments (special information) . . . 
which, when furnished, is of no practical use either to the 
state or to the policyholder." He thought " . . .  the time 
has come when it behooves us seriously to consider whether 
relief cannot be had from Congress . . . substituting federal 
regulation of the interstate insurance business . . . for the
^Annual Report of Insurance Commissioner, 1865.
Quoted in John F. Dryden, Addresses and Papers in Life Insur­
ance and Other Subjects (Newark, New Jersey.: The Prudential
Insurance Co. of America, 1909), p. 178.
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present method of oversupervision by some fifty different 
insurance departments.
A more recent expression of a similar position is 
represented by testimony before the Subcommittee on Anti­
trust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
(Senator Philip Hart, Chairman) in its 1969 hearings.
Finance Professor Oscar R. Goodman of Roosevelt University, 
member of the American Risk and Insurance Association, and 
economic consultant to the House Banking and Currency 
Committee, advocated Federal regulation:
It is time for us to realize and accept the fact 
that State regulation has failed to regulate the risk 
of insolvency among insurance carriers. Solvency 
should be the primary purpose of government regulation, 
and this basic need is not met by present State regula­
tion. 2
Similar criticism has been voiced both within and 
outside the industry. In the summer of 1973 an article by 
two staff reporters of The Wall Street Journal was entitled, 
"The States' Regulation of Insurance Companies Often Viewed 
as Farce."3 The criticisms in this article are similar to 
to those expressed by Ralph Nader in testimony before Senator
llbid., pp. 175-6.
^U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 
The Life Insurance Industry, Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on Antitrust and Monopoly, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1940, p. 8950.
^William Blundell and Priscilla Meyer, "The States' 
Regulation of Insurance Companies Often Viewed as Farce,"
The Wall Street Journal, August 21, 1973, pp. 1, 16.
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Hart's Committee.1 Among the criticisms listed are; insuffi­
cient beginning capital requirements, inefficient and incom­
petent examiners— particularly for electronic data processing- 
anachronistic regulations unable to deal with holding compan­
ies, and regulatory agencies which are "creatures" of the 
industry. The story further states that, "Most often (con­
cerns in serious financial trouble) are quietly bailed out 
by state regulators who negotiate behind the scenes to 
forcibly merge them or sell of their policies to well- 
financed larger companies . . . It should be noted that
Joe Hunt, the long-time Insurance Commissioner of Oklahoma, 
has stated that he felt there were many misrepresentations 
in the story.^ Clay Cotten, Insurance Commissioner of
Texas from 1955 to December, 1974, expressed his criticism
of the article in a letter:
I personally resent this article since it is 
based upon matters that happened largely a great 
number of years ago. I did a study for the NAIC 
(National Association of Insurance Commissioners) 
that demonstrated that there was less loss to 
policyholders through state regulation of life 
insurance than to bank depositors. I was further 
able to demonstrate that the loss to policyholders 
was fractional in comparison to the money paid 
to the PDIC by banks for depositor protection. I
am sure you are aware of the fact that in the
State of Texas we now have guaranty acts covering 
substantially all lines of insurance (except title
Ip. 12.
^Blundell and Meyer, loc. cit., p. 1. 
^Interview, Oklahoma City, August 6, 1973.
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insurance, fraternels, farm insurance and some of 
the smaller mutual companies). The article was 
slanted and unfair.1
Another recent Wall Street Journal article dealt with 
the power of insurance lobbies at the State level, and quoted 
David Greenstone, Chairman of the Department of Political 
Science, University of Chicago, as follows;
State legislators typically lack staffs of their 
own, so they must rely on lobbyists for technical 
information and guidance. Press coverage of state 
government isn't as intense as it is in Washington, 
so lobbyists have more room to operate. Finally,
I think history shows that official venality is 
more prevalent at the state level than in Congress.
Given a choice, most industries would opt for state
regulation.2
It is reasonable to expect that state regulatory 
officials would favor continuation of the present system.
It should be noted that Joe Hunt, the long-time Insurance 
Commissioner of Oklahoma strongly favors State regulation.
Ask Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner Joe B.
Hunt on any Monday, Wednesday or Friday what his top 
priority is and you'll get the same answer on Tuesday, 
Thursday and Saturday: "Keeping the feds from regu­
lating the insurance business and competing with 
private industry."
"It's a constant battle," said the Commissioner 
in a recent interview, "to have the answers for those 
Congressmen who keep trying to make hay by saying 
they have found weaknesses in the state regulation 
of the industry."
^Letter to writer, August 21, 1973.
^Jonathan Laing and Frederick Klein, "Industry 
Lobbies are Active and Powerful at the State Level. A Case 
in Point is Illinois Where Insurance Men Possess Great Lever­
age," The Wall Street Journal, June 6, 1974, p. 1.
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"We have a healthy climate for the industry here 
in Oklahoma. The companies have done a tremendous 
job in the economic support they have given this 
state. In fact, we have more than 1,100 companies 
licensed to do business with our residents.
Many industry spokesmen could be quoted in favor of 
State regulation, though some may favor Federal supervision. 
Their views are based on a variety of reasons, both philoso­
phical and practical. Hunter McLean of Fort Worth, Texas, 
whose experiences have included both company direction and 
State Supervision, as Chairman of the State Board, believes
the cost element alone is a significant one:
Pre-emption of insurance regulation by the 
Federal Government is no answer, would only com­
pound the suppression of ideas and progress. The 
expenses imposed on life companies by the S.E.G. 
in connection with the variable life policy is, by 
comparison, a minor concern. The cost and adequacy of 
a Federal regulatory agency is the greatest concern . . .
Nor did the financial disasters of the great 
depression give comfort to Federal regulation, as 
documented by the Temporary National Economic 
Committee, one of the most prestigious and certainly 
the most acclaimed Committee ever appointed by Con­
gress, in its conclusions that costly failures of 
National banks reflected adversely upon the quality 
of Federal bank regulation whereas the modest loss 
from life company failures demonstrated the high 
quality of their State r e g u l a t i o n . 2
^Southern Insurance Regional, A Publication of Insur­
ance Information Institute, July 31, 1973, p. 1.
2william Hunter McLean, former Chairman, State Board 
of Insurance, letter to Don J. Willmon, Dallas, October 4,
1973. Mr. McLean also cited the study made by Commissioner 
Cotten comparing costs of the FDIC with losses from life insur­
ance company failures. "Over a 30-year period, FDIC regulatory 
costs ranged from a high of $830 per $1 million of all bank 
deposits annually to a low of $310 per $1 million of all bank 
deposits annually. Life insurance company failures at that 
time (1938-1967) cost life policyholders 74* per million of 
reserves annually. That record offers no basis for assumption 
that Federal regulation of insurance companies would improve 
upon State regulation for solvency or provide added benefits 
to policyholders."
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Another approach to the problem, and one often over­
looked in the partisan discussion, was brought out by Spencer 
L. Kimball in an address to The Association of Life Insurance
Counsel in 1968:
There is importance to our whole society, altogether 
transcending and overriding industry interests, of some 
fundamental political values urging state level regula­
tion. The very basis of our federal system is at issue. 
Decentralization and dispersion of political power is 
in itself an important value in a democratic society. 
Concentrations of power are bad, per se, and it is 
irrelevant whether the concentrations are in government, 
in labor, or in business . . . .  Finally, I think it 
can be suggested that uniformity is a much overrated 
virtue.1
'/
The economist qua economist may not be able to take a 
position on this last point. However, it certainly cannot be 
ignored. In judging the performance of the industry, various 
standards will be considered. In Chapter VI some of the con­
flicting purposes of regulation will be discussed. It will be 
shown, for example, that restrictions designed to prevent cen­
tralization of economic power may be superimposed on regulation 
of insurance company investments in a way that have nothing to 
do with the safety of the company's finances. Chapter IV will 
describe the industry in Texas to prepare the way for the dis­
cussion of the Texas regulatory system in Chapter V.
Igpencer L. Kimball, "The Case for State Regulation of 
Insurance" in Kimball and Denenberg, op cit., p. 416, 421. Mr. 
Kimball's strong feeling on this point of centralization of 
power may be partially explained by his background. A Phi 
Beta Kappa graduate of the University of Arizona, he attended 
Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar and received a Bachelor 
of Civil Laws degree. After teaching in the Law School of the 
University of Utah, he was appointed Dean of the University of 
Wisconsin Law School in 1968. (Foreword to Kimball and Denen­
berg, op. cit., p. X . )
CHAPTER IV
THE LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY IN TEXAS
The life insurance industry of Texas began during the 
days of the Republic, and was continued during the early days 
of Statehood in a similar manner. The initial efforts were 
designed to meet frontier conditions, and so the industry 
grew in a way quite different from the companies which served 
primarily large population centers. This chapter will des­
cribe the modern industry which developed from that frontier 
beginning, and will indicate how Texas companies and their 
policies differ from the companies and the policies of other 
states. The chapter will discuss the differing problems of 
small and large companies, and will end with an examination 
of the economic and political climate for insurance in Texas.
Early History 
In 1972 Texas had more legal reserve life insurance 
companies (219) than any state except Arizona (388). The 
state in third place, Louisiana, had less than half as many 
(99).1 If all types of non-legal reserve life companies are
^Life Insurance Fact Book 1973, p. 90.
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included, the figure is much larger— 723 as of August 31, 
1973.^ This is a reduction of 30 per cent from the number 
of companies in the early and middle 1950s.^
Many of these companies were created to serve an 
economy which was largely rural and agricultural, with great 
distances between population centers. Under these conditions 
an insurance agent found his prospects widely separated. The 
situation is colorfully described by Hunter McLean, speaking 
at the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Texas Legal Reserve 
Officials Association, when he said:
It was in those decades that Texas law, respon­
sive to this isolation, authorized several types of 
• aid societies or associations to permit the few hun­
dred souls surrounding a hamlet to band together to 
care for each other in the event of death or dis­
ability . . . .
These conditions gave rise to a very large num­
ber of small insurance companies in Texas that have 
been the subject of so much misunderstanding elsewhere 
in the nation, and sometimes in recent years in Texas.
The number of life and disability assessment associa­
tions in Texas grew until in the late 1930's they 
totalled some 1,100. Many were managed by farmers or ‘ 
ranchers. A large number were managed by undertakers, 
a "conflict of interest" and form of "insider trading" 
which in other corporations would send the SEC into 
orbit.
As the insureds grew older, and the assessments for 
death or disability became more frequent and costly, 
younger insureds looked elsewhere, and found legal 
reserve life insurance more suited to their pocketbooks. 
That, coupled with inexpert management, brought hundreds 
of associations to their knees.
^Texas, State Board of Insurance, Ninety-eighth Annual 
Report for the year ending August 31, 1973, p. 7.
^Texas Legislatiye Council, Insolyency in the Texas 
Insurance Industry, 1939-1954 (Staff Research Report #53-5), 
December, 1954, p. 9.
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Their failures or mergers, though most were tiny 
in numbers of insureds, provided the statistical base 
of companies retired in Texas which, in turn, led to 
adverse publicity in the state and in the nation all 
out of proportion to the facts.1
Mr. McLean also outlined the changes through the 
1920s and 1930s when local mutual aid and fraternal benefit 
associations were placed under increasing State regulation.
He stated that, "Many of Texas' finest companies today had 
origins as assessment associations, converted bo limited 
capital stock companies, then converted to full capital 
stock companies." In answering criticism of a regulatory 
system which allowed so many companies to go out of business 
by merger or reinsurance, he stated, ". . . i t  was because 
of strong laws, not for the lack of them, that the companies 
were retired from business."
In considering more recent growth, both in number of ' 
companies and amount of insurance sold, Don Dunham, Deputy 
Assistant Administrator of the Texas State Board of Insurance, 
compared the growth in insurance with the growth in population. 
He stated that the two prime growth areas for insurance since 
World War II have been around Atlanta and in Texas. The oil 
and gas industries, petro-chemical industry, electronic 
industries and NASA have created extensive new markets in
William Hunter McLean, First President of Texas Legal 
Reserve Officials Association and former Chairman, State Board 
of Insurance. Speech, Houston, August 17, 1973, p. 2.
2Ibid., pp. 3-4.
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Texas. "You have the growth where there is a need," stated 
Mr. Dunham.^
This same growth pattern has existed throughout the 
South and Southwest, and undoubtedly has something to do 
with the large number of companies in Arizona. The growth 
in New Mexico from increased governmental activity has been 
accompanied by a marked increase in insurance in that State.
Number and Size of Companies 
This study is primarily concerned with legal reserve 
companies, as they write the vast majority of life insurance 
today. A simplified definition of such a company is given 
in the Life Insurance Fact Book; "A life insurance company 
operating under State laws specifying the minimum basis for 
the reserves the company must maintain on its policies.
An insurance textbook gives a more complete definition and 
explanation:
Life insurance premiums as such are not generally 
subject to regulation by the various state regula­
tory authorities. The adequacy of such premiums 
is regulated indirectly by regulation of reserve 
liabilities. Because of the regulation of policy 
reserves, they have come to be known as legal 
reserves and the term "legal reserve life insurance 
company" has come to be commonly applied to companies 
carrying such reserve liabilities in their financial 
statements. Actually, the states only prescribe the
^Interview, Austin, October 23, 1973. 
2lbid.
^Life Insurance Fact Book 1973, p. 121.
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basis on which minimum reserves are to be calculated, 
the companies being permitted to use any other basis 
which results in reserves equal to or greater than 
those produced by the statutory method. The basis 
is stated in terms of the mortality table to be used, 
the maximum rate of interest to be assumed, and the 
valuation method to be applied.^
The Life Insurance Fact Book and Best's Insurance 
Reports, Life/Health include information on legal reserve 
companies only. The State Board of Insurance issues annually 
a List of Insurance Companies Authorized to Transact Business 
in Texas. This includes all types of insurance companies, 
both domestic and foreign. The list shows the total amount 
of insurance in force for each of the life insurance compa­
nies, as well as the address of the company and principal
2
officers. The Texas Blue Book of Life Insurance Statistics 
is commercially published, and contains financial and operating 
statistics for a three-year period for all life insurance com­
panies authorized to do business in the State. The Annual 
Report of the State Board of Insurance reports the number of 
companies in operation, with names of all new companies, and 
companies which had any change in status during the year. It 
also includes detailed information about the operations of 
all the sections of the State Board. The information in Table 
IV-1 is taken from the Ninety-Eighth Annual Report for the 
year ending August 31, 1973.
^Huebner and Black, op. cit., pp. 374-5.
^The Texas Blue Book of Life Insurance Statistics, 30th 
Annual Edition, 1973 (Dallas: The Record Publishing Co., 1973).
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TABLE IV-1
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES LICENSED IN TEXAS 
AUGUST 31, 1973
Type of Company Texas Foreign Total
Stock Life Insurance Companies 212 371 583
Mutual Life Insurance Companies 10 65 75
Stipulated Premium Life
Insurance Companies! 57 57
Non-Profit Life Insurance Companies^ 1 1
Fraternal Benefit Societies^ 12 27 37
Total 291 464 755
Statewide Mutual Assessment Life,
Health and Accident Insurance
Companies^ 8 8
Local Mutual Aid Associations^ 150 150
Burial Associations^ 79 79
Exempt Associations? 21 21
Total 258 258
Grand Total 549 464 1,013
Source: State Board of Insurance, Ninety Eighth Annual
Report for the year ending August 31. 1973
1a refinement of a burial association or mutual assess­
ment company. It must maintain such reserves as are determined 
by the State Board of Insurance, and may adjust its premiums if 
necessary to do so. (Texas Insurance Code 1969, Chap. 22.)
^This company is Group Hospital Service Inc. (Letter,
Creg Hargis, Clerk, Committee in Insurance, House of Represen­
tatives, July 22, 1974.)
^A Society with a lodge system and representative form 
of government, or a secret fraternity with a lodge system and 
representative form of government may make provision for insur­
ance benefits. (Code, Chap. 10, Art. 10.01)
4only such companies as were incorporated under pre­
existing law, and were actually operating prior to January 1,
1933, are authorized. (Code, Chap. 13, Art. 13.01.)
^Many of these are operated by funeral homes. Their
operations must be confined to a single county. (Code, Chap. 12.)
^A Burial Association must operate under the laws pertain­
ing to a Local Mutual Aid Association (Code, Chapt. 12.), but may 
make payments partly or wholly in merchandise of services, not 
in excess of $150. (Code, Chap. 14, Art. 14.37.)
^"According to the State Insurance Board, the 'Exempt
Associations' are fraternal operations." Letter, Creg Hargis 
Clerk, Committee on Insurance, House of Representatives, July 
22, 1974.
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The total of all Texas companies and associations is 
549. This number is 85 more than the total of foreign com­
panies operating in the State.^ By way of contrast, the 
State of Oklahoma has 54 legal reserve life insurance compan­
ies. This number is a tie with California for eighth place 
among the states in number of companies.^ The total of all 
types of life insurance companies, both domestic and foreign, 
licensed to do business in Oklahoma is 1 , 1 2 6 . 3  Mr. Hunt, 
State Insurance Commissioner, stated that there are more out- 
of-state companies licensed in Oklahoma than in 47 other 
states.4 The President of Western National Life of Amarillo, 
E. Jay O'Keefe, stated, "A company appreciates Joe Hunt.” He 
said his company had no difficulty getting licensed in Okla­
homa, whereas in some states the time involved was as long as 
three years. Querried as to whether this was due to ineffi­
ciency or to give an opportunity for some form of "pay off," 
he said it could be either, but that Western National would 
not pay any form of bribery.^
The term "foreign" is used to denote companies domi­
ciled in other states, and "alien" for companies domiciled in 
other countries. The Canadian companies are often included 
with the U. S. companies, however.
^Life Insurance Fact Book 1973, p. 90.
^Oklahoma, State Insurance Commissioner, Sixty-sixth 
Annual Report and Directory, 1973, p. 6.
^Interyiew, Oklahoma City, August 6, 1973.
^Interview, Amarillo, Texas, December 20, 1973.
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In Chapter II the total assets and insurance in force 
for the fifty largest Texas companies were shown. These com­
panies are listed in Table IV-2 with year of organization, 
initial capital structure, and premium and annuity income 
for 1973.
Only two of these fifty companies are mutuals, whereas 
the five largest companies in the nation, and twenty-six of 
the top fifty are mutual companies. One other of the top fifty 
was organized as a mutual— Republic National, number four in 
terms of assets, and second in insurance in. force.^ One of 
the Texas mutuals. Praetorian, began as a fraternal organiza­
tion, as have others which are not in the top fifty.
Many of the Texas companies have grown by merger and 
combination, whereas the largest companies in the nation have 
expanded through internal growth. Albert W. Atwood, writing 
in 1945 (primarily about the Mutual Benefit Life Insurance 
Company of Newark, N. J.) called attention to this character­
istic :
In numerous lines of industry the larger units have 
become great and all-powerful through combinations, 
mergers, and the absorption of smaller competitors.
This is in no sense the case in life insurance. The 
Mutual Benefit has never merged with any other company; 
it has not even grown by reinsurance. As a matter of
^As mentioned in Chapter I, one of the continuing con­
troversies in the life insurance field concerns the relative 
merits of mutual and stock companies. A strong argument for 
mutualization of all companies is found in Halsey D. Josephson, 
Life Insurance and the Public Interest (New York: Crown Pub­
lishers, Inc., 1970).
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TABLE IV-2
FIFTY LARGEST TEXAS LIFE COMPANIES 
Year of Organization, Initial Capital Structure, 
Premium and Annuity Income, 1973
Company and 
Year Organized
Initial
Capital
Initial
Surplus
Premium &
Annuity
Income
American National (1905) $100,000 $ 20,000 216,137,892
Southwestern Life (1903) 100,000 100,000 148,424,249
Southland Life (1908) 
Republic National (1928) 
converted to stock co.
300,000(1917) not given 
(mutual)
95,298,961
(1930) 100,000 100,000 284,359,442
Great Southern (1909) 119,690 84,254 402,314,551
American General (1925) 250,000 125,000 52,837,545
Fidelity Union (1927) 100,000 100,000 61,794,066
Variable Annuity (1955) 100,000 92,986 63,839,367
Reserve Life (1938) 25,000 not given 90,166,364
Tennessee Life (1955) 
U.S. Life (1968)
100,000 100,000 62,214,005
(formerly Great National) 100,000 200,000 1,353,168
United Fidelity (1920) 
Great American Reserve
500,000 250,000 15,731,416
(1937) 25,000 30,837 
(after 3 yrs.)
29,223,909
Government Personnel Mutual
(1934) (mutual)
Great Commonwealth (1955) 25,000
World Service Life (1947) 25,000
Union Bankers (1953) 422,158
American Founders (1954) 250,000
Southwestern General
(1958) 1,000,000
(took over Universal Life 
& Accident, formed 1927) (50,000)
Transport Life (1958) 
Pioneer American (1946) 
Texas Life (1901)
Group Life and Health 
(1952)
Western National (1944) 
USAA Life (1963) 
American Security (1935) 
United American (1947) 
Praetorian Mutual (1899) 
converted to mutual 
company (1958)
Life of the Southwest 
(1955)
250.000
100.000 
100,000
25.000
35.000 
1,000,000
25.000
25.000
12.500
12.500 
(incl. surplus) 
(incl. surplus)
500.000
(50,000)
250.000
500.000 
not given
12.500 
35,000
1,000,000 
not given 
not given
13
10
27
28 
12
,889,141
,205,943
,311,129
,268,611
,743,727
16,871,824
25
7
5
68
16
10
14
19
(Fraternal Insurance Society) 
(mutual)
25,000 12,500 20
,507,850
,185,037
,231,041
,051,861
,284,268
,513,797
,491,159
,146,360
,261,859
,351,275
TABLE IV-2, continued
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Initial
Capital
Initial
Surplus
Premium &
Annuity
Income
Gulf Atlantic (1962) 500,000 1,000,000 13,340,613
State Reserve (1924) 100,000 100,000 4,148,546
Combined American (1944) 25,000 not given 12,323,140
Lone Star Life (1951) 100,000 5,000 13,760,736
National Farm Life (1946) 25,000 10,000 2,606,971
Gibraltar Life (1945) 250,000 50,000 2,423,460
Great Southwest (1951) (not given) 3,533,434
United Liberty (1953) 100,000 50,000 7,411,466
First Continental (1954) 50,000 50,000 8,856,533
American Capital (1954) 25,000 12,500 3,265,613
Continental Life (1969) 103,000 103,000 1,342,371
Peerless Life (1955) (not given) 1,433,721
American Bankers (1946) 
Eureka Life of America
25,000 12,500 3,967,593
(1953) 25,000 12,500 3,686,845
Coaches of America (1965) 890,000 (including surp.) 8,479,963
Citizens Standard (1953) 40,000 20,000 2,441,670
North America (1948) 30,000 15,000 2,316,668
Employers National (1961) 200,000 800,000 3,868,669
Industrial Life (1945) 25,000 25,000 6,206,702
Republic-Vanguard (1955) 500,000 500,000 2,043,844
United National (1954) 25,000 12,500 1,477,333
Source; List of Companies from Texas Parade, July, 1974.
Year of organization, capital and surplus data 
Best's Insurance Reports, Life/Health, 1973
from
Premium and Annuity Income 
State Board of Insurance,
from Letter, Chairman, 
August 1, 1974
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fact, neither the Metropolitan, the largest of the 
companies, nor any of the other of the largest, has 
attained its present size primarily through the 
merger of absorption of other companies. Nor does 
the practice of interlocking directorates prevail 
among life insurance companies.!
Of the ten largest companies in the nation (ranked by 
assets), only one has acquired another life insurance company.
In 1959 John Hancock acquired Maritime Life Assurance of 
Halifax, Nova Scotia— hardly significant in relation to its 
size.. By contrast, of the top ten Texas companies, all but 
two have acquired, by merger or reinsurance, the insurance 
of other companies. One of these (Tennessee Life) is a wholly- 
owned subsidiary of Philadelphia Life Insurance Company. Repub­
lic National has acquired seven other companies, and Reserve 
Life (mostly by reinsurance), has acquired the business of 
eleven other companies.^
^Albert W. Atwood, The Great Stewardship. A Story of 
Life Insurance (New York: Harper & Bros., 1945), p. 156-7. A
random check of 100 names in Who's Who In Life Insurance (Engle­
wood, N. J.: The Underwriter Publishing Co., 1974) tends to
confirm this last item. The book lists officers, and not those 
who serve only as directors. There were very few shown as 
officers or directors of more than one company. Most of the 
multiple affiliations seemed to be (from the similarity of 
names) with related companies, such as Great American Reserve 
Insurance Company, and Great American of Dallas Fire and 
Casualty Company.
The practice of interlocking directorates with other • 
types of financial institutions is not at all uncommon, how­
ever. It began in the post-Civil War years, as brought out in 
this statement from a well-known text in economic history.
"The more successful investment banks soon discovered that con­
trol of commercial banks, trust companies, and insurance com­
panies would greatly increase their power and influence."
(Gilbert C. Fite and Jim E. Reese, Economic History of the 
United States, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1973), p. 307.)
^Best's Insurance Reports, Life/Health, 1973
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In recent years several of the leading national 
companies have acquired— or organized— fire and casualty 
companies, mutual fund operations and other types of finan­
cial service organizations. These are the result of growth, 
rather than its cause.
The following Tables, IV-3 and IV-4, with information 
from the Ninety-Eighth Annual Report of the State Board of 
Insurance, show changes in companies operating in Texas 
during the last fiscal year.
TABLE IV-3
NEW COMPANIES ORGANIZED OR ADMITTED TO TEXAS, 
SEPTEMBER 1, 1972-AUGUST 31, 1973
Type of Company Texas Foreign Total
Stipulated Premium Insurance Co. 7 7
Stock Life Insurance Companies 7 28 35
Exempt Associations 1 1
Totals 15 28 43
The Annual Report further showed 28 Texas Life Insur
ance companies in Receivership on August 31, 1973, ten in 
Conservatorship and two under Supervision.^ (Actions under 
these conditions will be described in Chapter V.)
A comparison of the amount of business by Texas and 
foreign life insurance companies is taken from the "Summary 
of Information From Annual Statements."
^Ninety-eighth Annual Report, pp. 22-28.
122
TABLE IV-4
NEW COMPANIES ORGANIZED OR ADMITTED TO TEXAS 
Between September 1, 1972, and August 31, 1973
Texas Reinsured 
Companies or Merged
Dissolved or 
Withdrawn
Permanent
Receivership Total
Stipulated Premium
Insurance Cos. 1 1 2
Stock Life Insurance
Cos. 7 2 1 10
Local Mutual Aid
Associations 5 1 6
Local Mutual Burial
Associations 1 1
Exempt Associations 1 1
Statewide Mutual
Assessment Cos. 2 2
16 5 1 22
Foreign Companies
Stock Life Insurance
Companies 2 2
Totals 18 5 1 24
Source for both above tables : State Board of Insurance 0
Ninety-eighth Annual Report , p. 14.
The figures in Table IV-5 confirm the overriding impor­
tance of legal reserve life insurance in Texas (98 per cent of 
the total), and further show that Texans have about twice as 
much life insurance with companies in other states as they have 
with domestic companies. Figures are not available to show how 
much was purchased in other states. The influx of population 
to Texas in the last quarter-century would indicate a substan­
tial amount of the latter. The total premiums and annuity con­
siderations collected by Texas companies (on Texas business)
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TABLE IV-5
LIFE INSURANCE IN FORCE IN TEXAS, BY TYPE 
OF POLICY, BY TYPE OF COMPANY,
DECEMBER 31, 1972 
(000,000 omitted)
Type of Company Ordinary Group Industrial Total
Legal Reserve
Texas Companies $17,654 $10,016 $ 439 $28,109
Foreign Companies 29,795 25,428 1,541 56,765
Total $57,449 $35,444 $1,980 $84,874
Other Types of Companies
Stipulated Premium Companies 232
Fraternal Benefit Societies
Texas Societies 3 0 2
Foreign Socities 815
Statewide Mutual Assessment Companies 4 2
Local Mutual Aid Associations 215
Burial Associations 21
Exempt Associations (figures not reported as 
insurance in force)
Grand Total of Life Insurance in Force in Texas $86,502
Source: State Board of Insurance, Ninety Eighth Annual
Report, pp. 31-38.
for 1972 was $590,422,526, and the comparable figure for 
foreign companies was $846,405,536.  ^ Apparently Texas com­
panies are "gaining" on their out-of-state competitors. These 
figures indicate that the new business purchased from Texas 
companies in 1972 was considerably more than fifty per cent 
of that purchased from foreign companies— the relationship 
for total business in force.^
A^nnual Report, p. 31
^This changing pattern is apparently part of a nation­
wide trend. According to William Hunter McLean, "Fifty years 
ago about 90 per cent of the life insurance in the nation was 
being written in companies domiciled in New York or New England. 
Now those companies are writing about half of the new insurance." 
Letter, to Don J. Willmon, June 14, 1972.
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Characteristics of Texas Companies and Policies 
ï'he most obvious characteristic of Texas life insur­
ance companies since World War II has been the increase in 
numbers. The large number of returning service men, and the 
influx of population created the demand; the low entry 
requirements for a limited capital stock company facilitated 
the supply. From 1948 to mid-1952, 150 new legal reserve 
companies were organized in Texas. The state with the next 
largest number was Louisiana, with seventy-seven. Among the 
other states, only Illinois and South Carolina had as many 
as twenty-five.1 At the end of 1953, Texas had 245 legal 
reserve companies and 773 fraternal and assessment associa- 
tions. This latter figure represented one-half the total 
number of such companies in the nation, and the former figure 
twenty-eight per cent of the total.
The 1953 figures are considerably larger than the 
1972 figures reported above. Although the pace of growth in 
number of companies has slowed since the mid-fifties, it has 
not stopped. But larger numbers of companies have been 
retired; some through receivership, but more through merger 
and consolidation.
^Life Insurance Fact Book, 1973, p. 41.
^Best's Life Insurance Reports, quoted in Staff 
Research Report, "Insolvency in the Texas Insurance Industry, 
1939-1954." (Austin: Texas Legislative Council, 1954), p. 9.
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Why and how did this growth come about? The first 
part of the question can be answered in several ways. The 
growth of population, as already mentioned, provided an 
increased demand for the product. The low entry require­
ments made it relatively easy to organize a new company.
Prior to 1958, the operating income of life insurance com­
panies was exempt from federal income taxes, with only the 
"free investment income" subject to taxation.^ This pro­
vision made a life insurance company an attractive financial 
device for the accumulation of capital.
The tax advantages, coupled with the low entry 
barriers, attracted some "promoters" who were not interested 
in building a company, but in selling stock. The great appre­
ciation in stock values that had taken place in a few selected 
companies was used to illustrate the profit possibilities for 
potential investors.
^Huebner and Black, op. cit., p. 754n. "The Life 
Insurance Company Tax Act of 1959 (Internal Revenue Code, 
Secs. 801-820). . . represents a so-called 'total-income' 
approach which involves not only the investment income, but 
also the gain from operations and the capital gains income. 
The 1959 Tax Act made life companies taxable on all their 
income at full corporate rates." Ibid., p. 755.
A further explanation is given by former Texas Board 
Chairman Hunter McLean: "The income tax law does defer taxes
on some of the earnings of life companies in recognition of 
the long-term contracts issued by life companies and the 
possible need for reserves to off-set adverse mortality or 
asset valuation decline . . . .  However, these differences 
from the general corporation tax are not 'advantages' to 
either stockholders or policyholders. If the amounts upon 
which taxes are deferred are not used to repair adversity, 
they are taxed." Letter, William Hunter McLean, Fort Worth, 
August 8, 1974.
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In many cases the initial stock was sold by the
organizers at little or no expense to the company— if the
desire was to build a successful company. Sometimes, however,
the selling expense was substantial, as in the case of the
Union Bankers Life Insurance Company:
The company, incorporated under the laws of Texas,
February 2, 1953, licensed April 6, 1953, and began 
business July 16, 1953. Initial funds were provided 
through the sale of 50,000 shares of Series A no par 
value shares at $0.50 each and 50,000 shares of Series 
B no par value shares at $10 each, which produced 
capital and surplus of $422,158 after payment of sales 
commission of 25 per cent. The Series A shares were 
purchased by the management and the Series B shares 
were offered to the public and special contract 
holders of National Bankers Life Insurance Company,
Dallas, Texas.1
One of the leading companies of Texas is Great Ameri­
can Reserve Insurance Company, which is now owned by the J.
C. Penney Company. It secured surplus by selling stock to 
the public at a higher price than paid by the organizers:
Original capital of $25,000 was sold at par, $10 per 
share, to Travis T. Wallace and C. O. Hambleton who, 
in turn passed over 49 per cent of the stock (1,125 
shares) to trustees for sale at $30 per share, which 
resulted in net surplus contribution to the company 
of $30,837 over the years 1937 to 1940, inclusive.2
In each of these cases the organizers of the company 
were in a position to make substantial profits on their origi­
nal stock when the higher selling price became established.
The subsequent success of these companies justified the higher
^Best's Insurance Reports - Life/Health, 1973. 
2lbid.
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prices, but not all companies were successful. An article in
the Chicago Tribune in the early 1960s describes what happened
in some cases:
When the first "public issue" runs out, a second one 
is floated at a higher price, then a third at a still 
higher price if the market will bear it, and so on.
After a few such flotations, each at a higher price 
than its predecessor, a secondary market is likely to 
develop that is sufficiently strong to enable the 
"founders," if they wish, to unload their original 
stock at a profit of several hundred per cent.
At this stage the initial promoter or team of pro­
moters, who of course are among the holders of 
founders' stock, may do just that and pull out of 
the organization to go elsewhere and do likewise.
When they do, they leave behind no broken laws, but 
a lot of publicly held stock in an insurance company, 
which tho actually operating, has yet to earn— or 
demonstrate that it could ever earn— the accolades 
bestowed upon it in the course of the stock promo­
tion . . . .1
Some of the newly-organized companies offered their 
stock for sale in connection with their policies. In order 
to sell the policy, some special feature was added to make 
it more appealing— thus a specialty, or "gimmick" policy.%
A part of the growth of Texas companies came from such a pro­
cess, but certainly not all of it. Much of the criticism 
which arose during the 1950s concerned inexperienced agents 
who used a "canned" talk to sell such policies. Experienced
^Quoted in Spencer L. Kimball and Jon S. Hanson, "The 
Regulation on Specialty Policies in Life Insurance," 62 Michigan 
Law Review (1963): 174.
2gee p. 129-131 for an explanation of such policies.
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agents generally could not be hired away from established 
companies, so new agents were given information about a few 
specialty policies, but often they had little real knowledge 
of life insurance. A type of appeal frequently used alledged 
that " . . .  rather then spend money on advertising, the com­
pany is creating a special block of policies with particularly 
attractive features to get some business on the books in a 
hurry." The prospect was led to believe that the company 
recommended would be as successful as the examples given.^ 
Whether used in connection with stock sales or not, 
specialty policies are highly controversial. Spencer L. 
Kimball^ and Joseph M. Belth^ have written about them, as 
have many others. The Commissioner of Insurance in Colorado, 
J. Richard Barnes, C.L.U., served as an agent for New York 
Life before being appointed to his position in 1964, and has 
seen the problems which such policies can cause:
In a desperate effort to compete, too many companies 
try to come out with extremely unusual policies which 
may not be profitable for them, extremely high commission 
rates to induce agents to represent the smaller company 
which finds it harder to sell its product, and increas­
ing costs attendant to rapid growth.
^These statements are based on the writer's knowledge 
from having heard such presentations.
^Kimball and Hanson, loc. cit., p. 174.
^Joseph M. Belth, The Retail Price Structure in Ameri­
can Life Insurance (Bloomington: Bureau of Business Research,
Graduate School of Business, Indiana University, 1966), Chapter 13.
^J. Richard Barnes, Commissioner of Insurance of Colorado, 
Letter to writer, July 11, 1974.
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In an industry with a high degree of product differ­
entiation, however, the specialty policy is an effective means 
of non-price competition. An excellent technical analysis of 
such a policy is given by E. Jay O'Keefe, who served as his 
company's actuary before becoming president. His article was 
designed to assist agents not selling specialty policies to 
understand them and meet the competition they posed.
. . . a specialty policy is defined as one which 
combined several insurance and other benefit pro­
visions, so that the insured gets under one contract 
what he might have gotten by purchasing several con­
ventional policies . . . .
It should be clearly understood that this article 
does not intend to accuse nor imply that any company 
which sells specialty policies is a bad company or 
involved in illegal practices, nor to imply that 
the policies are illegal or actuarilly unsound. . . .
This article will seek to show the objectional 
features of specialty policies, and to conclude that 
generally speaking they do not meet the needs of the 
average insurance buyer . . . .^
Mr. O'Keefe gives instructions for calculating the 
premium for each of the death benefits, and then advises the 
agents,
The remainder represents the annual "overcharge" out 
of which the company expects to pay coupons, dividends 
and any other living benefits exclusive of the standard 
non-forfeiture benefits provided by the policy.2
Specialty policies have strong defenders and vigorous 
critics. Kimball and Hanson describe their use:
^E. J. O'Keefe, "Understanding Specialty Policies," 
Life Association News, June, 1968, pp. 89-91.
2Ibid., p. 90.
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First, many of the policies supplement orthodox 
insurance protection with investment features and 
other attractions in order to provide a maximum 
marketing appeal despite admittedly high costs.
Second, various orthodox insurance coverages are 
combined in such a way that benefits vary greatly, 
and cost comparisons with the traditional policies 
becomes impossible. In either of these two ways, 
the specialty company may shift the competition 
from price to another basis.1
Often the specialty policy takes the form of a 
"coupon" policy. The coupons generally mature annually, 
beginning when the second annual premium is paid. They may 
be designed to resemble interest coupons on bonds, or they 
may take some other distinctive appearance. There are many 
types of coupon provisions, but most commonly they provide 
four options: 1) payment in cash, 2) reduction in premium,
3) paid-up additions to coverage or 4) retention to accumulate 
with interest.
The proponents of all types of specialty policies look
on them as a legitimate means of competition— particularly for
new and small companies. This view is forcefully expressed
in "Editorial Comment" in The National Underwriter:
It is a well known fact that for some years the pro­
ponents of life insurance monopolism have been attack­
ing "special policies" because these plans are superior 
to the ones they offer. The intent is clear. They want 
to eliminate the competition these "special policies" 
give them. It is a well known fact that benefit for 
benefit the Eastern Monster Companies cannot compete 
with the superior "special policies" being offered by 
many smaller non-New York companies. Rather than 
adopting the American free enterprise method of creating
^Kimball and Hanson, loc. cit., p. 173.
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better policies of their own to compete with the 
special benefit plans, they seek to deny the American 
public the opportunity to purchase such plans.1
If special policies provide high-cost insurance,
some conflict arises in characterizing them as "superior."
Professor Belth described his efforts to make an accurate
comparison of the costs of such policies, and confessed they
were not very fruitful. He was able to secure data from very
few companies issuing such policies.
The results of the study may be summarized by stating 
that the specialty policies for which sufficient data 
were obtained may certainly be classified as high- 
priced policies, since their prices are substantially 
in excess of the corresponding figures for the low- and 
medium-priced conventional policies (previously analyzed). 
At the same time, it must be emphasized that some of the 
specialty policies studied are lower in price than some 
of the high-priced conventional policies. In this latter 
sense, the study suggests that, if specialty policies 
are to be labelled as excessive in price, it may be 
necessary to attach a similar label to some conventional 
policies . . .  .2
If the price is not excessive, what is the principal 
objection to such policies? It is ease of misrepresentation 
and the lack of disclosure of the portion of the price which 
pertains to the coupon or other specialty. Kimball and Johnson 
acknowledge there is no inherent vice in a coupon policy,
. . provided only that it is not put into the hands of 
people who need something else."^
Quoted in Joseph M. Belth, The Retail Price Structure 
in American Life Insurance (Bloomington: Bureau of Business
Research, Graduate School of Business, Indiana University, 
1966), p. 172.
2lbid., p. 179.
3l o c ., cit., p. 187.
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Many students of insurance, even proponents of 
specialty policies, acknowledge that such policies are sub­
ject to misunderstanding and misrepresentation. The compli­
cated nature of the insurance contract, and the lack of under­
standing on the part of consumers, have already been mentioned. 
If, in addition, there is a deliberate attempt to mislead, the 
buyer of insurance is at a great disadvantage.
The present Texas Insurance Code provides that all 
policy forms must be submitted to the State Board for approval.^ 
This is a relatively recent requirement. The Texas Legislative 
Council, in A Report to the Fifty-fifth Legislature in 1956 
stated;
The most serious problem in the field of legal reserve 
life insurance in Texas today is that of various types 
of policy contracts which are devised and promoted by 
some of the legal reserve companies operating in Texas.
For example, the Board of Insurance Commissioners does 
not have express authority to approve or disapprove 
contracts of legal reserve insurance which are sold in 
Texas . . . .
There are certain types of life insurance policies 
aggressively marketed in Texas today which are contrary 
to the public interest and which are contrived to lend 
themselves to fraud and misunderstanding. This problem 
may be approached in one of two ways: either by requir­
ing approval of all policies by the Board or by specific 
prohibitions against certain types of policies.2
In 1957 the Legislature provided for review of all 
policies before they were used. According to a 1958 study 
by the Texas Research League, this was ". . . t o  prevent the
Içode, Art. 3.42.
^Texas Legislative Council, A Review of the Adequacy 
of Insurance Legislation Enacted by the Fifty-fourth Legisla­
ture . A Report to the Fifty-fifth Legislature. December, 1956, 
p. 68.
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use of provisions which might be unfair, unjust, inequitable, 
misleading, deceptive, or otherwise contrary to law or the 
public policy of the State.
Such review is now an accepted part of regulation, 
but, as with many new regulatory requirements, was not well 
received at first. The 1958 Texas Research League study 
reported :
Life policy approval under new statutory provisions 
has not been a popular regulatory program. The 
statutes, however, require policies to be reviewed.
The controls imposed do not appear to be so rigid 
as to preclude experimentation with new coverages.
They do provide ample authority to prevent the 
sale of misleading or other improper forms.2
At the time of that Report, the Insurance Department 
was receiving each week an average of 200 new policy forms, 
and 30 to 60 resubmissions of rejected forms.3 If innovative­
ness is to be judged by the number of proposed policy forms, 
the companies operating in Texas will rank quite high, for the 
number of forms submitted for approval is now even higher.
In the week ending May 24, 1974, a total of 369 forms were 
submitted to the Policy Approval Section:
85 individual accident and health policy forms 
40 credit life forms 
68 group accident and health 
20 group life forms
10 combination group life and accident and health forms 
156 individual life forms^
^Regulation of Insurance in Texas; The Job to be Done, 
the Needs to be Met, (Austin: Texas Research League, December
1, 1958), p. 34.
2lbid., p. 35.
3Ibid., p. 34.
^Letter, June 5, 1974, Joe Christie, Chairman State 
Board of Insurance.
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Some states have taken more restrictive steps than 
policy approval for certain types of policies. Kimball and 
Hanson state that coupon policies were prohibited in Minne­
sota as early as 1913, and have subsequently been banned in 
other states.1 Such action clearly indicates that Texas is 
not the only state to be confronted with specialty policies 
of various kinds. But the combination of factors present in 
Texas in the 1940s and 1950s created the environment in which 
they were more widely used than ever before. The writer does 
not mean to imply that such policies were the only means of 
growth of Texas companies, but to indicate they were used 
more extensively in this State than in many others.^ Much 
growth came through the sale of conventional policies.
Initial Capital Requirements 
Much criticism has been directed at Texas in the past—  
and some in the present— for the alleged inadequacy of initial 
capital and surplus requirements. According to a study by the 
Texas Legislative Council, the first body of uniform laws 
governing the chartering of stock life insurance companies 
was enacted in 1874, and required initial, fully paid capital 
of $100,000.^ This requirement remained until 1955, when an 
additional $100,000 surplus was required. In 1909, however, 
provision was made for "Limited Capital Stock" life insurance
^Loc. cit., p. 198.
^Don J. Willmon, Interview, Amarillo, October 27, 1973,
^Gammel's Laws, pp. 199-202. Quoted in Texas Legisla­
tive Council, op. cit., p. 12-13.
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companies, with initial requirements of only $25,00 capital. 
Such companies were allowed until 1955. Although none could 
could be formed after that time, existing companies could 
continue under a "grandfather clause."^
The 1956 Report by the Texas Legislative Council 
states that the members of the Board of Insurance Commiss­
ioners (predecessor of the State Board of Insurance) were in 
general agreement that the new requirements ($100,000 capital 
and $100,000 surplus) were adequate.2
Texas still ranks among the three states with the 
lowest requirements in this area, however, as Table IV-6 shows
TABLE IV-6
INITIAL CAPITAL AND SURPLUS REQUIREMENTS 
FOR STOCK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 
AND NUMBER OF LEGAL RESERVE COMPANIES, 
BY STATE, 1972
State
Capital
($000)
Surplus
($000)
Combined Number of 
($000) Legal Reserve 
Companies
Alabama 400 600/400 1,000/800 52
Alaska 200 100 300 2
Arizona 100 50 150 388
Arkansas 250 250/125 500/375 27
California 450 250/225 900/675 54
Colorado 200 100 300 30
Connecticut (no minimum requirement)
Delaware 300 150 450 29
District of Col 200 100 300 10
Florida 500 750/100 1,250/600 28
Georgia 200 200 400 30
^Code, 1969, Art. 3.02, Sec. 2.
^Texas Legislative Council, Report, op. cit. , pp. 12-
TABLE IV-6 continued
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Capital
($000)
Surplus
($000)
Combined
($000)
Number of 
Legal Res. 
Cos. (1972)
Hawaii 200 100 300 9
Idaho 400 400 800 5
Illinois 750 500/300 1,250/1,050 93
Indiana 400 600/50 1,000/450 55
Iowa 350 400 750 27
Kansas 300 300 600 22
Kentucky 500 750 1,250 18
Louisiana 100 200 300 99
Maine 1,000 1,000 2,000 4
Maryland 500 750/500 1,250/1,000 16
Massachusetts 400 800 1,200 17
Michigan 1,000 500 1,500 18
Minnesota 450 225 675 24
Mississippi 200 300/150 500/350 16
Missouri 200 200/100 400/300 42
Montana 100 100/50 200/150 4
Nebraska 200 200 400 31
Nevada 200 500/100 700/300 2
New Hampshire 600 400 1,000 3
New Jersey 200 100 300 15
New Mexico 100 200 300 5
New York 1,000 2,000 3,000 62
North Carolina 200 200/50 400/250 22
North Dakota 150 75 225 11
Ohio 500 600 1,000 43
Oklahoma 250 125 375 54
Oregon Flexible Flexible 500 8
Pennsylvania 1,000 500 1,500 66
Puerto Rico 250 125 375 (not shown)
Rhode Island Flexible Flexible 750 5
South Carolina 150 150 300 35
South Dakota 200 300 500 8
Tennessee Flexible Flexible 1,125/750 20
TEXAS 100 100 200 219
Utah 200 500 700 14
Vermont 250 150 400 4
Virginia 500 300 800 16
Washington 400 400 800 22
West Virginia 750 375 1,125 4
Wisconsin 200* 100* 300* 25
Wyoming 200 100 300 4
*may be set higher by Commissioner
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TABLE IV-6 continued
Source : Capital and Surplus Requirements: Summary of State
Laws and Regulations Relating Thereto (Chicago: 
National Association of Independent Insurers, each 
state separately dated).
Source for Number of Companies: Life Insurance Fact Book,
p. 90.
SUMMARY
Less than $ 300,000 4
Exactly 300,00 10
More than 300,000 but
less than 750,000 16
Exactly 750,000 2
More than 750,000 but
less than 1,500,000 15
Exactly 1,500,000 2
More than 1,500,000 2
Those states which have two figures in the Surplus 
column and Combined column require the higher amount at time 
of initial authorization, with the lower figure acceptable 
thereafter— generally specified as five years. Approximi- 
mately twenty-five per cent of the states (thirteen) are in 
this category. In addition, nineteen states (about forty per 
cent) require additional initial capital if disability insur­
ance or accident and health insurance are written. Texas is 
not in this group.
In Delaware and Maine, after initial requirements are 
met, the Commissioner is authorized to determine the capital 
and surplus which each company must maintain. The decision 
is based on the kinds and amounts of insurance in force. New 
Mexico makes specific requirements for additional combined
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capital and/or surplus based on the annual volume of insur­
ance in force, as follows:
Up to $10 million $300,000
$10 to $25 million 450,000
Over $25 million 675,000
The variety of requirements indicates considerable 
difference of opinion among state legislatures and regulatory 
officials as to the proper provision for initial capitalization. 
States such as Arizona, Texas, and Louisiana, which have encour­
aged the formation of local companies, have among the lowest 
requirements. On the other hand, Illinois and Pennsylvania, 
which have high requirements, also have a large number of com­
panies. There seems to be little discernable pattern in rela­
tion to number of companies and amount of initial capital 
required.
Size alone does not assure strength, nor success. The 
success— and also the failure— of companies of all sizes indi­
cates that initial capital alone is not a sufficient require­
ment for successful operation. As Don Willmon, Chairman of 
the Board of United Bankers Life, expressed it, "You can be a 
strong little giant as well as a strong big g i a n t . ( H i s  com­
pany was referred to in its early years by some industry publi­
cations as "The Little Giant.") The difficulty of determining 
the necessary amount of initial capital is outlined by Kimball 
and Deneberg:
There has been widespread criticism of existing 
capital and surplus requirements. As a result, many
^Interview, Amarillo, Texas, October 27, 1973.
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states have increased their requirements, and the 
end of this trend is not yet in sight. Most of the 
changes, both proposed and enacted, have, however, 
been based on the roughest rules of thumb, with an 
assertion that existing levels are inadequate, but 
with virtually no scientific work to detrmine what 
level would be appropriate.^
A more critical question— because it has received 
even less attention— is the need for additional capital as a 
company expands. The above study continues:
Up to this point, morever, formal statutory require­
ments of capital and surplus have been directed only to 
the initial phase of a company's existance. Yet require­
ments that are realistic for the formative stage are 
entirely unrealistic when the quite different question 
is put: what amount of capital and surplus is necessary
to support safely an insurance operation with given 
characteristics? Up to this point in time little 
scientific research has been done to solve this problem.
The Texas Research League study of 1958 recognized 
this shortcoming:
Nor do Texas requirements recognize, except to a 
minor degree, that the need for adequate financial 
underpinning grows with the number of insurance lines 
a company may write. For example, Texas does not 
require greater financial backing for a company which 
writes all casualty lines than for a company which 
writes only one casualty line.3
The writer has talked with several persons who expressed 
a concern about proper capital in relation to a company's acti­
vities. Among these have been Don Willmon, Chairman of the 
Board of United Bankers Life^ (a medium-sized company), and
^Kimball and Denenberg, op. cit., p. 63.
^Ibid.
^Texas Research League, op. cit., p. 72. 
^Interview, Amarillo, Texas, October 27, 1973.
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Sam J. Winters, attorney for the Texas Life Convention (a 
group of the larger companies.)^ The question arose out of a 
discussion as to the amount of initial capital that should be 
required. Both expressed the feeling that capital per se was 
less important than capital in relation to the activities of 
the company.
The problem has become more acute in recent years 
with increased numbers of insurance companies being components 
of holding companies. There is a danger that a holding com­
pany, with primary interests in fields other than insurance, 
will acquire a life insurance company and withdraw enough 
assets to jeopardize the insurance operation.
Differing Goals of Small and Large Companies
Much of the governmental regulation of industry which 
is ostensibly designed to "protect competition" is actually 
designed to "protect the competitor." As expressed by Clair
Wilcox, "Whenever competition really hurts, steps are taken
2
to moderate its force." The life insurance industry conforms 
to this pattern: the large companies want to maintain their
position; the small ones want to grow.
As brought out in the discussion of specialty policies, 
smaller companies have used these policies as a form of pro­
duct differentiation to attract more business. Don Willmon,
^Interview, Austin, June 20, 1973. 
^Clair Wilcox, op. cit., p. 825.
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whose company (United Bankers Life) had used a "Founders 
Policy" in its early years, said that much of the criticism 
came from members of the National Association of Life Under­
writers who were working for companies without comparable 
policies. Mr. Willmon stated that much support for specialty 
policies came because it induced persons who needed insurance 
to buy it when they might not otherwise do so. He acknowledged 
that, " . . .  the trouble is in selling it to the wrong people.
This latter point is stressed by those opposed to spec­
ialty policies— primarily representatives of the larger com­
panies, and persons whose views are similar to those expressed
2
by Ralph Nader and former Commissioner Denenberg. The represen­
tatives of the smaller companies claim they will not be able 
to grow as readily unless they are allowed to use such tech­
niques as the specialty policy. The claim is often made that 
some of the larger companies who are now so opposed, used such 
techniques when they were smaller and trying to grow.
Interview, Amarillo, Texas, October 27, 1973. Mr. 
Willmon had used a unique plan. He first organized a mutual 
company. Prospective policyholders were informed that when 
the company reached a certain size, it would be converted into 
a stock company. A $10,000 policy would give the policyholder 
an option to buy 100 shares of stock at that time. Coupons 
attached to the policy, could, over a period of four years, be 
exchanged for the amount of cash required to buy the stock. 
Subsequently, there was a "Guaranteed Annual Return" of slightly 
less amount than each of the four coupons. This could be used 
in any of the four ways coupons could normally be used. The 
writer purchased one of those policies, and purchased the stock 
when the stock company was organized.
^Herbert S. Denenberg, "The Decline and Fall of Cash 
Value Life Insurance— Clarify or Perish," Best's Review, Life/ 
Health Edition, (October, 1970): 34.
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Another area of difference between small and large 
companies concerns investments. The smaller companies do not 
have the opportunity for diversification available to the 
larger companies, and sometimes advocate less restrictive 
regulation. Larger companies, with greater opportunity for 
diversification, and often with more capable investment coun­
sel, are apt to favor more restriction.
The larger companies, of course, support high entry 
requirements. The smaller companies advocate "more competi­
tion." This argument will be decided politically, and not 
economically. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult 
to start a small company and continue successfully. One com­
pany president said it would be foolish to try to start a 
company with less than $1 million.^ The difficulty of reach­
ing "the upper tier of companies" was expressed by a former 
New York regulatory official. He said the best example he 
knew of was Allstate, and, "Of course, Allstate is backed by 
Sears, and for many years Sears was putting more money into 
it than they were getting out of it."
It is possible that the smaller companies, in the 
practice of non-price competition, have been more innovative.
^E. Jay O'Keefe, interview, Amarillo, Texas, December 
20, 1973.
^Samual C. Cantor, Senior Vice President for Law and 
External Affairs, The Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, 
and former Acting Superintendent for Insurance in New York State. 
Quoted in a letter from Suzanne T. Turner, Press and Community 
Relations Specialist, Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, 
March 26, 1974.
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Former State Board of Insurance Chairman Hunter McLean believes 
that to be the case. In the speech at the Twenty-fifth Anni­
versary Meeting of the Texas Legal Reserve Officials Associa­
tion, he cites these examples:
In 1927 at Baylor Hospital in Dallas, through the means 
of a small assessment association, was born hospital 
insurance as we have known it since. That is, policies 
paying for room and other miscellaneous services . . . .  
Incidentally, from that modest beginning at Baylor 
Hospital in Dallas, evolved Blue Cross and Blue Shield. 
Baylor was the founding patron.
In 1933 the first commercial life company, a Texas 
limited capital company of Fort Worth, filed its hospital 
policy with the Texas insurance commission. Others soon 
followed suit . . . .
A small capital stock company of Fort Worth originated 
polio insurance, at a modest cost annually, and was 
immediately swamped with applications. Other Texas 
companies soon entered the field, as did companies from 
other states. In a period of less than four years, 
ninety per cent of the patients in polio wards were paying 
their own bills through the medium of polio insurance 
benefits.1
Mr. McLean cites other examples— and significant ones—  
but the larger companies have also been innovators. Some advan­
ces have been in fields which required large scale operations, 
such as use of computers and electronic data processing. Others 
have been in areas which required extensive actuarial study and 
extensive capital, such as the variable annuity. Both actuar­
ial study and market research may lead to new products, and it 
is not at all clear whether the large or the small firms will
^William Hunter McLean, loc. cit., pp. 4-5.
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be the most innovative in the future.^
Economic and Political Climate
for Insurance in Texas
The life insurance industry in Texas is a powerful
force, both economically and politically. It is variously
regarded as the largest, or second largest, industry in the
State, and has an impact through its income, its payroll,
its investments, and its claim payments. Its payment of fees
and taxes to the State is substantial. For the year ending
August 31, 1972, all insurance companies paid a total of
$76,381,603.72 in occupation (premium) taxes. The portion
of this attributable to life insurance is shown in Table IV-7.
Insurance companies also paid in excess of $3 million
in fees of various kinds. Approximately one-half of this
represented examination fees charged against the companies
for examiner's salaries and travel, and for "Overhead Assess- 
2
ments."
^Since 1967 the Institute of Life Insurance has spon­
sored an annual study (Monitoring Attitudes of the Public) to 
try to spot changes in public attitudes toward the industry 
and its products (as well as other ideas of general interest). 
The MAP Report, 1973 Series (New York: Institute of Life
Insurance, 1973).
2Annual Report, p. 73. "The Expense of all examina­
tions of domestic insurance companies made on behalf of the 
State of Texas by the Board of Insurance Commissioners or 
under its authority shall be paid by the corporations examined 
in such amount as the Board of Insurance Commissioners shall 
certify to be just and reasonable." (Texas Insurance Code, 
1969, Article 1.16.) Similar provision is made for payment 
of examination of foreign companies.
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TABLE IV-7
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OCCUPATION TAXES 
FISCAL YEAR ENDING AUGUST 31, 1973
Type of Company__________________ Taxes Paid
Domestic Life $ 3,964,020.07
Foreign Life 29,046,357.63
Foreign Life-Article 3.25 25,705.84
Mutual Assessment Life,
Health and Accident 38,164.86
Retaliatory Fees^ 821,751.20
Stipulated Premium 134,583.19
Non-Profit Corporations 1,733,889.23
$35,764,472.02
Source: State Board of Insurance, 
Report, p. 71.
Ninety-Eighth Annual
An industry of such magnitude would be expected to 
have political influence. It does. Opinions differ as to the 
amount of influence wielded by various segments of the industry. 
The increase in the number of companies indicates existing mem­
bers of the industry have not been able to erect very signifi­
cant barriers to entry. The increase might also indicate the 
State Board is interested in "promoting" the interests of the 
industry in the sense of "helping it grow."
A charge that the Board is a "branch office" of the 
industry was made by former Chairman Larry Teaver, whose
^Not all of these fees (which are placed on foreign 
companies under the provisions of Code, Art. 21.46), are 
attributable to life insurance, but the Board is not able to 
furnish a breakdown between life and other types of insurance. 
Letter , Creg Hargis, Clerk, Committee on Insurance, House of 
Representatives, July 22, 1974.
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reappointment to another term was rejected by the State Senate
in 1972. According to the Austin Insurance Report,
He blasted Members Manford and Price as being con­
trolled by the industry. Teaver blames the insur­
ance industry for engineering his defeat in the 
Senate. Teaver is further quoted as saying, "There 
are some insurance lobbyists paid as much as $100,000 
a year just to influence that Board. When I found 
out what was going on, I told some of them, 'Turn in 
your key to the building.
In analyzing Mr. Teaver's statement it must be rem­
embered that the life insurance industry is not monolithic. 
There are at least three trade associations in the life insur­
ance field in Texas whose viewpoints often conflict, and many 
other independent areas of interest. This difference of opin­
ion will be exemplified in the next chapter in the discussion 
of the Guaranty Bill.
If the Board does represent the industry, the situation 
contrasts with that advocated by the Superintendent of the New 
York State Insurance Department. In an interview for the Life 
Underwriters Association of New York City, Superintendent 
Benjamin R. Schenck stated, "We are interested in protecting 
the public. We are policemen of the industry, not partners 
in progress. That's the job of the commerce department." The 
interview further reported that " . . .  the department views 
itself more as an adversary of the industry and less as an 
advisor or mediator between the conflicting interest of buyers 
and sellers of insurance.^
lAustin Insurance Report. July 18, 1972, p. 1.
^Nancy Q. Keefe, "Insurance Department Profile: 
Benjamin R. Schenck, Superintendent," The Bulletin of the Life 
Underwriters Association of the Citv of New York. March, 1974, 
pp. 1, 24.
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Apparently this "adversary position" is departmental 
and not personal. According to Donald Dunham, Deputy Assist­
ant Administrator of the Texas State Board of Insurance, many 
of the New York Superintendents have, "made a name and then 
taken a big legal job in the industry.
There has not been a similar movement into the indus­
try in Texas; perhaps because of the longer tenure in office. 
However, in December of 1973, the Commissioner of Insurance 
in Texas, Clay Cotten, resigned to take a position in indus- 
try. He had served as Commissioner since 1965, and was with 
the Department for twelve years before that. The members of 
the Board are appointed by the Governor for six-year terms.
Ned Price was appointed in 1960 and Durwood Manford in 1961.
The Chairman, Joe Christie, was appointed by Governor Briscoe 
in 1973, after several of former Governor Smith's proposed 
appointees had been rejected by the Senate.
In general, the climate for insurance in Texas is 
healthy. The overall growth of the State's economy had created
^Interview, Austin, October 22, 1973.
^"Veteran Insurance Commissioner Quits," Amarillo Globe- 
Times, December 14, 1973, p. 5.
One former member of the Board, John Osorio, who served 
briefly as Chairman in 1957, was recently sentenced to a two- 
year term in a Federal penal institution for illegal actions in 
connection with National Bankers Life. The violation did not 
involve his duties on the Board, and was a part of the "Sharps- 
town State Bank Scandals," which involved a number of prominent 
Texas officials and political leaders. A comprehensive account 
of this series of activities is given in Texas Under A Cloud 
by Sam Kinch, Jr., and Ben Proctor (Austin: Jenkins Publishing
Co., 1972).
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- a demand which is being met both by Texas and Foreign compan­
ies. There are many companies operating profitably, although 
there are always some, particularly among the smaller compan­
ies, which are in financial trouble. In the next chapter the 
Texas regulatory system will be discussed, with particular 
attention to the actions taken to try to prevent financial 
trouble, or to counteract its effects. It will be seen that 
the regulations have become increasingly sophisticated for 
the protection of the policy-holder through the years, but 
there is still much "pressure" from the industry and from 
the legislature.
CHAPTER V 
INSURANCE REGULATION IN TEXAS
Since the state constitution of 1876, which was 
strongly influenced by reaction against a Reconstruction 
Governor, the Legislative Branch of the Government of Texas 
has been powerful, and the Executive Branch weak. Thus, the 
regulatory agencies of the government originally had little 
power or influence. Generally, they could be described as 
"creatures" of the industry they were designed to regulate. 
Through the years they have been given additional duties by 
the Legislature, and some, such as the State Board of Insur­
ance and the Banking Commission, have become quite powerful.
The members of all such commissions are appointed by the 
Governor, except for the members of the Railroad Commission, 
who are elected.
This chapter will trace briefly the history of insur- . 
ance regulation in Texas— with special emphasis on the Robert­
son Act of 1907. The present structure of the State Board 
of Insurance will be examined, and some of the current problems 
considered, particularly as they relate to solvency. Recent 
developments in the use of early-warning tests will be surveyed,
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Sone of the most important legislative acts of the last two 
sessions will be explained, with additional explanation of 
the process of reaching agreement on the Guaranty Fund Act 
of 1973. The Chapter will close with a description of the 
types of disclipinary action available to the State Board.
History of Texas Regulation 
In the early days of Statehood, there were few Texas 
insurance companies, and most insurance business was conducted 
by companies from other states. Between 1848 and 1874, sixty 
fire insurance companies and twelve life insurance companies 
were licensed by the State Comptroller, but only eight were 
Texas companies. One of these, the Texas Mutual, was a life 
insurance company.^
Regulation was very ineffective. Many of the compan­
ies did not pay the prescribed occupation tax, or otherwise 
comply with the law. Governor Richard Coke, who was inaugurated 
January 15, 1874, mentioned this problem to the Legislature in 
his message of January 26;
I feel it is my duty to call to your attention the 
subject of insurance in our state, and especially to 
some of the evils which have become apparent to the 
most casual observer . . . the vast bulk of the enor­
mous business in our state is done by foreign compan­
ies . . . .
No provision of law exists by which rights and remedies 
can be enforced in our home tribunals against these
^George L. Curry, op. cit., p. 2.
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corporations . . .
On May 2, 1874, the Legislature heeded the warning of 
the Governor, and passed the first act regulating life and 
health insurance companies. Initial, fully-paid capital of 
$100,000 was r e q u i r e d .2 From that time to the present almost 
every legislative session has seen much time and effort devoted 
to problems concerned with insurance companies.
No provision for regulation of insurance had been made 
in the Constitution of the Republic of 1836, nor in the state 
constitutions of 1845, 1861, 1866, or 1869.^ However, the 
Constitution of 1876, under which the State is now governed, 
did make such provision.^
When this section was implemented, the state was able 
to make some progress in insurance regulation. Governor L. L. 
Ross reported to the Twenty-second Legislature at the close of 
his term on January 31, 1891:
^Texas, Governors' Messages, Coke to Ross (Inclusive) 
1874-1891, Edited by and for the Archive & History Department 
of the Texas State Library (Austin: Collections of the Archive
£c History Department of the Texas State Library. Executive 
Series, 1916), pp. 22-23. (Quoting from House Journal, 38-45 
and Senate Journal, 32-38.
^Gammel's Laws, pp. 199-202. Quoted in Texas Legisla­
tive Council, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
3john Sayles, The Constitutions of the State of Texas, 
With Reconstruction Acts of Congress, The Constitution of the
Confederate States, and of the United States. Annotated, 4th
ed. (St. Louis; The Gilbert Book Co., 1893).
4"The Legislature may, at such time as the Public 
interest may require, provide for the office of Commissioner 
of Insurance, Statistics and History, whose term of office and 
duties and salary shall be provided by law." Article XVI,
Sec. 38.
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In the insurance branch (of the Department of Insurance, 
Statistics and History) twenty-two insurance companies 
transacting business without authority of law, and in 
most cases without capital stock upon which to operate, 
and therefore wholly irresponsible, have been driven 
from the State and the people protected against loss 
by purchasing worthless insurance. They collected 
about $200,000 annually from the citizens and gave no 
benefit.1
James S. Hogg had been Attorney General during the 
Administration of Governor Ross, and succeeded him in the 
Governorship. Hogg had been active in driving out the "wild­
cat" insurance companies, and continued the process as Governor. 
Some insurance companies had been attempting to quality as 
"benevolent corporations" in order to avoid the capital require­
ment, and the Commissioner of Insurance had sought advice from 
Attorney General Hogg. In answer to one such querry about a 
Kansas (fire) insurance company, Hogg replied:
Title LIII, Chapter 1, Revised Statutes, is the only 
authority for incorporation of insurance companies 
in Texas. It requires every insurance company to 
have an actual bona fide capital stock of not less 
than $100,000, and in what its surplus shall be 
invested. Evidentally this is for the protection 
of policyholders, and applies as well to foreign 
as to domestic companies. It is against the spirit 
and letter of Texas laws for corporations to do an 
insurance business for profit in Texas unless her 
citizen policyholders are amply protected by the 
capital stock of at least one hundred thousand 
dollars which cannot be reduced by any prescribed 
rules below that amount.2
iTexas, Governors' Messages, p. 682. The Governor also 
mentioned that the Twentieth Legislature had created a Bureau 
of Agriculture, and added it to the Department of Insurance 
Statistics, and History.
^Letter, James S. Hogg to L. L. Foster, Commissioner of 
Insurance, February 26, 1887. Addresses and State Papers of 
James Stephen Hogg. Edited with a Biographical Sketch by Robert 
C. Cotner (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1951), p. 39.
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When Hogg opened his campaign for Governor, he spoke
of his actions as Attorney General against certain corporations;
My first work . . . was against illegal fire and life 
insurance companies, generally called "wildcat" concerns. 
Then there were about forty of them operating in Texas 
in violation of the law. By the aid of an efficient 
and faithful Commissioner of Insurance through the 
courts, I effected the extermination of every one of 
them within twelve months . . . .  By this work the 
Commissioner informs me that the people have saved at 
least $250,000 per year.l
As previously mentioned, many mutual assessment and 
fraternal associations were formed around the turn of the 
century. By 1903, eighty-five fraternal groups were selling 
life insurance in Texas.  ^ Some of these, such as the "Slavonic 
Benevolent Order of the State of Texas," had other purposes as 
well.
While the SPJST (the abbreviation of its Czeck name) 
was organized primarily for the purpose of offering 
its members reliable and economical life insurance .
. . it was also organized for the purpose of teaching 
and instructing its members in their duties as Ameri­
can Citizens and installing patriotism and American 
citizenship into their hearts.3
In the first decade of the Twentieth Century Democratic 
leaders of Texas increasingly identified with the Populism of 
William Jennings Bryan. There was a great deal of sentiment 
for "control" of large corporations. In 1905 the Legislature
^Ibid., p. 65 
2Hugh Williamson, The Story of Insurance in Texas 
(Dallas: John Moranz Associates, 1954), p. 41.
3Ibid., p. 42., quoting J. F. Chupick, Secretary of 
the Company.
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raised taxes on the intangible assets of corporations, levied 
a one per cent tax on the gross receipts of railroads, and a 
two per cent tax on the gross receipts of insurance companies. 
A special session later in the year raised the tax on the 
gross receipts of life insurance companies to 2.25 per cent.^ 
The combination of the Populist movement and the 
reaction to the exposures of the Armstrong investigation (as 
outlined in Chapter III) led to many changes in insurance laws 
in the various states. One of the most far-reaching was the 
Robertson Law of 1907 in Texas.^ A strong feeling existed in 
the State that much money was "siphoned" out of Texas to New 
York because the Eastern companies collected so much more in 
premiums than they paid out in benefits. Thomas Benton Love, 
Commissioner of Insurance and Banking, reported that over a 
twenty-year period ending in 1907, the three largest New York 
companies doing business in Texas— New York Life, Equitable 
and Mutual— had collected approximately $52,000,000 while 
paying out only $16,500,000.^
Several states considered some form of compulsory 
investment requirement, but Texas was the only one to pass
^Alwayn Barr, Reconstruction to Reform; Texas Politics 
1876-1906 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971), p. 234.
^Chapter 170, General Laws of Texas of 1907.
^James A. Tinsley, "Texas Progressives and Insurance 
Regulation," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly 36 (December, 
1955): 238-9.
155
such a law. It required that all life insurance companies 
doing business in the State must invest seventy-five per cent 
of the reserves on Texas business in Texas securities, and, 
with certain exceptions, deposit them in the State, where they 
would be available to pay Texas claims if needed— and also 
be subject to State and local taxes.
The controversy was bitter, but the law was passed.
A number of the foreign companies (21 out of 46) immediately 
withdrew from the State. They cited the deposit feature as 
the chief reason for the withdrawal, but when that feature 
was removed in 1909 none of them returned.^
The results of the Robertson Law were widely hailed 
in Texas. Insurance Commissioner Love reported that within 
a year after the new law went into effect, insurance loans 
on farm mortgages were over $1,125,000. He said this was 
"$256,675.94 more than the 21 companies which had left the 
State had loaned during the 30 years they had done business 
in the State.
There is a difference of opinion as to whether the 
Robertson Law was primarily designed to assure more adequate 
service from the foreign companies or to promote the domestic 
companies. Whatever its aim, it certainly helped achieve the 
latter purpose. The five domestic companies in 1906 increased
llbid., p. 243.
2lbid.
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to eleven in 1909 and twenty-one in 1911. Their share of the 
business written increased from twenty-five per cent ($15.8 
million) prior to the passage of the law, to forty-nine per 
cent ($46 million) in 1909 and fifty-one per cent ($54 million) 
in 1911.1
The foreign companies which remained in the State did 
not consider the law unduly restrictive, and their business 
increased along with that of the domestic companies. The 
Dallas representative of the Hartford Life Insurance Company 
wrote Commissioner Love on March 20, 1909, that " . . .  Texas 
now has one of the best insurance codes of any state in this 
union,"^
More recent analysis has indicated that the results 
from the standpoint of promoting Investment in Texas were not 
as substantial as formerly believed. Professor Winston C.
Beard has studied the Robertson Act and its aftermath exten­
sively. His Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Illinois^ 
dealt with this subject, and he served as a consultant to the 
State of Arkansas when a similar law was being considered in 
in that state. His most recent study was published after the
^Texas, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Insurance 
and Banking, (1907-1912).
^Letter, William H. Patterson (Dallas) to Love (Austin), 
March 20, 1909. Quoted in Tinsley, loc. cit., p. 243.
3
Winston Clingan Beard, "The Financial and Economic 
Effects of Geographical Restriction Upon the Investment Policies 
of Life Insurance Companies" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of 
Illinois, 1961).
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repeal of the RoJertson Law in 1963. He concluded that,
. . . very little, if any, of the increase in 
investments by life insurance companies can be 
attributed to the Robertson Law. The increase 
that did occur following its enactment was so 
far in excess of the requirements of the law that 
other factors are presumed to have caused the 
investment growth.1
Professor Beard points out that the reasons for the 
repeal of the law grew out of the same sort of process which 
brought it into being; Texas companies expanding into other 
states were being threatened with retaliatory provisions of 
a similar nature. Following the invoking of such provisions 
in Arkansas, the Texas Life Convention pointed out to the 
Legislature that, "If other states follow the lead of Arkansas, 
it will be disasterous for Texas and Texas life insurance com- 
panies." The repeal bill was signed by Governor Connally on 
May 28, 1963.3
Regardless of the effect on investments, the Robertson 
Law stimulated the domestic life insurance business, but also 
drew attention to the industry and the need for effective regu­
lation. In 1923 the regulatory functions pertaining to insur­
ance and banking were separated, and a Department of Insurance 
created, under the direction of a Commissioner of I n s u r a n c e .4
^Winston C. Beard, "An Epitaph for the Robertson Law," 
Journal of Risk and Insurance 32 (December, 1965) : 595-608.
3Ibid., p. 605.
^Senate Bill 27, 58th Legislature, Regular Session,
1963.
4Acts 1923, 38th Legislature, 3d Called Session, Ch. 19
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In 1927 a Board of Insurance Commissioners was created. It 
consisted of a life insurance commissioner, a fire insurance 
commissioner and a casualty insurance commissioner, all 
appointed by the Governor. The life insurance commissioner 
was the chairman.^ This body administered a group of laws 
which multiplied rapidly in the late 1940s, and brought 
increasing recognition of the need for more systematic 
procedure.
The growth of Texas after World War II was accompanied 
by an increase in the number of domestic companies and a return 
of several of the large Eastern Companies. Eleven of them had
p
returned by 1951, including four before 1947. As a result of 
this growth, the regulatory structure was not adequate to meet 
the increased burdens placed upon it. In 1951 the Legislature 
enacted the first Insurance Code for the State. It was des­
cribed as.
An Act arranging the Statutes of this State affecting 
the business of insurance into appropriate Chapters 
and Articles into a consistent whole and under a single 
code, making such editorial changes in context as are 
necessary to that accomplishment; preserving the sub­
stantive law as it existed immediately before the 
passage of this Act except as to laws affecting the 
business of insurance passed at the Regular Session of 
the 52nd Legislature, and as to such laws just passed, 
preserving same and each of them, and containing all 
details appropriate to achievement of those purposes, 
providing for severability of the different Articles 
or parts of Articles so that unconstitutionality of
^Acts 1927, 40th Legislature, Ch. 224.
^William R. King, "History and Development of Insurance 
Law in Texas," in Vernon's Annotated Texas Statutes, Vol. 14. 
(Kansas City, Mo.; Vernon Law Book Co., 1963), p. 12.
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one or more shall not affect the remainder of the Act; 
repealing in Section 4 hereof, certain Statutes and 
Acts together with all laws or parts of laws in conflict 
herewith; and declaring an emergency.^
This Code has been amended many times. In 1969 the
State Board of Insurance prepared the Texas Insurance Code
1969.' The Preface states, over the name of the Commissioner
of Insurance:
This publication has been prepared as an unofficial 
revision of the original code which was adopted in 
1951. It contains all amendments to the date of 
adjournment of the 61st Legislature, September 9,
1969.
This volume also covers other statutes which relate 
to insurance. The Rules of Practice and Procedure 
Before the State Board of Insurance and the Commis­
sioner of Insurance are also included for convenient 
reference. The Business Corporation Act and the « 
Non-profit Corporation Act are not included in this 
publication, but their provisions do govern insurance 
companies when not in conflict with this code.^
Major revisions in the legislation itself were made
by the Fifty-fourth Legislature in 1955. These were largely
based on a study made by the Texas Legislative Council in
31954, as directed by the Fifty-third Legislature. The Council
^House Concurrent Resolution No. 179, 52nd Legislature, 
1951, p. 868, Ch. 491. Also, Vernon's Annotated Texas Statutes 
Vol. 14 and 14A.
Texas Insurance Code 1969, p. iii. The State Board 
prepared a listing, with reproduction of the Acts, of "Insur­
ance Legislation Enacted by the 62nd Legislature of Texas" in 
December, 1971, and a similar listing after the 63rd Legisla­
ture. Commissioner Cotten stated in an interview in Austin, 
June 20, 1973, that he felt it was time to prepare a new 
"Code," but this has not yet been done.
^House Concurrent Resolution 36, 53rd Legislature,
1954, First Called Session.
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had been directed to make the study because of an increasing 
concern in the State— in the industry, the Legislature and 
among a great many citizens— about various types of insurance 
"promotions" and an apparent increase in insolvencies. The 
Fifty-fourth Legislature passed sixteen separate insurance 
bills. Among the more important were bills to increase the 
initial capital and surplus required, to give the Board of 
Insurance Commissioners more control over capital and sur­
plus and to strengthen the examination procedure.^
In 1956, the Texas Legislative Council prepared a 
report on the adequacy of the previous year's legislation.
The Council concluded that the Fifty-fourth Legislature had 
acted affirmatively with respect to 82.5 per cent of the 
recommendations the Council made which warranted legislative 
attention.2 Despite these improvements, Texas continued to 
be troubled by company insolvency. From 1954 to 1958 twenty- 
three Texas insurance companies or organizations were placed 
in receivership.3 Something more was needed in the way of 
regulatory control.
^William R. King, loc. cit., p. 15-
^Texas Legislative Council, A Review of the Adequacy 
of Insurance Legislation Enacted by the 54th Legislature. A 
Report to the 55th Legislature, 1956, Sec. 3(c) of Summary.
^William R. King, loc. cit., p. 15.
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Present Administrative Organization 
and Procedure
An entirely new administrative structure was created 
by the Fifty-fifth Legislature in 1957. The State Board of 
Insurance Commissioners was changed into the State Board of 
Insurance, whose three members were to operate as a unit.
They were to appoint a Commissioner of Insurance who would 
be the Chief Executive and Administrative Officer, and sub­
ject to the Board's supervision.^ This arrangement has pro­
duced a stability that is lacking in many states. Clay 
Cotten served as Commissioner from 1965 to December, 1973, 
following twelve years in the Department prior to that time.
While interviewing Don Dunham, Deputy Assistant Admin­
istrator of the State Board of Insurance, in the fall of 1973, 
the writer questioned the allegation in an article in The Wall 
Street Journal that the "average tenure of State Insurance 
Commissioners was two y e a r s . M r .  Dunham checked a directory 
showing the year of appointment of each of these officials, 
and determined this to be true at that time. With the excep­
tion of Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Colorado there has 
been a very high turnover of state commissioners. At that 
time thirty-eight of the incumbents had been appointed in
^Insurance Code 1969, Arts. 1.02, 1.03, 1.04, and 1.09
^William Blundell and Priscilla Meyer, "The States' 
Regulation of Insurance Companies Often Viewed as Farce" The 
Wall Street Journal, August 21, 1973, p. 1.
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1971, 1972, or 1973.1
Former Board Chairman Hunter McLean praised the
stability of the Texas system:
The Commissioner, an appointee of the Board, is not 
subject to dismissal with each change of Governors, 
but instead, accumulates experience in the technical 
and complex business of insurance, knowledge of his 
personnel, and may expect to hold the position so 
long as good judgement and conduct are e x e r c i s e d . ^
Mr McLean also frankly acknowledged the political
impact on regulation:
I do not believe you will be able to successfully 
sort political influences from insurance economics.
Political decisions determine much of the economic 
results of regulated institutions . . . .  I do not 
oppose insurance regulation; believe it to be desir­
able. I am convinced that much of it is absurd, 
conflicting and counterproductive to its major 
justification, to wit: Solvency of insurers.3
In the last year of Governor Smith's administration 
(1972), several of his proposed appointees to the State Board 
were rejected by the Senate. Such action definitely indicates 
political influence at the policy-making level— where it clearly 
belongs.
One of the continuing controversies involving the regu­
latory process concerns the alleged tendency of the regulatory 
agency to become the "captive" of the industry. Such a process 
has been described by Marver H. Bernstein as the almost-inevitably-
^Interview, Austin, October 23, 1973. 
^Letter, November 2, 1973.
3%bid.
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recurring "life cycle" of regulatory agencies.^ The wide
range of acceptance of such a thesis is indicated by this
statement in a report of the Third Annual Summer Economics
Institute for Law Professors:
When Professor Alchian (Armen A. Alchian, University 
of California, Los Angeles) proffers an opinion, it 
is usually only after several caveats and disclaimers.
For example, when pressed by Justin Sweet of the 
University of California Law School, he admitted that, 
yes, he subscribes to the belief that government 
regulatory agencies are often taken over and dominated 
by whatever agencies it is they are supposed to regu­
late— a position he holds in common not only with 
Milton Friedman, but with Ralph N a d e r . 2
Not all students of the regulatory process accept the
"life cycle" hypothesis, however. There are challenges on
two grounds: (1) the explanation is just too pat— "an old
Progressive slogan elevated to a dogma," or (2) (an approach
attributed to Professor Jaffe of the Harvard Law School)
reliance on the affected interests does not evolve; it begins
with the establishment of the agency.^
A statement by management consultant Peter Drucker
helps explain some of the difference of opinion about the
influence of the industry, so-called "political pressure."
^Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating Business By Indepen­
dent Commission (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955).
^Edwin McDonald, "Bringing Law Profs Up to Date," The 
Wall Street Journal, July 23, 1973, p. 8.
^Samuel Krislov and Lloyd D. Musolf, eds.. The Politics 
of Regulation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), pp. 61-2.
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If I were to have a criticism of the American business­
man, it is that he has made no attempt to understand 
the political process. He attempts to influence it 
without understanding it.^
Many groups in Texas have tried to influence the 
political process of insurance regulation, but as mentioned 
in the previous chapter, the industry does not speak with one 
voice. There are at least three organizations of life insur­
ance companies whose interests often do not coincide, and 
there are many other sources of "pressure" on regulatory 
officials and the legislature. Furthermore, the legislature 
itself is often a source of pressure.
Representatives of smaller companies tend to crit­
icize the Board as being dominated by the large companies.
On the other hand, an indication of influence of smaller 
companies is the "grandfather clause" in the Insurance Code 
pertaining to initial capital and surplus. When these pro­
visions were raised in 1955 from $25,000 capital and $12,500 
surplus to $100,000 of each, companies existing prior to May 
15, 1955, were not required to provide for any i n c r e a s e . ^
In a similar manner, the Guaranty Fund which is described 
later in this chapter, does not include the non-legal reserve 
companies. They wanted to be left out.^ Since political
l"Inside Peter Drucker," Nation's Business, March,
1974, p. 63.
^Insurance Code 1969, Art. 3.02, Sec. 2.
^Austin Insurance Report, February 29, 1972; "Robert 
Sneed, Texas Association of Life Insurance Officials, said that 
mutual assessment and stipulated premium companies want to be 
left out of such legislation. He said that his group opposes 
the preassessment section of the bill, saying, "We would like 
to be left just like we are."
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action canno+ be completely neutral, it must be conceded that 
political pressures will be exerted for economic ends.
Insurance regulation in Texas covers numerous types 
of activity in addition to life insurance. All are adminis­
tered by the same Department, but sometimes in quite differ­
ent ways. The Chief Clerk of the Insurance Committee of the 
House of Representatives described the basic difference in 
these terms: property and casualty companies are subject to
"front-end" regulation, that is, rate regulation; life com­
panies are subject to "back-end" regulation, or regulation 
of administration, investments and operations.^ The regula­
tion of fire and casualty companies takes more of the time 
of the Board, because of the involvement with rates.
Current Problems 
The Texas Insurance Code 1969, With Related Acts and 
Rules of Procedure covers over 600 pages. Almost 500 of these 
deal in some way with life insurance. This paper will not 
attempt to cover all the topics which are included in the life 
sections. Instead, the writer intends to discuss a few of the 
most critical current problems, to consider several recent 
legislative acts designed to alleviate those problems and to 
discuss briefly the types of disciplinary action available to 
the State Board.
^Forrest C. Roan, Interview, Austin, June 18, 1973.
p
Durwood Manford, Interview, Austin, June 22, 1973.
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Solvency is a subject of prime concern in any dis­
cussion of life insurance regulation. While entry conditions 
and operating conditions both have an influence, much atcen- 
tion has been focused on capital and surplus requirements.
The statutory requirements for initial capital and surplus 
were listed in Chapter IV. As indicated, the requirements 
in Texas are among the lowest in the nation. Yet size alone 
is no guarantee of successful operation. As D. J. Hundahl,
Jr., President of National Security Life and Accident Insur­
ance Company, expressed it, "After all, if size alone is the
1
criteria for an insurance company, we only need one."
The wide range of initial capital requirements indi­
cates considerable difference of opinion as to the necessary 
capital. As indicated in the previous chapter, much current 
thinking centers on the relation of capital to the size and 
type of operations rather than to size per se.
Herbert S. Denenberg, in an article written before 
he was Insurance Commissioner of Pennsylvania, recognized the 
need for more study to determine adequate capital. He mentioned 
the recently enacted Michigan requirements for $1,000,000 cap­
ital and $500,000 surplus.
These figures have appeal to a regulator's insatiable 
appetite for conservatism. But why not the more con­
servative $1,000,000/$2,000,000 New York requirement?
Or perhaps $5,000,000/$10,000,000? And why not smaller 
figures? Can the insurance enterprise be safely operated
^Letter, October 25, 1973, D. J. Hundahl, Jr., to D. 
J. Willmon, Dallas.
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on smaller capital? Should the requirements of the 
enterprise be entirely discretionary with the commiss­
ioner (as in some European countries)?
These questions can be answered in a rough qualiti- 
tive sense, but would be more acceptable if backed by 
statistics of surplus actually needed, placed in 
jeopardy, and expended by young companies. More 
information is needed if this, and many of our other 
conclusions about regulation, are to be firmly 
accepted.1
An aspect of initial operations which is quite impor­
tant, but is often overlooked, concerns the ability or exper­
ience of those making application to charter a new company. 
Article 3.04 of the Texas Insurance Code provides:
Sec. 3. In considering any such application, the 
Board shall within thirty (30) days after public 
hearing, determine whether or not:
(a) The minimum capital and surplus, as 
required by law, is the bona fide 
property of the company;
(b) The proposed officers, directors and 
managing executive have sufficient insur­
ance experience, ability and standing to 
render success of the proposed company 
profitable;
(c) The applicants are acting in good faith.^
The writer querried the Chairman of the State Board 
about the number of applicants who might have been rejected 
for reasons other than lack of required capital. The follow­
ing reply was received:
. . .  we have not maintained any specific statistics 
on this matter. However, I am informed by a staff
^Herbert S. Denenberg, "How to Rewrite An Insurance 
Code: Comment," Journal of Risk and Insurance 34 (December,
1957): 562.
^Insurance Code 1969, Art. 304, Sec. 3.
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member familiar with this matter that within recent 
years some applicants have been rejected by the appli­
cation of the criteria provided in such statutes.^
These criteria admittedly provide much leeway for 
value judgment. Chairman Christie's letter indicates they 
are not rigidly applied. Fear of legal action in case of an 
adverse ruling might be a deterrent. Yet such provisions are 
a strong tool for the use of the State Board.
Even if all the initial criteria are adequately satis­
fied, many factors may cause trouble for a company. After the 
initial requirement of $100,000 capital and $100,000 surplus is 
met,, the only continuing requirement relates to capital. Since 
some surplus is required to cover the expenses of every new 
life insurance policy written, a company must have surplus over 
and above its capital. If this capital becomes impaired to the 
extent of thirty-three and one-third per cent, the company must 
"make good such impairment within sixty days by reduction of 
its capital stock." It cannot be reduced below the statutory
minimum, however, without forfeiting the privilege of writing 
2
new insurance.
A doctoral dissertation at the University of Texas, 
which was mentioned in Chapter II, listed a number of causes 
of insurance company failure.^ The study is well-illustrated
^Letter, Joe Christie, Chairman, State Board of Insur­
ance, June 5, 1973.
^Insurance Code, Art. 3.60.
^See p. 73. See also p. 219, Letter from William Hunter 
McLean, August 8, 1974.
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with examples from the decade of the 1950s. Even a cursory 
examination of this data would lead one to conclude that no 
set of regulations could protect adequately against all of 
these possibilities, yet regulatory officials must seek to 
do so.
The officials would prefer to detect conditions lead­
ing to bankruptcy in an incipient stage in order to minimize 
loss to policyholders. In recent years several states have 
been seeking to develop "early-warning" tests for such a 
purpose. Texas has been among the leaders in this endeavor.^ 
Similar concern in other states is indicated by a series of 
articles in The Journal of Commerce.
This business newspaper published a series of articles
by state insurance commissioners dealing with the regulatory
problems they face. Because of wide-spread interest in the
problems, the articles were reprinted together in pamphlet
form. Of the total of seventeen, four dealt with solvency,
2
or surveillance tests.
Commissioner Gotten explained that the normal examina­
tion of a life insurance company may take several months. Dur­
ing such a period, conditions in a company facing financial diffi­
culties could deteriorate rapidly. Now, however, combination of
^Clay Gotten, Interview, Austin, June 20, 1973.
Sam J. Winters, Interview, Austin, June 20, 1973.
^"The Commissioners Speak," A Special Report by the 
Journal of Commerce. Articles reprinted from the Journal of 
Commerce, New York.
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computer accounting techniques and a recent statutory require­
ment have now made it possible to tell "in a week's time" if 
a company is in trouble, according to Mr. Gotten.^
The Sixty-second Legislature in 1971 enacted a piece
of legislation which Commissioner Gotten said was "one of the
2most significant acts in the last decade." He was referring
to the Assets Protection Act, which has the following purpose:
This Act is for the purpose of requiring insurers to 
have and maintain unencumbered assets in an amount 
equal to reserve liabilities; to provide preferential 
claims against assets in favor of owners, beneficiar­
ies, assignees, certificate holders, or third party 
beneficiaries of insurance policies; and to prevent 
hypothecation or encumbrance of assets in excess of 
certain amounts without prior written order of the 
Commissioner of Insurance.3
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
throughout its existance has worked for uniformity of state 
insurance laws, and for improvement of the entire regulatory 
process. In recent years the creation of adequate early-warn­
ing tests for insolvency has been the subject of much concern. 
In 1973 the NAIC contracted with the management consultant 
firm of McKinsey & Company to study the entire process of 
state regulation of insurance, and to seek specifically to
^Interview, Austin, June 20, 1973.
^Ibid.
^Senate Bill 839, 62d Legislature, 1971, Sec. 2. Mr. 
Gotten stated in the June 20 interview in Austin that the Cen­
tury Life Insurance case had brought on this legislation. That 
company had hypothecated over $11 million in FHA loans and 
other assets. He further stated that this Act, for the first 
time, gave real meaning to the term "legal reserve life insur­
ance company."
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devise more adequate tests of surveillance than those already 
in use in Texas and a few other states.
This part of the McKinsey study, "Improving the Life
and Health Early Warning System," was released in the spring
of 1974- The Introduction to the Report states;
Judging from experience during the past decade, the 
recommended system would be dramatically more effec­
tive in distinguishing between troubled and sound 
companies than the current system. As shown in the 
final pages of this report, half of the improvement 
in effectiveness results from dropping ineffective 
tests; the other half results from adding and modi­
fying tests and altering the cutoffs for determining 
exceptional values.^
The system is designed with a basic purpose of "dis­
tinguishing between troubled and sound companies." Then there 
is a "broad variety of further analyses" for the troubled com­
panies to "determine the source of the difficulty and its 
degree of s e v e r i t y . T o  determine the effectiveness of given 
ratios in distinguishing between troubled and sound companies, 
the study used the historical approach, i.e., comparing the 
ratios of a group of companies that became insolvent during
^McKinsey and Co., Inc., "Improving The Life and Health 
Early Warning System. National Association of Insurance Com­
missioners." (n.p.: McKinsey and Co., Inc., April 12, 1974),
p. 1.
2Ibid., p. 2.
3lbid.
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the past decade with the ratios of a group of financially 
sound companies.^
The McKinsey analysis develops a "priority" designa­
tion for those companies most likely to require further exam­
ination. This would have identified about eighty per cent of
the insolvents in each of their last four years prior to insol- 
2vency.
The regulation of investments is another area of con­
cern, and the subject of considerable controversy. Authorized 
investments and loans for Texas life insurance companies are 
listed in Article 3.39 of the Insurance Code. Article 3.40 
authorizes holding of real estate, and Article 3.40-1 makes 
additional provisions for investment in income-producing real
Ibid. Prior to the release of the McKinsey report, 
the writer conducted such a study of Texas companies, although 
on a much less sophisticated basis. Complete data was not 
available on all the companies which had failed, so the infor­
mation in the Texas Blue Book of Life Insurance Statistics was 
used. Thirteen items are shown for each company. Taking the 
data for three years, a process of Linear Discriminate Analysis 
was used to determine the probability of a company being a 
success or failure. The sample examined included all legal 
reserve companies in Texas for the years 1963-1972. The results 
achieved were able to explain only twenty per cent of the prob­
ability of success or failure. Detailed results are not pre­
sented, as the McKinsey study has provided much more useful 
analytical tools. The type of analysis used by the writer is 
described in David R. Cox, The Analysis of Binary Data (London: 
Methuen and Company, 1970). Dr. Frank Landrum of West Texas 
State University assisted the writer in adapting the process 
for the specific purpose of this study. An excellent example 
of the use of linear discriminate analysis for a similar pur­
pose is described in Edward I. Altman, "Predicting Railroad 
Bankruptcies in America," The Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science 4 (Spring, 1973): 184-211.
^McKinsey & Co., "Early Warning System," pp. 11-12.
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estate.1 A company may invest "Any of Its Funds and Accumula­
tions" in the following types of securities:^
1. U. S. Bonds and Obligations Guaranteed by the 
United States
2. Canadian Bonds (Dominion, province or city)
3. State, County, and City Bonds^
4. County, City and School District Bonds^
5. Bonds of Educational Institutions
6 . Revenue Bonds, etc., of Educational Institutions
7. Bonds and Warrants of Municipally Owned Systems
8 . Paving Certificates
9. Bonds Issued Under Federal Farm Loan Act
10. Corporate First Mortgage Bonds, Notes and 
Debentures
11. Shares of Savings and Loan Associations
12. Bank Stocks
13. Debentures of Public Utility Corporations
14. Preferred Stock of Public Utility Corporations
15. Securities Not Otherwise Specified (". . . shall not 
exceed one per cent (1%) of the admitted assets of 
any such life insurance company; and provided further 
that the investments authorized by this Section shall 
not exceed the lesser of (a) five per cent (5%) of 
its admitted assets, or (b) the amount of its capital 
and surplus in excess of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($200,000) . . . .")
ISA. Other Bonds
(1) Inter-American Development Bank Bonds
(2) State of Israel Bonds
15. Securities Authorized by Special Acts of the Legis­
lature (thirteen citations to specific laws)
17. Other Securities Specifically Authorized by Law
States,
^Insurance Code, Articles 3.39, 3.40 and 3.40-1. 
^Insurance Code, Article 3.39, Part I, Subdivision A.* 
"The bonds of any state, county, or city of the United
"Any bonds or interest-bearing warrants issued by auth­
ority of law by any county, city, town, school district or other
municipality or subdivision . . . under the laws of any state .
. .; provided legal provision has been made by a tax to meet
said obligations."
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Other portions of this Article pertain to investment 
of the following types of funds:
Part I
B. Policy Reserves and Surplus
C. Capital, Surplus and Contingency Funds Over and 
Above Policy Reserves
D. Capital, Surplus and Contingency Funds Not to 
Exceed Ten Per Cent
E. Minimum Capital and Surplus
F. General
Part II Authorized Loans^
The Sixty-third Legislature, in what came to be refer­
red to as the "Surplus-Surplus Bill," amended Part I, Subdi­
vision C, of the Insurance Code:
. . . to permit investment of surplus funds over and 
above the greater of either (a) ten per cent of admitted 
assets . . .  or (b) the minimum capital and surplus 
requirements for incorporating a life insurance company 
. . . in the capital stock, bonds, and other obligations 
of any one or more solvent corporations.2
Thomas Thompson, former Editor of the Amarillo Globe- 
Times, whose articles about the Texas life insurance industry 
influenced the writer to begin this study,^ was very critical 
of the above-listed investment provisions. Among his censor­
ious remarks were the following:
An overhaul of the investment provisions of the insur­
ance code is long overdue. They are inadequate, they 
are permissive and leave too much to the judgement and 
discretion of the insurance commission s t a f f .4
llbid., Part I, Subdivisions B-F; Part II.
^Senate Bill No. 480, 63rd Legislature, 1973.
^See p. 18.
^Thomas H. Thompson, "Insurance Scandals Prove Ease of 
Lassoing Fast Bucks," Amarillo Globe-Times, April 18, 1972.
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There is nothing in the Texas Insurance Code that 
requires a balanced investment or diversification of 
investments. The New York Insurance Code emphasizes 
that life insurance companies' portfolio shall con­
tain securities "wherein the speculative elements 
are not predominant." You look in vain for this 
specific kind of language in the Texas code.l
A vigorous criticism was also expressed by E. J. 
Reeves, President of Commercial Travelers Life Insurance 
Company:
. . . it must be admitted that regulations as 
established under Article 3.39 are outdated and 
narrow; some parts containing such wretched 
grammar that they are almost devoid of clear 
understanding. It is said, though I personally 
could not vouch for the same, that Texas has per­
haps the narrowest and most awkward investment 
statute of any of the fifty states . . . .
I have observed over the years that many feeble 
efforts to improve this statute and it has always 
fallen short of the needed. (sic) It is well 
said in the industry concerning the matter of 
amending 3.39, "Hell, go ahead, there ain't 
nothing you can do to make this section any 
worse." That probably is a statement a bit too 
strong, yet it does not fall far short of the mark.
A different position is taken by representatives of 
some of the smaller and medium-sized Texas companies. Presi­
dent D. J. Hundahl, Jr., of National Security Life and Acci­
dent Insurance Company, regards the 1973 change as an improve­
ment:
Our investment statutes were improved considerably 
by the passing of S.B. 480 . . . .  It is my feeling
^Thomas H. Thompson, 'Insurance Code Requires No 
Balanced Investment," Amarillo Globe-Times, April 19, 1972.
^Letter to Don J. Willmon, Dallas, October 25, 1973.
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that funds that are subject to dividend declaration 
should not be restricted in any way and that the law 
should assume that minimum surplus requirements are 
adequate to protect the policyholders and the public.
Some of the criticism of these investment provisions 
is undoubtedly engendered by the conflicting purposes they 
seek to serve. Kimball and Denenberg explain it as follows:
Investment regulation has long presented the horns 
of a dilemma to the insurance commissioners and to the 
legislature. Either legislation and regulation must 
be so detailed and strict as to put handcuffs on the 
competent investment managers of strong and well-run 
insurers, or so general and lacking in detail as to 
make it possible for inexperienced investment per­
sonnel to endanger seriously the interests of insureds 
and the public.2
Similar controversy surrounds investment in real 
estate. The industry average is three per cent of admitted 
assets.3 The Texas Code permits thirty-three and one-third 
per cent with provision for this figure to be increased to 
fifty per cent with advance approval of the State Board of 
Insurance.4 Many states have lower limits. The 1956 study 
of the Texas Legislative Council showed that of thirteen 
states which were picked for comparison, ten set a lower 
limit than Texas, with figures ranging from ten to twenty- 
eight per cent; two set no limit, and one made no provisions 
in its statutes pertaining to real estate investment.^
^Letter to Don J. Willmon, Dallas, October 25, 1973.
^Kimball and Denenberg, Insurance, Government and 
Social Policy, p. 137.
^Best's Reports, Life/Health 1973.
^Insurance Code, Art. 3.40.
^A Report to the 55th Legislature, p. 58.
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Of the top fifty Texas companies at the end of 1972 
five owned no real estate. For the other forty-five, the 
portion ranged from 0.03 per cent to twenty-six per cent of 
admitted assets, for an average of 5.34 per cent.^
Spencer Kimball concluded, after studying various
state restrictions on real estate ownership;
From the earliest insurance company charter in the 
United States, strict limitations were imposed upon 
acquisition of real property. These laws long ante­
date the law's real concern for the security of insur­
ance company assets; rather, they seemed to effectuate 
a policy like that of the English mortmain acts, to 
keep real property out of the control of institutions 
which might have perpetual life.2
Mr. Reeves, whose letter was quoted above, favors 
more liberal consideration for real estate. "The section 
actually mitigates against investment and consideration for 
Texas real estate albeit a fact that the very basis of our 
wealth in this state is indeed in real e s t a t e . D o n  Willmon 
stated there is nothing wrong with having more than three per 
cent in real estate. He said each situation should be analyzed 
individually, and he felt there was more of a tendency for the
^Best's Reports, Life/Health 1973.
^Kimball, Insurance and Public Policy, pp. 69-70. 
^Letter, E. J. Reeves to Don J. Willmon, October 25,
1973.
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Insurance Department to undervalue it than to overvalue it.l
It is true that, historically, land has been a good investment
in Texas. A recent study reported in Texas Parade surveys the
current situation and concludes:
Speaking generally, the rise in land prices has been 
spectacular. Choice Texas land doubled in price 
between 1953 and 1970. Between 1970 and 1972, it 
doubled again. In another two years, it had doubled 
again.2
Commissioner Cotten told of the difficulties with 
Girard Life involving real estate. The company owned some 
"junky real estate," which it was required to remove from 
its admitted assets. This left one very valuable piece of 
real estate (about 100 acres near downtown Dallas) comprising 
about eighty per cent of the company's assets. Following some 
"bad decisions," the company was placed in receivership Decem­
ber 31, 1970. The land was carried on the company's books for 
$30 million, but the best offer the Commissioner could get for 
it was $8 million. Rather than accept that, with considerable
^Interview, Amarillo, Texas, October 27, 1973. If 
underevaluation is widespread, it may be an over-reaction to 
a prior situation. The Texas Legislative Council 1956 Report 
stated, "Regulations governing appraisal of real estate owned 
by insurance companies were non-existent prior to 1955. The 
situation was capitalized on by a number of unscrupulous oper­
ators in the post World Warll years until the enactment by the 
54th Legislature of laws designed to stop such practices. Evi­
dence disclosed, as reported in the Legislative Council's 1954 
study, that flagrant overevaluation of real estate, partic­
ularly of home office buildings, was a primary or contributing 
cause of failure of several companies." Texas Legislative 
Council, Report to the 55th Legislature, pp. 47-8.
^Dudley Lynch, "Gimme Land, Lot'sa Land. Land Fever is 
Rampant— And The Prices Just Keep Climbing Higher," Texas Parade, 
June, 1974, p. 15.
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loss to policyholders, he set out to try to work out some­
thing else.l
The results are described in the Texas Star of January 
28, 1973. Commissioner Cotten finally worked out an arrange­
ment with John D. MacArthur of Chicago. According to Cotten:
Mr. MacArthur shared my conviction that the potential 
value of the real estate through development would 
ultimately restore the policyholders to a situation 
of no loss whatsoever. In fact, he was so convinced 
that he in effect guaranteed to accomplish this 
within a ten year period. He guaranteed to make the 
policyholders whole within such period in the event 
that he fails to realize the value by development 
of the land.2
Board Chairman Christie said he wanted to "emphasize 
strongly that this was an excellent example of how a talented 
and dedicated Commissioner like Mr. Cotten has worked hard to 
save policyholders."3
These various views about real estate confirm the 
observation of Mr. Willmon quoted above, that it is not the 
percentage of real estate which matters, but the particular 
situation.
In considering current problems, the matters of ascer­
taining costs and disclosing costs to the buyer, as described 
in Chapter II, must not be overlooked. Both of these problems
^Interview, Austin, June 20, 1973.
^Gordon Fulcher, "Search for A Savior; Insurance 
Commission Uses New Concept To Help Protect Company's Policy­
holders," Texas Star, January 28, 1973, p. 9.
^Interview, Austin, June 20, 1973.
180
merit continued study. Regulatory officials must continue 
to work closely with interested groups in the industry and 
in the accounting profession to alleviate these problems.
The Order of the State Board to use the Interest 
Adjusted Cost Comparison Index has already been cited.^ 
Accompanying this Order was a letter from the Commissioner 
specifying minimum acceptable requirements for complying with 
the Order. Among them was the following:
4. Any proposal or comparison of life insurance 
policies shall be in written form and shall 
contain the following statement or one of the 
same substantial meaning in a clear and con­
spicuous manner: "The amounts and calculations
reflected herein show a relationship of the 
premiums, cash values and other policy values.
Such should not be considered to represent the 
cost of any insurance or annuity policy pro­
posal. "2
This required disclaimer is evidence that the Cost 
Comparison Index is no more than an index. Additional study 
is needed to determine actual cost figures which are satis­
factory.
The whole question of accounting is involved in the 
question of Board examination of companies. Examinations must 
be made every six months for the first three years of opera­
tion; once a year for the fourth through sixth years of opera­
tion, and thence once every three years. It may be done more
^State Board of Insurance, Order No. 26809, March 28,
1974.
2
Letter, Don B. Odom, Commissioner of Insurance, to 
"All Companies Authorized To Write Life Insurance In the State 
of Texas," attached to Board Order No. 26809.
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often as deemed desirable.1 The variation in examination 
requirements is recognition that some companies require 
examination more than others. A study by a Professor of 
Insurance at the University of Pennsylvania advocates even 
more flexibility. He claims the examination system of most 
state insurance departments is "deficient in every respect,: 
and calls for " . . .  substituting annual independent audits 
for mandatory, full scale examinations of every insurer."
Much of his thesis is based on the belief that, "To, examine 
(giant companies) which are firmly established as often as 
smaller, less sophisticated companies are examined, is an 
inefficient use of examination manpower.
Texas has taken a partial step in this direction, in 
that the Code requirement for annual re-licensing of all 
companies was changed in 1955. A company's license to oper­
ate will now continue in force until revoked.^
A continuing problem is provision of adequate exam­
iners— both in quality and quantity. In 1957, John Osorio, 
while serving a short term as Chairman of the Board of Insur­
ance Commissioners, acknowledged the deficiency in examinations, 
He stated that during the fiscal year 1955-1957, the Board was
^Insurance Code, Art. 1.15, Sec. 1.
^Robert A. Zelten, "Solvency Surveillance: The Prob­
lems and a Solution," Journal of Risk and Insurance 34 (Decem­
ber, 1972): 573,575.
^Acts 1955, 54th Legislature, p. 826, ch. 307.
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able to make only 587 of the 1,504 examinations required by 
law. In spite of that, the Legislature was preparing to 
reduce the personnel allowed the Board. He asked for 140 
examiners and 28 field actuaries, stating, "This Board can­
not close down a company on rumor or conjecture or where the
full facts are not thoroughly d e t e r m i n e d . T h e  Board was
2
authorized 44 examiners, which is the present number.
No matter how many examiners might actually be avail­
able, however, all problems would not be detected in time to 
forestall trouble. When a guaranty bill was being considered 
for the District of Columbia in 1971, the following testimony 
from Dr. Richard M. Heins was presented:
Expansion and improvement in the quality of examina­
tion and audits of annual statements will curb insol­
vency. Still, crimes are committed regardless of the 
number of policemen hired, and insolvencies will occur 
regardless of the thoroughness or frequency of exami­
nation.3
A problem which has caused concern both in Oklahoma 
and Texas is the increase in "mail order" insurance. Oklahoma 
Commissioner Hunt has stated that he and his staff are giving 
close scrutiny to firms selling by this method: "We will con­
tinue to keep a very close eye on this type of operation to
^Letter, John Osorio, Chairman, Board of Insurance 
Commissioners, to William S. Fly, Chairman, Senate Finance 
Committee, and Max C. Smith, Chairman, House Appropriations 
Committee, April 5, 1957.
^State Board of Insurance, Ninetv-Eighth Annual Report.
3u. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the District of 
Columbia, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Business, Commerce 
and Judiciary, 1971, p. 140.
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make sure that all of the facts are clearly and properly 
stated in the advertisement," he added.^ Deputy Commissioner 
Grimes indicated that Pennsylvania is the source of most of 
the problems.2
The increase of such operations in Pennsylvania is 
understandable in view of their encouragement from former 
Commissioner Denenberg. In 1971 he stated he "intended to 
save the public at least $75 million a year by approving 
mail order sales of life insurance . . . ."^
The Texas Insurance Commissioner issued an Official 
Order in December, 1971, which attempted to forestall objec­
tionable practices of mail-order business and deceptive adver­
tising practices. Each company must file with its Annual 
Statement a certificate by an authorized officer stating 
that,
. . . to the best of his knowledge, information 
and belief, the advertisements which were dissem­
inated by the insurer during the preceding State­
ment year complied or were made to comply in all 
respects with the provisions of these g u i d e s .4
^Southwestern Insurance Regional, July 31, 1973, p. 1.
^Interview, Oklahoma City, August 6, 1973.
^Robert B. Mitchell, "In Retrospect," The National 
Underwriter, Seventy-fifth Anniversary Edition, 1972, p. 221.
^Official Order, No. 35848, Commissioner of Insurance, 
State of Texas, December 21, 1971, "Commissioner's Guidelines 
in Respect of Insurance Trade Practices, Advertising and 
Solicitation.
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Recent Legislation 
Each session of the Texas Legislature considers many 
bills pertaining to insurance. In the 1973 session 29 such 
bills were passed, of which 15 pertained in some way to life 
insurance.1 One of the most significant was the Life, Acci­
dent, Health and Hospital Service Insurance Guaranty Asso­
ciation Act.2 In previous years such a proposal had been 
very controversial. In 1972, members of the Texas Life Con­
vention (the larger companies) were generally opposed. At a 
meeting of a Legislative Interim Study Committee, Ben H. Car­
penter, President of Southland Life, stated clearly the basis 
for their objection: "It is absolutely wrong to take funds
away from the policyholders and stockholders of strong, pru­
dently managed companies for the purpose of subsidizing mis­
managed and fraudulently managed c o m p a n i e s . A t  the same 
meeting. Commissioner Cotten stated his views, and those of 
some of the smaller companies. He compared the Guaranty Fund 
to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which he said 
some bankers had probably opposed when it was initiated, but 
which he thought now had general support.^
iList provided by Representative Bynum, "Insurance 
Bills Passed by the 63rd Legislature."
^Senate Bill 777, 63rd Legislature. It will add a 
new Article to the Insurance Code, Article 21.28-D. It applies 
only to legal reserve companies.
^Austin Insurance Report, February 29, 1972.
^ibid.
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By the time of the 1973 Legislature, support for some 
type of guaranty fund had increased. During testimony before 
the Senate Economic Development Committee, Board Chairman 
Christie referred to the bill as "social legislation." George 
Cowden, Speaking for the Texas Life Convention, agreed that 
it was "social legislation." He said that members of the 
Texas Life Convention favored the bill, although some had 
opposed it in the past.^
State Representative Ben Bynum explained to the 
writer how conflicting views had been reconciled to reach a 
compromise which would receive wide-spread support. First, 
no fund is actually created until a company fails. Then 
assessments are made based on total premiums in Texas. The 
amounts contributed may be shown on a company's financial 
statement as an asset, and then used as a tax credit against 
the premium tax over a period of five years. (In effect, 
this means the State is paying the amount out of its revenues, 
and spreading the losses among a larger group.) Second, no 
company may advertise in any way, nor print on the policy, 
that it is insured by the State.^
The attorney for the Texas Life Convention, Sam Winters, 
drafted most of the provisions in the bill which was finally 
passed (based on recommendations of the National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners). He stated some concern had been
^Ibid., Legislative Edition, April 25, 1973. 
^Interview, Amarillo, Jun 12, 1973.
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expressed that a Guaranty Fund could lead to laxity in regu­
lation because of less likelihood of loss to policyholders.
He felt enough safeguards were in the bill to prevent that, 
however.^
Two important recent legislative acts have already 
been discussed; the Assets Protection Act of 1971 and the 
Surplus Investment Act of 1973.  ^ The other act to be dis­
cussed here, the Insurance Holding Company System Regulatory 
Act of 1971,^ is regarded as highly significant throughout 
the industry. Previous mention has been made of the trend 
toward holding company operation, in which a life insurance 
company is only one of the subsidiary components. Prior to 
this Act, Texas was without adequate regulatory authority 
to deal with some of the financial arrangements being con- 
sumated. The Act states (in part):
It is further found and declared that the public 
interest and the interests of policyholders and 
shareholders are or may be adversely affected when:
(1) control of an insurer is sought by persons who 
would use such control adversely to the interests 
of policyholders or shareholders . . . . ^
The Commissioner is given authority over the payment 
of "extra-ordinary dividends" and certain transactions "between
^Interview, Austin, June 20, 1973.
Senate Bill 480, 63rd Legislature, 1973.
Senate Bill 233, 62nd Legislature, 1971.
'Ibid.
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a domestic insurer and any person in its holding company 
system . . .
Representative Bynum said that if this bill had pre­
viously been in existence, it could have prevented the insol­
vency of one Texas company which had been bought by a "Mafia 
operation," and left as a shell without adequate as s e t s . ^
Types of Disciplinary Action 
Available to the Board
The Texas Insurance Code 1969 includes "Rules and 
Practice and Procedure Before the State Board of Insurance 
and the Commissioner of Insurance." The stated objective 
". . . is to obtain a just, fair, equitable and impartial 
adjudication of the rights of parties in all matters within 
the jurisdiction of the State Board of Insurance and the 
Commissioner of Insurance." All official acts of the State 
Board and the Commissioner must be in writing and open to the 
public.^
When it becomes necessary for the Board to take action 
because of actual or threatened insolvency, three courses are 
open: receivership, conservatorship and s u p e r v i s i o n .^ Com­
missioner Cotten stated that the Conservatorship is unique to
^Ibid.
^Interview, Amarillo, June 12, 1973. 
^Insurance Code, p. 516.
^Insurance Code, Arts. 21.28 and 21.28-A.
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Texas.  ^ Receivership comes through Court action, and the Code
provides that the Liquidator designated by the Board shall be
the receiver. He shall take possession of the assets, and,
. . . subject to the direction of the Court, imme­
diately proceed to conduct the business of the 
insurer, or to take such steps as may be necessary 
to conserve the assets and protect the rights of 
policyholders and claimants for the purpose of 
liquidating, rehabilitating, reinsuring, reorganiz­
ing or conserving the affairs of the insurer.2
The provision for the Liquidator, an employee of the 
State, to serve as receiver is regarded as an improvement in 
regulation.3 Until 1961, liquidation employees were paid by 
the receivership. Their fees took precedence over claims of 
policyholders and creditors.^
Recognizing that once the process of receivership has 
been instituted, there is almost no possibility of returning 
to solvency, the Legislature has provided for " . . .  the addi­
tional facility of supervision and conservatorship . . . for 
attempting the rehabilitation without immediate resort to the 
harsher remedy of receivership.
^Interview, Austin, June 20, 1973.
^Insurance Code, Art. 28, SeC; 2=
^Interview, John L. McCarty, Amarillo, June 6, 1973. 
Mr. McCarty was founder and President of Estate Life Insurance 
Company, which was placed in Receivership May 26, 1958. He 
stated that a great part of the Company's assets were used 
for expenses of the Receivership. See also p. 233.
^ciay Cotten, Interview, Austin, June 20, 1961; Code, 
Art. 21.28, Sec. 12A.
^Insurance Code, Art. 21.28-A, Sec. 1.
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Supervision may be instituted when the Commissioner 
determines that a company is, or appears to be, insolvent, or 
has failed to comply with the law, or when the company gives 
its consent. From the time of notice of supervision, the 
company has sixty days to correct the situation. During 
supervision there are certain restrictions on the company's 
actions designed to protect its assets.^
If the conditions are corrected within the sixty days, 
supervision is discontinued; if not, the Commissioner shall 
immediately take charge of the Company as Conservator.^ In 
this capacity he takes managerial authority to try to rehabil­
itate the company. Or, if he feels the company cannot be 
rehabilitated, he may make immediate application to a district 
court in Travis County, Texas, for leave to file suit to for­
feit the company's charter.^
Commissioner Gotten stated that there were "twelve to 
sixteen small companies which were in and out of conservator­
ship all the time." Olympic Life (part of the Sharpstown 
State Bank scandal) was in conservatorship for two years, and 
one company had been under supervision for three years/*
^Ibid., Sec. 4. See Appendix B for example of 
Supervision Order.
2
See Appendices C, D, and E for examples of Conserva­
torship Orders.
3
Insurance Code, Sec. 5.
^Interview, Austin, June 20, 1973. See also, p. 227 
for comments of William Hunter McLean.
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Procedures of this type have aided greatly in main­
taining the values of a going concern, and in most cases—  
even if the company could not be rehabilitated— have resulted 
in reinsurance or transfer of the insurance without any loss 
to policyholders in the long run.
When a company has reached the stage of receivership, 
some losses are inevitable. Those persons whose claims are 
not satisfied, or whose equity is wiped out, will not approve 
of the arrangement. When critics call attention to the large 
number of failing companies in Texas in the past, proponents 
of the industry in the state refer to the large number of 
successful companies. The many types of small companies in 
Texas have made life insurance available to a great many 
people who might otherwise have had none available. The type 
of regulation in Texas has reflected the strong desire in the 
state to aid local business, and to place more reliance on 
competition to regulate the market than is found in some other 
states.
Chapter VI will discuss some of the conflicting pur­
poses which serve as a guide to regulation, and point out 
which purposes have been dominant in Texas.
CHAPTER VI 
CONFLICTING PURPOSES OF REGULATION
This study has examined the life insurance industry 
in the nation and in the State of Texas. It has also exam­
ined the regulatory system under which the industry functions. 
In Chapter III some of the characteristics which create a 
demand for regulation were considered. It was also pointed 
out that there are several types of demands which call for 
different types of regulation. These conflicting demands 
are analogous to the differing goals in our economy as a 
whole. Ostensibly, a desire to maintain competion is our 
primary goal, yet there are also other purposes to be served. 
In time of war, military considerations may be given priority; 
in time of depression, problems of unemployment may be consid­
ered paramount. At all times, the desire to protect the 
"little businessman" is much in evidence.
Just as pursuit of these goals may lead the economy 
in different directions, so the differing purposes to be 
served by the insurance industry will call for different 
regulatory actions. Some of these conflicting purposes will 
be examined here.
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Economie Goals
It is easy for regulators, and the practicing politic­
ians who have constructed the regulatory system, to say that 
they are acting in the "public interest" or the "common good." 
However, it is difficult to define public interest. Some, 
such as Joseph Schumpeter, deny that such a concept can even 
exist:
There is, first, no such thing as a uniquely deter­
mined common good that all people could agree on or 
be made to agreee on by the force of rational argu­
ment. This is due not primarily to the fact that 
some people may want things other than the common 
good but to the much more fundamental fact that to 
different individuals and groups the common good 
is bound to mean different things.^
Any government intervention in the market— for however 
valid a purpose— will benefit some and harm others. Paul 
Samuelson said, "There are no rules concerning the proper role 
of government that can be established by a priori r easo n i n g .
In our economy continuing attempts are made to "improve" 
the market operation, but the government action is no guarantee 
of success. Professor James Hibdon has pointed out the diffi­
culties which can arise:
^Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Demo­
cracy, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, Harper Torchbooks,
1950), p. 251.
2paul A. Samuelson, "The Economic Role of Private Activ­
ity, " in The Collected Scientific Papers of Paul A. Samuelson, 
Joseph E. Stigley, ed.. Vol. II (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press,
1966), p. 1423.
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There can be little disagreement with the proposi­
tion that if the market economy does not provide 
satisfactory results and governmental direction of 
the economy will provide better results, then the 
latter should prevail. But if the proposition is 
unchallengeable, the conditions of its application 
are less obvious. It is not always demonstrably 
evident that the losses due to flaws in the mar­
ket economy can be minimized by increased govern­
mental control and direction.^
This paper has quoted Ralph Nader, whose views seem
to be that the market must be regulated.^ There are also
those who say that the market must be left alone.^ Most
regulation is devised by those whose viewpoints lie between
these two extremes. Spencer Kimball points out the influence
of both of these viewpoints on insurance regulation:
An accomodation between the two forces resulted 
in unevenness of regulation of different aspects 
of the business. Thus, there was continued reluct­
ance to interfere in underwriting and other manage­
ment decisions, except for very cogent reasons.
On the other hand, investment was tightly controlled 
by the law.^
In most cases of government intervention in the market 
process the control of rates is of primary concern. This is
Ijames E. Hibdon, "The Market, Externalities, and the 
State," in Monev, the Market and the State; Economic Essays in 
Honor of James Muir Wallace, ed. by Nicholas A. Beadles and L. 
Aubrey, Jr., (Athens: University of Georgie Press, 1958), p. 159.
^p. 71.
^Among the many capable expressions of this viewpoint 
are the following: Henry C. Simons, "The Requisites for Free
Competition," in Economic Policy for a Free Society (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1948); and Milton Friedman, Cap­
italism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1962), Chap. 1.
^Spencer L. Kimball, Insurance and Public Policy 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1960), p. 308.
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particularly true in the various modes of transportation and 
of those industries generally regarded as public utilities.^ 
Such control is traditionally regarded as designed to protect 
the "public interest," but such a viewpoint is not universally 
accepted. Professor George Stigler advances the thesis that 
". . . as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and 
is designed and operated primarily for its benefit." He fur­
ther believes that the regulated industry favors price fixing, 
"Even the industry that has achieved entry control will often 
want price control administered by a body with coercive pow­
ers . "2
Life insurance regulation in Texas does not encompass 
setting of rates, except in a very general way. The determin­
ation of minimum required reserves implies that rates must be 
adequate to maintain such reserves. However, a company has 
considerable leeway in determining its rate levels and its 
rate structure.^
Iciair Wilcox, op. cit. Other authorities include insur­
ance in the public utility field, as, for example, "Included in 
this category were transportation facilities, warehouses, docks, 
ferries, insurance firms, markets and taverns," (Fite and Reese, 
op. cit., p. 146.)
^George J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," 
The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2 (Spring 
1971); 5.
different process is followed in regulation of fire 
and casualty insurance. These rates must be approved by the 
State Board, although the 1973 Legislature made some changes in 
the process. House Bill 64, 63rd Legislature, 1973, authorized 
deviation from State Board approved rates when a deviation appli­
cation is submitted to and approved by the State Board. This 
is regarded as one of the important bills of the 63rd Legislature.
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Insurance companies in Texas are also subject to most 
of the restrictions and obligations of other types of corpora­
tions. The Code states, "The laws governing corporations in 
general shall apply to and govern insurance companies incorpor­
ated in this state insofar as the same are not inconsistent 
with any provisions of this Code . . . .
The State of Texas recognizes no more nor less obli­
gation to protect investors in insurance companies than in 
other types of business activities, but any action taken to 
help assure a company's solvency will be of benefit to the 
stockholders. In contrast, California and New York have taken 
specific action to try to prevent" . . . speculation and over­
valuation of the shares from the o u t s e t . i n  California the 
minimum price for the initial offering of stock in a new life 
insurance company is $50 per share.^ In New York the par value 
of life company shares cannot be less than $2.00.^
Solvency, or protection for policyholders, is almost 
universally regarded as a primary goal of regulation. Numerous
^Insurance Code, Art. 2.18.
^William R. Robertson, speech, Williamsburg, Va., May 
14, 1965, quoted in Jon S. Hanson and Duncan R. Farney, "New 
Life Insurance Companies: Their Promotion and Regulation,"
Marquette Law Review 49 (Fall 1965): 230.
^California Department of Insurance Memorandum, Nov.
25, 1964, as amended Jan. 15, 1965, quoted in Hanson and Farney, 
loc. cit., p. 230.
‘^106th Annual Report of the Superintendent of Insurance 
to the New York Legislature Covering 1964, p. 25, quoted in 
Hanson and Farney, loc. cit., p. 230.
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quotations in this paper have testified to this point, and will 
not be repeated here. Yet if solvency is regarded as the only 
goal or purpose, it will override others that have some valid­
ity. A pre-eminent concern for solvency might cause entry 
barriers to be set so high that new companies would have no 
chance to enter the market. Existing companies would then 
have an opportunity for monopoly profits.
Tibor Scitovsky addressed this point in a paper
delivered at the 1949 American Economic Association:
We think of competition as a force that tends to 
eliminate profits; and of monopoly or oligopoly 
power as something that restrains competition and 
thereby prevents the elimination of profits. Oligo­
poly power, therefore, is the power to restrain com­
petition. Professor Chamberlin has shown that we 
must distinguish two kinds of restraint on competi­
tion. One of these is the obstacles to entry, which 
keep profits from attracting newcomers to a market 
and so prevent the elimination of profits by the 
additional competition of these newcomers. The other 
kind of restraint on competition is that imposed on 
the market behavior of established firms, which enables 
them to raise prices higher relatively to costs than 
they could in the absence of such restraints.1
Professor Donald Dewey has expressed the general aver­
sion to monopoly in our nation (and thus the belief in "small" 
business) as follows: "Over the years the case against mono­
poly has rested mainly on the popular conviction that its 
posession confers on the fortunate party an unfair advantage 
in the competition for the good things of life."2 The letters
^Tibor Scitovsky, "Ignorance as a Source of Oligopoly 
Power," American Economic Review 40 (May 1959): 48.
^Donald Dewey, Monopoly In Economics and Law (Chicago: 
Rand McNally & Co., 1959), p. 1.
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quoted in the previous chapter from presidents of several Texas 
life insurance companies bear out the belief that small com­
panies should be allowed to grow. Some of the difficulties 
facing small companies are brought out clearly in a recent 
letter from the Commissioner of Insurance in Colorado, a for­
mer insurance agent, who has held office since 1964:
Perhaps the greatest problem facing a small 
insurance company today is its size. They are 
finding it extremely difficult to compete with 
larger companies, both for getting agents to 
represent them and for selling of business.
Tills is particularly true in the life and acci­
dent field.
Evidence of this is rather clear in the 
increasing number of acquisitions and mergers 
that are going on. Repeatedly we hear in hear­
ings relating to acquisitions that the small 
companies have not been able to grow, and 
therefore, consider merger as one means of 
getting large enough that they can compete.
Related also to the size problem is the 
cost of doing business. Computer programs and 
other procedures cannot be justified unless the 
volume is sufficient. Combined, a small company 
finds their costs going up out of proportion to 
their volume, their volume not going up because 
of their size, and their size making it difficult 
for them to maintain a sales force. Finally, the 
insurance regulator looks at their high expenses 
of operation, their slowly depleting surplus, and 
has a great concern for the insuring public.^
A spokesman for small and medium-sized companies 
gives an illustration of the expense problem in this way:
The big problem is the enormous increase in the 
items of general expense, which is a by-product of 
inflation and one wholly outside the control of the
^J. Richard Barnes, C.L.U., Insurance Commissioner, 
Colorado, Letter to writer, July 11, 1974.
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industry. Some of it, I know, is occasioned by 
vanity; some small companies think that they need 
a computer of a size capable of serving American 
National, when all they need is a ten-key, eight­
digit adding machine. But when you consider that 
the cost of mailing the premium notice of an older 
policy has increased more than 500 per cent, it is 
easy to get the problem in context.^
The Texas Insurance Code, Part II, includes portions 
of the Business and Commerce Code pertaining to Trusts and 
Monopolies. Included are definitions of trusts and monopop- 
olies, and lists of certain prohibited acts which " . . .  tend 
to prevent or lessen competition."^ The numerous mergers of 
insurance companies without challenge under this Code indi­
cate a clear feeling that competition is not thereby lessened.
An alternative view is that the approval of the mergers 
may indicate a favoring of large companies, as expressed in 
this letter from former State Insurance Board Chairman Hunter 
McLean;
In many states, including Texas, there is a 
legislative and regulatory distrust of new or small 
companies that takes form in discriminatory statutes 
and regulations, and in their enforcement. With 
anti-trust and anti-monopoly suits being filed by 
the score against giant general corporations all 
over the country, it may be noteworthy that not a 
single giant life insurance company has been filed 
on by any state regulatory agency, even though some 
are enaged in the buying of business with large 
demand deposits in banks, mortgage loan take-out 
agreements with mortgage lenders, or what have you.
loeWitt H. Roberts, Executive Secretary National 
Association of Life Companies, (Atlanta, Ga.) Letter to 
writer, October 24, 1973.
^Insurance Code, Part II, p. 449-452. (This portion 
of the Insurance Code incorporates Secs. 15.01 and 15.02 of 
the Business and Commerce Code-Vernon's Annotated Texas Statutes.)
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in exchange for credit or permanent life insurance 
origination.!
In a subsequent letter Mr. McLean outlined some of 
the conflicts that appear in insurance regulation:
The original and paramount purpose of insurance 
regulation is solvency. In contradition of purpose, 
much legislation and political campaign demagoguery, 
compelling greater benefits for and lower costs to 
insureds, invites insolvency. Also, almost no recog­
nition has been given the conflicts of prudence vs. 
speculation inherent in insurance. The insurance 
company official is charged with the duty of pru­
dence to maintain solvency while, at the same time, 
being subjected to political criticism for not 
accepting speculative insurance risks. Bankers 
being charged solely with prudence, legislators 
would not consider for one minute a bill requiring 
them to make loans to replace the burned up auto­
mobile of any character that walked into the bank.
Yet insurance officials are expected to accept sub­
standard risks, in cases of workmens compensation are 
required to do so, and still measure up to the rule
of prudence.2
Regulation of life insurance company investments may 
also be concerned with concentration of economic power in a 
way unrelated to normal regulatory procedure. Kimball and 
Denenberg state, "The laws may, for example, prohibit an 
insurer from purchasing a block of stock in another corpora­
tion large enough to permit the insurer to establish control.
The possibilities of political influence on investment 
regulations are illustrated in this statement from Mr. McLean:
..3
^William Hunter McLean, Dallas, Letter to Don J. 
Willmon, October 4, 1973.
^William Hunter McLean, letter to writer, November 2,
1973.
^Kimball and Denenberg, op. cit., p. 127.
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Bank Stocks are favored by statute. Until the last 
session of the Texas legislature a life company could 
have had 100 per cent of its assets invested in the 
stock of any one bank . . . ,
There can also be influence on investments based on
"social" objectives. Kimball and Denenberg give an example
of this from New York:
For example, in authorizing investments in housing.
Sec. 84 of the New York Insurance Law states: "To
promote and supplement public and private efforts to 
provide an adequate supply of decent, safe and sani­
tary dwelling accomodations for persons of low and 
moderate income and to assist in relieving the hous­
ing situation, any domestic life insurance company 
may, wherever it is actually doing the business of 
life insurance, acquire or construct housing pro­
jects . . . ." Social objectives like.these are more 
numerous than they were— it is no longer possible, 
if it ever was, for the insurance industry to regard 
the great needs of our society as irrelevant to the 
insurance business, nor does the responsible leader­
ship in the insurance community wish to do so.2
Social and Political Goals
On the national scene the "social responsibility" of 
the life insurance industry has been recognized and accepted. 
At a White House Conference called by President Lyndon Johnson 
in September, 1967, a group of 163 of the leading life compan­
ies pledged $] billion to be made available immediately to 
finance housing and other job-creating activities in the city 
core areas.3 By the spring of 1970, the Institute of Life
Iwilliam Hunter McLean, Dallas, Letter to Don J. Will­
mon, October 4, 1973. The legislature changed the regulations 
to allow a company to invest ten per cent of its assets in any 
one bank or bank holding company. (Insurance Code, Art. 3.39, 
Part I, A. 12.)
2Kimball and Denenberg, op. cit., p. 128.
^Charles Moeller, Jr., "Economic Implications of the 
Life Insurance Industry's Investment Program in the Central 
City." Journal of Risk and Insurance 36 (March 1969): 97.
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Insurance estimated that $1.5 billion had been made available 
under this program, with $1 billion going for housing, and 
that 54,000 jobs had been created in the process.^ In the 
program each company made its own decisions and its own 
investments, taking into consideration both short-range and 
long-range responsibilities to its owners. Only on such a 
basis could the program be justified by the industry. Com­
pany officials felt that outside direction might jeopardize 
future business success.
By 1973 this Urban Investment Program had reached a 
new goal— $2 billion pledged to be diverted from usual invest­
ments into special higher-risk investments designed to bene­
fit residents of inner core areas.^
In addition to "socially desirable" investments, there 
are also "politically desirable" investments. The previously- 
mentioned provision for investment in "Securities Authorized 
by Special Acts of the Legislature" is a case in point.^
^Philip Zinkewicz, "Attention Must Be Paid— Life Indus­
try Response to Social Problems," Weekly Underwriter, January 
9, 1971, p. 46.
2
Charles Moeller, Jr., loc. cit., p. 93.
^Life Insurance Fact Book 1973, p. 10.
^Insurance Code, Art. 3.39, Part I, A.16. Most of 
these specific items pertain to authorization to invest in 
bonds of Navigation Districts, Municipal Improvement Districts, 
and the like. Bonds of five of the sixty Water Supply and 
Control Districts authorized under General Law are authorized 
as investments for insurance companies. (Vernon's Annotated 
Texas Statutes, Secs. 8280-133, 8280-134, 8280-137, 8280-138 
and 8380-139.)
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Newspaper Editor Thomas Thompson explained how these special
situationJ could be created:
A Texas legislator with enough trading stamps 
occasionally can get a new class of investments auth­
orized. For example: A Texas domestic life insurance
company is specifically authorized to be able to invest 
its money in "any paving certificate issued by any city 
in the State of Texas and secured by first lien on real 
estate." Now isn't that a fine blue chip investment 
for a life insurance portfolio?!
Former Texas Commissioner Gotten described this pro­
cess as the Legislature "continually chipping away" at the 
Board's authority.^
Revenue and Employment Goals 
The Texas Legislature has also taken steps to encourage 
investment within the State by differential tax rates. The tax 
assessed against foreign companies for premiums collected in 
Texas (3.3 per cent) is higher than the premium tax on domestic 
companies (1.1 per cent). The former rate may be reduced to 3.02 
per cent, 2.75 per cent, 2.2 per cent or 1.92 per cent, depend­
ing on the percentage of investments of "Texas Securities."3
Investment by insurance companies in the state creates 
employment, as does the selling and servicing of insurance.
Of the one and one-half million people employed in insurance 
in the nation in 1972, approximately fifty-six per cent were
^Thomas Thompson, Amarillo Globe-Times, April 19, 1972. 
^Interview, Austin, June 20, 1973.
^Insurance Code, Part III; Vernon's Annotated Civil 
Statutes, Arts. 4769 and 7064a. "Texas Securities" are 
defined in Art. 3.34 of the Texas Insurance Code.
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employed wholly or partially in life insurance. With about 
five per cent of all life insurance in the nation in Texas, 
probably a similar per cent of the employees would be in 
Texas.^ If so, this would amount to more than 40,000 people 
in 1972. These people are working in a "smokeless industry" 
of the sort which most communities consider desirable. It 
is understandable that states would encourage the location 
of such industries within their borders.
State regulation might also be designed to attract 
companies because of the tax revenue. The figures listed 
in Chapter IV show this to be a substantial figure in Texas. 
Mr. Samuel C. Cantor, former Acting Superintendent for Insur­
ance in New York, and now Senior Vice President for Law and 
External Affairs of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New 
York, was questioned about such a motive:
In regard to your question about whether "laxity"
(in regulation) is a result of a conscious decision to 
create a climate where local companies might prosper,
Mr. Cantor recognized that this might be a legitimate 
orientation. As a former insurance commissioner, he 
feels that the modus operandi should be: 1) to protect
the policyholder, 2) to insure that companies remain 
solvent and 3) within those constraints, to create an 
environment where companies prosper because if a com­
pany— particularly a mutual company— thrives, the bene­
fits redound to the policyholders. Also motivation in 
Texas could be to attract tax revenues. California, 
for example, has offered tax advantages for companies.
He believes this is not a compromise, as long as pro­
tection of the policyholders remains primary.!
!These figures are taken from the Life Insurance Fact 
Book 1973, pp. 23, 96, 97.
^Letter, Suzanne T. Turner, Press and Community Rela­
tions Specialist, MONY, to writer, March 26, 1974.
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No one would advocate that the various purposes of 
regulation discussed above should supersede completely sol­
vency and protection of policyholders. Yet the more consid­
eration any of them receives, the less certain become the 
primary goals. Legislators and regulators should realize 
that pursuit of one goal may impinge on the pursuit of 
another. However, it must be realized that in each state 
the combination of goals pursued will ultimately be decided 
through the political process.
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Among economists there are often differences of opin­
ion. When political interests must be considered, such differ­
ences may well be amplified. As the previous chapter has illus­
trated, regulation of the life insurance industry is designed 
to serve purposes which are sometimes incompatible. The 
writer's conclusions and recommendations in this chapter are 
based on a balance of what he deems economically desirable and 
politically feasible. This balance must recognize not only 
political and economic factors, but also the various groups 
whose interests are involved. These include not only insurance 
buyers, but stockholders, agents, company officials, and all 
citizens of the regulating states.
Conclusions
The stated purpose of this study was to analyze the 
effect of administrative regulation on the Texas life insur­
ance industry, and to determine whether microeconomic theory 
could be an effective tool of analysis. The importance of 
theory was recognized by Texas Insurance Board Member Durwood 
Manford, who stated, "No theory was validity unless it is 
practical; nothing is practical unless there is a theory.
^Interview, Austin, June 21, 1973.
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The writer believes that theory has provided a tool of analy­
sis in examining the structure, behavior and performance of the 
industry, but sometime is has been only a crude tool. One 
explanation of this fact is that there are significant differ­
ences between the life insurance industry and other industries 
for which analytical techniques have been more fully developed.
In this presentation analysis of the structure of the 
industry has been conducted in the conventional manner. The 
most obvious structural characteristic of the industry in Texas—  
the number of companies— undoubtedly has been influenced by regu­
lation. The low entry requirements have encouraged the organi­
zation of new companies, as has the provision for lower premium 
taxes on domestic companies. Despite the claims of some repre­
sentatives of smaller companies that regulation discriminates 
against them the process of organizing such companies continues.
Although there seems to be no general agreement as to 
the minimum size necessary for profitable operations, the 
smaller companies are finding it increasingly difficult to 
operate profitably. This is confirmed both by company officials 
and regulatory personnel. Economies of scale may become more of 
a barrier to entry than statutory requirements.
The low initial capital requirements which existed in 
Texas for many years generated much criticism, yet many compan­
ies have grown and prospered after starting with the minimum 
allowable capital and surplus. Even the current requirements 
are among the lowest in the nation. A much more significant
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factor than the initial capital is the relation of the capital 
and surplus to the operations of the company.^ According to 
Kimball, the initial capital provides security for policyholders 
while a company gets a start, but then there is a need for a 
fund which, with " . . .  the reinsurance arrangements of the 
company, must be related to the size and other characteristics 
of the company's portfolio, though certainly not in any rela-
p
tionship that is easy to compute."^
Dean Kimball also described the way in which insurance 
regulators in several European countries meet this problem by 
prescribing capital requirements on an individual company 
basis.3 He believes the number of companies in the United 
States is too large for this at the present time. Neverthe­
less, it is quite possible that the declining number of com­
panies in Texas will make it possible to look at each company 
more carefully in the future. New legislation would be needed, 
however, to make specific requirements for each company, as is 
done in Delaware and Maine.^ An approach which seems more real­
istic politically is the New Mexico approach, which has capital 
requirements scaled to the size and nature of a company's oper­
ations.5 As this paper has indicated, there is considerable
ISee p. 228 for comment about amount of premium income 
in relation to solvency.
^Spencer L. Kimball, "Sketches From A Comparative Study 
of American and European Insurance Regulation," Journal of Risk 
and Insurance 32 (June 1965): 204.
3Ibid., p. 204-5.
4gee p. 137-8.
Sibid.
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difference of opinion as to what constitutes the proper cap­
ital structure for a life insurance company. The question, 
is sure to receive continued attention in industry, regula­
tory and academic circles.1
In addition to amount of capital needed, economies of 
scale also play a part in the increasing number of affiliations 
between life companies and mutual funds. A related development 
is the rising number of holding companies in which life insur­
ance is only one component. These activities reflect the 
desire of the life insurance companies to ". . . regain that 
portion of the consumer savings dollar that in recent years has 
gone into other forms of savings." Such actions accentuate the 
problem of defining industry boundaries for economic analysis 
and regulatory purposes. Edward Chamberlin spoke of such a
problem at the American Economic Association in 1949:
"Industry" or "commodity" boundaries are a snare 
and a delusion— in the highest degree arbitrarily drawn, 
and wherever drawn, establishing false implications both 
as to competition of substitutes within their limits, 
with supposedly stops at their borders, and as to the 
possibility of ruling on the presence or absence of mono­
polistic forces, by the simple device of counting the 
number of producers included.3
iThe Oklahoma Insurance Department is now seeking to 
raise initial requirements to $400,000, and also to require 
existing companies to meet that figure. (Gerald Grimes, 
Deputy Commissioner, Telephone Interview, August 7, 1974.)
^Best’s Insurance Report, Life/Health 1973, p. ix. 
("Recent years' refers to years prior to World War II, 
according to a letter from Robert J. King, Staff Analyst,
A. M. Best Co., July 26, 1974.)
^Edward H. Chamberlin, "Product Heterogeneity and 
Public Policy," American Economic Review 40 (May 1950): 86-87.
209
The process of counting firms and seeking to measure 
concentration in the industry by traditional methods is inexact 
for the life insurance industry. Scitovsky and others have 
attributed this difficulty to ignorance, or the "uninformed 
market." Professor Belth has applied such an analysis to 
insurance :
Given the many dimensions of ignorance in 
transactions involving insurance (and the prac­
tices that substitute for overt price competition), 
it is perhaps apparent that the extent of the 
industry's departure from the ideal of perfect 
competition is not fully reflected by concentra­
tion ratios. The shortcomings of these ratios in 
this regard may well be greater in this major 
industry than in any other. Casting further 
light on the state of competition in the industry, 
however, is far from simple. A major problem is 
to devise a defensible method of determining 
effective price— a method that permits valid com­
parisons to be made.l
In considering the behavior of the industry, the analy­
sis of market strategy is very important. Using Professor
Stocking's definition of strategy as "the weapon of a firm
2
operating in an imperfectly competitive market," it is clear 
that this weapon includes a highly differentiated product and 
definite price discrimination. Other indicators of behavior 
patterns which are sometimes used, such as collusion, price 
leadership, conscious parallelism and merger history, are not 
always pertinent to life insurance.
Ijoseph M. Belth and W. David Maxwell, "The State of 
Competition in the Life Insurance Industry," Antitrust Bulletin 
15 (Summer 1970): 220.
2see p. 47.
3These factors are listed in "Legal and Economic Issues 
in Competition and Monopoly," Brookings Research Report No. 2, 
The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., June 1962, p. 4.
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One of the most serious behavior problems— and one 
not found in other industries— concerns cost determination 
and accounting. The accounting problems of the industry are 
of such nature that traditional accounting methods are not 
used. They do not reveal the true cost of the product either 
to the industry or to the customer. It is thus practically 
impossible to determine at what point on an average cost 
curve a firm is operating.
Part of the problem arises from the practice of 
treating all acquisition costs as an expense in the year 
incurred. An example of the misleading nature of accounts 
kept in such a manner is provided in the explanation accom­
panying the current "Fortune Directory of the Fifty Largest 
Life Insurance Companies."
One figure among the totals does seem at first 
glance to be out of joint. The group's net gain 
from operations was up only 2.1 per cent— versus 
56.9 per cent in 1972. Metropolitan was primarily 
responsible for this sharp fall-off. The Met 
reported a net loss from operations of $13 million, 
versus a gain of $72 million in 1972. Such figures 
are deceptive, however. State insurance laws require 
a company to set aside reserves for the policies it 
writes; in addition it must charge off the cost of 
writing them as they occur. Thus that "loss," which 
is recoverable in future years, resulted from the 
fact that the company did a healthy volume of group 
and individual annuity business.^
Another part of the problem arises from the differing 
purposes to be served by the company's reports. One professor 
of business administration analyzed it in this way:
l"The Fortune Directory of the Fifty Largest Life 
Insurance Companies," Fortune, July, 1974, pp. 112-113.
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Certainly in the life insurance industry the 
accounting methods prescribed for reporting to 
regulatory authorities are not suitable for 
reporting to investors. The Insurance Commis­
sioner is primarily concerned with seeing that 
the policyholder is protected by the maintenance 
of unquestionable company solvency. The investor 
is primarily concerned with knowing the results 
of the company's operations. Reports prepared 
for distribution to stockholders and the invest­
ment community should reflect accurately the 
income resulting from company operations.!
A manual prepared to assist students and company 
officers seeking specific guides and principles for the com­
pletion of the required Convention form of annual statements 
acknowledges that there are many interpretations of the 
various items. The manual further reveals the inexact nature 
of the various accounts:
Because of the long term nature of the life insur­
ance contracts and the necessity of providing for 
reserves estimated to cover future guaranteed commit­
ments, it would not be appropriate to imply that a 
given "profit" or "loss" is sustained by a company in 
any particular year. However, the Net Gain from Opera­
tions . . .  is the company's expected results if future 
experience corresponds with the mortality and interest 
factors assumed.2
These problems of accounting are a contributing fac­
tor in the difficulty of explaining pricing policies of the 
industry. The difficulty is intensified by the failure of 
consumers to treat price as a prime factor in their consider­
ation of life insurance. A review of significant events in
^Reynolds Griffith, "A Note on Life Insurance Account­
ing," Journal of Risk and Insurance 31 (July 1964): 207.
^Charles M. Beardsley, Life Company Annual Statement 
Handbook (Winston-Salem, N.C.: Charles M. Beardsley, 1962),
p. I—1.
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the industry in the last quarter-century brought this comment
on price-consciousness from the former editor of the Life
and Health Insurance Edition of The National Underwriter;
. . . people continued to buy life insurance in 
very much the same way they bought automobiles, 
groceries, booze, or legal and medical advice.
They didn't ignore price, but neither did they 
try very hard to make sure they were dealing with 
the lowest bidder.1
Lack of attention to the price of the policy is also
motivated by the belief that buying life insurance involves
more than just the policy- It involves service from the
agent and the company. The Press and Community Relations
Specialist for Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York
expressed this position;
Denenberg and Senator Hart have been pushing in 
the direction of complete disclosure and standard­
ization with certain minimal requirements for policy 
benefits. These are certainly paths that result from 
the consumer movement where people are concerned with 
getting the best value for their money. The other 
side is that freedom to provide a diversity of pro­
ducts and benefits is the ultimate direction of com­
petition where management discretion and expertise, 
experience and new ideas works to the advantage of 
the consumer . . . .  MONY and many of the other big 
companies say that professional service is one of the 
most important parts of life insurance because it is 
the only way to help the client find the right pro­
duct for his own specific n e e d s . 2
Finding the right product in the midst of the plethora 
of policies may involve very high information costs. Critics
^Robert M. Mitchell, "In Retrospect, The Last Quarter- 
Century in American Insurance," The National Underwriter, 
Seventy-fifth Anniversary Edition, 1972, p. 20.
^Letter, Suzanne T. Turner, New York, March 26, 1974.
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of the industry believe costs could be lowered by required 
standardization of policies. Such a criticism is not unique 
to the life insurance industry, but is prevalent throughout 
the economy. A forceful answer to this criticism is given 
in the following passage from a well-known text:
Some people think that most product differen­
tiation is silly. Are Chesterfields not the same 
as Lucky Strikes; Cokes the same as Pepsis and 
Palmolive the same as Lux? Although the physical 
differences may be trivial, in the minds of some 
customers, they are significant . . . .  You 
could declare them prejudiced, ignorant, or dis­
criminatory, but all you mean is that their tastes 
or preferences differ from yours. And this should 
give us reason to pause before confidently assert­
ing that buyers who discriminate among brands of 
cigarettes, aspirin, paper tissues, soap, corn 
flakes or canned milk do so only because they are 
irrational or uninformed.1
Some critics of the industry would meet the problem 
of alleged consumer ignorance by forced standardization. 
Professor Belth has recognized such a possibility, and con­
siders it highly undesirable:
A possible alternative to a rigorous system of 
information disclosure . . . would be the standardi­
zation of life insurance policies and a drastic 
reduction in the number of policy types. In my 
opinion, only two policy types would be needed: 
straight life and either one-year renewable term 
or five-year renewable term. The difficulty with 
the approach is that it would tend to place the 
life insurance industry in a straitjacket. Further­
more, I have more faith in the ability of consumers
^Armen A. Alchian and William R. Allen, University 
Economics. 2d ed. (Wadsworth, California: Belmont Publishing
Company, 1967), p. 118.
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to make decisions for themselves than in the ability 
of regulators to make decisions for consumers.1
The writer agrees with those who defend product 
differentiation. Consumer taste is one of the basic factors 
affecting demand, and the tastes of individual consumers 
differ widely. The market provides a mechanism for eliminat­
ing types of policies which do not satisfy consumer demand.
For the market to function in this way, however, more 
information is certainly needed by consumers. In testimony 
before Senator Hart's Subcommittee, Professor Belth stated 
that the major problem in the industry, as far as consumers 
are concerned, ". . . is the lack of good, solid, reliable
information at the point of sale concerning the benefits and
2
prices of the insurance they are proposing to buy."
The difficulty of ascertaining these benefits and
prices has been set forth at length in this paper. There
has not yet been devised a simple system of price comparison.
The system which Professor Belth proposed to the Subcommittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly would involve:
First, a two-page form that contains prescribed 
information to be given to the policyholder at or 
prior to the delivery of the policy; and second, the 
premium notice that the policyholder receives on each 
yearly anniversary of his policy.
^Testimony of Joseph M. Belth. U. S. Congress, Senate, 
Committee on the Judiciary, The Life Insurance Industry, Part 
1, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. 
93d Cong., 1st Sess., 1973, p. 531.
Zibid., p. 536.
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The first page of the two-page form would con­
tain annual information about the policy, and the 
second page would contain summary information. The 
yearly premium notice would contain information in . 
addition to that which companies provide routinely."
For the consumer who seeks to compare prices of insur­
ance policies in the same way he compares prices of auto­
mobiles or stereo sets, the above process seem unduly compli­
cated. Yet it may be the price he has to pay if he continues 
to demand the differentiation which the market now provides.
Even an attempt to rank companies by the price of 
the policy (without using exact figures) is not a satisfac­
tory solution. Professor Belth was asked if it were possible 
for Company A to rank higher than Company B on one type of 
policy, but lower than Company B on another. He replied:
Yes; very definitely. As a matter of fact, this 
is one of the very serious problems, even with my 
book, because it only contains the information for 
certain policies
And there is a big caveat in there that the 
figures pertain only to the policies shown, so 
that this, or Commissioner Denenberg's Shoppers'
Guides have had very interesting impact on the 
industry. They are merely based on certain policies.
Any kind of listing has got to be out of date 
the minute it's published; in fact, it's out of date 
even prior to the publication date and furthermore 
applies only to the policies shown.
That is why the whole idea of shoppers' guides 
or listings or consumers' handbooks, or anything 
like that is not an adequate substitute for a full 
system of information disclosure at the point of sale.2
llbid., pp. 530-531. 
2Ibid., p. 539.
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Even a simplified system of price disclosure would 
not satisfy the type of criticisms leveled at the industry 
by Ralph Nader.^ While it seems to the writer that some of 
Mr. Nader's own criticisms fall within his characterization 
of "collateral irrelevance and semantic n u l l i t i e s , some 
of them indicate a view of life insurance which varies con­
siderably from that of the industry.
He criticizes the industry because it "fails to 
sufficiently protect widows," while the industry cites with 
approbation the number of widows who are beneficiaries of 
life insurance policies. Nader says husbands are duped into 
buying too much of the wrong kind of insurance. Similar 
criticisms could be leveled at the way many consumer expend­
itures are made.3
The writer does not have information relating to Mr. 
Nader's charge that the Securities and Exchange Commission 
has blocked accounting reforms that would put life insurance 
profit reports on equal footing with those of other industries
^See pp. 71-72.
Ibid. For example, he criticizes the industry for 
high expenses, "virtually all borne by the consumer." Yet 
ultimately all expenses must be paid by the consumer.
3por example, a decade ago much criticism of expendi­
tures on funerals was spawned by Jessica Mitford's The Ameri­
can Way of Death (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1963) . The
answer of the funeral industry was that the American people 
made their decisions about money spent on funerals in the 
same way they made their decisions about other expenditures. 
(This statement is based on conversations with William N. 
Griggs, funeral director, Amarillo, over a period of several 
years.)
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The evidence available, however, indicates the difficulties 
are inherent in the process, and not the result of deliber­
ate obstruction.
In regard to the charge of a military-insurance inter­
lock at the Veterans Administration and Department of Defense, 
Senator Hart's Subcommittee received testimony on this matter, 
but the question is outside the scope of this study.
Mr. Nader's charge that the industry's "quiet" con­
centration of economic power has been ignored by Congress 
is subject to considerable value judgement. As indicated in 
Chapter II, the concentration within the industry is not 
quite at the level which would call for antitrust action in 
an unregulated industry. The industry is close to such a 
level, however, and perhaps more study is needed of the 
inter-locking directorates of insurance companies, banks 
and other financial institutions.
The charge of lack of effective price competition 
is also subject to varying interpretations. The presence 
of a large number of companies would normally be expected 
to provide the sort of competition that would remove any 
monopoly profit from the price. Yet the industry is still 
criticized for high prices. Mr. Nader referred to the cost 
of distribution as "a national disgrace," and cites high 
agent turnover as a contributing factor.1
^Hearings, loc. cit., p. 9.
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The industry is aware of this criticism, and of its 
very real factual basis, but has not yet found the answer 
to the problem. Similar criticism came from an industry 
spokesman, Michael P. Walsh, Director of Marketing, Home 
Life of New York, who submitted a statement to the Senate 
Subcommittee. He acknowledged the lack of an "effective and 
efficient method of distribution," and called for the indus­
try". . . to go from an institution which sells its products 
to a business which markets its p r o d u c t s . M r  Walsh also 
recognized that, "A competitive market depends on knowledge­
able buyers."2
As such voices become more prominent within the 
industry, the likelihood of devising a more efficient distri­
bution system increases. The industry has not survived for 
almost two centuries by being impervious to change.
Regardless of the type of distribution system, the 
elements determining cost will remain the same— mortality, 
investment income and operating expenses. Unless costs of 
distribution can be substantially reduced, operating costs 
will remain about the same. The presence or absence of regu­
lation will have little effect on these costs, although it 
must be remembered that costs of comparable products vary 
widely among companies.
llbid., p. 37.
Zibid., p. 41.
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The writer shares the belief, expressed to him by 
E. Jay O'Keefe, President of Western National Life of 
Amarillo, that the firms which have been successful under 
regulation in Texas would be successful in a free market.
The companies would face the same costs, and would price 
their products in about the same way. (He describes his 
company has having a "gut low" price on ordinary life insur­
ance.)^ If regulation were to involve rate-fixing, then some 
high-cost firms might be driven from the market.
One problem which regulation has not been able to 
overcome completely is dishonesty and fraud. This is true 
in insurance, banking and other types of activities where 
integrity is an important factor. The McKinsey and Company 
study mentioned in Chapter I attributed seventy-seven per 
cent of all life company insolvencies to dishonesty. A 
recent letter from former Texas State Board Chairman McLean 
describes the problem in the following colorful language:
Insurance commissioners long for, but none have 
been so wise as to develop a "Wasserman Test" disclos­
ing tendencies that may be present in individuals 
toward incompetence or dishonesty. Short of that, 
incompetence and dishonesty will continue to take 
their toll in life companies as well as in banks and 
other financial institutions.3
^Interview, Amarillo, May 17, 1974: This low price
also means low cash value.
^See p. 15.
^Letter, William Hunter McLean, Fort Worth, to writer, 
August 8, 1974.
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Mr. McLean also referred to the previously-reported 
study of comparative cost of losses in banks and life insur­
ance companies.^ He stated, "In proper perspective, the 
aggregate of policyholder losses from failure of life com­
panies . . .  as compared to banks, is as mice nibbling at 
the toes of elephants.
Even in the absence of fraud, however, no regulation 
can prevent all the problems which might arise. Former New 
York Superintendent of Insurance Richard E. Stewart acknow­
ledged such a problem;
Sometimes we have indulged ourselves in the view 
that solvency— that is, the absence of failures of 
insurance companies— was entirely dependent on the 
quality of regulation . . . .  All we can do realis­
tically is to require adequate capitalization, guard 
against management activities that threaten financial 
condition of the company, and try to detect deterior­
ation quickly and help in its repair. . . . But it 
is our responsibility to accept fully the fact that 
all these steps will sometimes not be enough.3
The writer believes that the absence of regulation 
would not precipitate drastic changes in the industry, either 
on the micro or macro level. There might well be changes in 
investment patterns, although these would come slowly because 
of the long-range nature of much life insurance investment.
^See p. 108n.
p
McLean, Letter, August 8, 1974.
^Richard E. Stewart, "The Social Responsibility of 
Insurance Regulation," in Insurance, Government and Social 
Policy, Spencer L. Kimball and Herbert S. Denenberg, eds. 
(Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1969), pp. 37-38.
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A study by the Research Department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis revealed;
Despite considerable legal and traditional con­
straints, life insurance companies maintain one 
of the most diversified portfolios of the finan­
cial institutions. Compared with most of the other 
institutions, variations in the portfolio have been 
due to secular rather than cyclical forces. Recently, 
however, life insurance companies have exhibited 
increased vulnerability to cyclical inf] vtgnces.^
In very recent years these cyclical influences have 
involved changes in interest rates. The above study further 
reported:
Of the methods by which life insurance companies 
might best meet their expanding competitition, 
investment in the stocks of private corporations 
appears to be the most promising. Since yields on 
certain stocks are potentially much higher than 
alternative uses of funds, it is not surprising 
that the companies have recently decided to organ­
ize their own mutual funds for stock investment 
purposes.^
The absence of regulations concerning investments
might well change the approach of some companies, as explained
in this statement from Hunter McLean:
An offering of municipal bonds recently crossed my 
desk from a district in Harris County, Texas. These 
were general obligation water and sewer revenue bonds 
of a district contiguous with a subdivision develop­
ment of 357 acres of land. There were six residents 
in the area and the vote for the bond issue was six 
to zero. The amount of the bond issue was over $2 
million. Those trashy bonds are legal investments 
for life companies. The statutes encourage life
iRoger W. Spencer and Michael J. Heppen, "Impact of 
Changing Economic Conditions on Life Insurance Companies," 
Working Paper No. 9, Research Department, Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, March, 1969, p. 6.
2Ibid., p. 11.
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company financing of such speculative ventures by 
others, at a higher development cost and risk, but 
deny a direct life company involvement in such 
developments even at a lower risk.l
Mr. McLean's letter illustrates what seems to the 
writer to be one of the major deficiencies of the Texas 
Insurance Code in relation to investments. The Code is con­
cerned more with the form of the investment rather than the 
content or the risk involved. Other types of evaluations, 
such as the Moody bond ratings, could give the companies 
more opportunities for profit, yet still protect the policy­
holders as well as or better than they are now.
Analysis of investment practices is a part of the 
overall performance evaluation of the industry. In consid­
ering performance indicators for the industry, any criteria 
used are inexact because of lack of standards for measure­
ment. It is clear, for example, that the industry presents 
a wide range of choices to consumers, though some critics 
say this variety of products constitutes a waste of resources, 
Does the industry provide innovations in its products to meet 
changing conditions and needs? The answer is equivocal.
There are constant attempts at innovation, but the inertia of 
regulation may cause delays. Michael Walsh, whose testimony 
before the Hart Subcommittee was quoted above, called for 
" . . .  listening to the consumer and moving in the direction
^Letter, William Hunter McLean, to Don J. Willmon, 
Dallas, October 4, 1973.
^See p. 218.
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of supplyin' the products which he is demanding in the market­
place.^
One of the most challenging problems to the innova­
tive ability of the industry at this time is the sale of a 
fixed dollar product in a period of inflation. The portion 
of disposable personal income going into life insurance 
premiums and annuity considerations has shown remarkable 
stability— fairly close to four per cent— for the last twenty- 
five years. The percentage of ordinary life in relation to 
term and group insurance has declined, however, and the 
latter are much less profitable to the company. The changing 
proportions for selected years are shown in Table VI-1.
TABLE VI-1
PROPORTIONS OF PERMANENT AND TERM INSURANCE
(per cent of total amount for years shown)
In Force 1950 1962 1970
Ordinary - Permanent 88% 76% 72%
Ordinary - Term 12 24 28
Purchases 1956 1962 1965 1967 1972
Ordinary - Permanent 67% 61% 59% 59% 59%
Ordinary - Term 33 39 41 41 41
Source: Surveys by Institute of Life Insurance and Life
Insurance Marketing and Research Association. 
(Reported to writer by Barbara Felicia of the 
Institute of Life Insurance of New York, July, 
1974.)
^Michael P. Walsh, loc. cit. , p. 41. 
^Life Insurance Fact Book 1973, p. 11.
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A Staff Analyst for the A. M. Best Company has pointed 
out the actions taken by the industry in the face of a grow­
ing percentage of less profitable sales:
To make up for the lost "cash value" sales, com­
panies have tried (not always successfully) to tie 
in mutual funds as a combination package thereby 
subscribing to the Wall Street theory of "Buy term 
and invest the difference."1
The industry has also sought to increase the market­
ing of its own equity products, such as variable annuities 
and variable life insurance, but little headway has been 
m a d e . 2 This delay is due partly to lack of knowledge of the 
product and partly to regulatory inertia.
The MAP Report (Monitoring Attitudes of the Public),
1973 Survey, included questions about these products, and
revealed little knowledge of either:
So far, scarcely anyone knows what the business's 
relatively new variable annuity product is. And 
of the few who say they know, only about one in 
three (representing two per cent of the total 
population) is able to give a correct description.
This is not surprising, when it is recalled that 
most people are poorly informed about life insur­
ance itself.3
Even fewer people than in the instance of variable 
annuities know what variable life insurance is 
(four per cent). Again, of those who say they know.
^Robert J. King, Staff Analyst, Life/Health Dept.,
A. M. Best Co., Morristown, N. J. Letter to writer, July 
26, 1974.
p
John W. Popp, "Past, Present, Future of Life Insur­
ance; Part XV of a Series," The National Underwriter, October 
3, 1970, p. 86.
^The MAP Report (New York: Institute of Life Insur­
ance, 1973), p. 86.
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only about one in three is able to give a correct 
description. In other words, at the present time 
Q few more than one million adults know what vari­
able life insurance is.l
For companies seeking to develop new products to
combat inflation, any delay is frustrating. Hunter McLean
places the blame on regulatory officials.
The advent of the variable or equity life policy 
exposes the inertia of regulation to innovation 
as well as the ineptness of Federal regulation of 
insurance. In the last ten years, while inflation 
was eroding the cash values and face amount of 
everyone's life insurance protection, life compan­
ies have pursued the issuance of variable or equit­
able life policies only to be frustrated at every 
turn, to a lesser degree by state regulators than 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission which, 
to this date, has yet to issue definitive regula­
tions. 2
Lack of product knowledge and delay in regulatory 
action are mutually reinforcing. There is much inertia in 
the regulatory process, and without strong popular support 
for a major change, the change will be slow to take place.
In almost any type of administrative procedure, maintenance 
of the status quo is the path of least resistance.
Such delay is more understandable in light of two 
points brought out earlier in this paper; insurance regula­
tion is different from that found in other industries, and 
the consumer lacks knowledge of the product. In the absence 
of rate regulation, the consumer is not as aware of the exist­
ence of regulation as he is in the case of some other industries
llbid., p. 88,
2william Hunter McLean, Letter to Don J. Willmon, 
Dallas, October 4, 1973.
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And lacking knowledge of the product, he relies on the agent 
or the reputation of the company. He will not initiate a 
demand to regulatory authorities for action on some new pro­
duct when he does not even know what the new product is— or 
realize a need for one.
The above comments have related primarily to company 
operations, but the writer has arrived at some additional 
conclusions about the Texas regulatory system. One of the 
greatest strengths is the provision for Supervision and Con­
servatorship. These actions can be taken before serious 
trouble develops, with the possibility of preventing irrevoc­
able damage. The value of such provisions is indicated by 
current action of the Oklahoma Insurance Department in seek­
ing legislative authorization for similar powers.^
There has been little loss to policyholders when a 
life insurance company in Texas was placed in receivership, 
because the Commissioner has arranged for other companies to 
assume policy obligations. In the future, the Guaranty Fund 
will give policyholders additional p r o t e c t i o n .  ^ But there 
has always been loss to stockholders, creditors and employees. 
Supervision and Conservatorship are designed to prevent these 
losses. Former Texas Insurance Commissioner Cotten spoke of 
a few small companies which were "in and out of conservatorship
^Gerald Grimes, Deputy Commissioner, Oklahoma Insurance 
Department, Telephone Interview, August 7, 1974.
2gee pp. 183-4.
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all the t i m e . F o r m e r  Texas Board Chairman McLean was asked 
to comment about the significance of such a situation, and 
replied :
I believe Mr. Cotten's statement . . . was casually 
made. Texas has a law permitting removal of incom­
petent management and if the situation was as stated, 
the Commissioner would have been negligent in not 
removing management. And, commissioners do try to 
save weak companies by giving them time to seek 
merger or reinsurance with strong companies. An 
agency force and an insurance account are non­
statement assets of great value and may only be 
preserved for benefit of policyholders by avoid­
ing receivership.2
In the final analysis, the instituion of either of 
these provisions is a matter of judgement, as is their 
termination. The results in the Girard Life case^ justified 
a lengthy period of search for proper disposition of the 
company. Undoubtedly the benefit of hind-sight shows that 
some companies should have been placed in receivership at an 
earlier stage.
The efforts to keep a company in operation in Texas 
are a proper accompaniment to ease of entry. There would be 
considerable waste of resources— as there has been at times 
in the past— in allowing companies to begin operation, only 
to fail shortly thereafter. The ease of entry and the rather 
liberal approval of a wide variety of policy forms have not
^See p. 188.
^Letter, William Hunter McLean, Fort Worth, August
8, 1974.
3See pp. 177-8.
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enabled the Texas companies to dominate the market, however.
As indicated in Chapter IV, Texas companies have about fifty 
per cent as much insurance in force in Texas as foreign com­
panies have in the State. The proportion of new insurance 
sold by the Texas companies is greater than that, however.1
There must be a variety of reasons for the large 
percentage of insurance in out-of-state companies. Undoubt­
edly many of the people who have moved into the State since 
World War II have continued their insurance with companies 
active in their former locations. Economies of scale are 
important, too. National advertising is a factor, but the 
ability to recruit and train an agency force is probably 
more significant. As brought out by the Colorado Insurance 
Commissioner, operations are becoming increasingly difficult 
for the small c o m p a n y .  ^ His view was corroborated by the 
McKinsey and Company survey which reported, "Almost eighty 
per cent of the insolvent companies had less than $1 million 
premium (annually). . . .  Further, in nearly seventy per 
cent of the insolvent companies, the owners had been in con­
trol for less than five years . . . .
The increased recognition of such difficulties may 
well intensify a demand for larger initial capital and surplus
Isee pp. 122-3.
2see p. 196.
^McKinsey and Company, Report to National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners, April, 1974. Quoted in Letter, 
William Hunter McLean, August 8, 1974.
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requirements. The writer feels that the capital structure 
should be related to operations, and that size, per se, does 
not provide strength.
Recommendations 
The very extensive problems of the life insurance 
industry which are outlined in this study cannot be resolved 
in a short period of time. But progress toward solution can 
be initiated, and in other areas progress already underway 
can be accelerated. The writer believes the following areas 
offer the greatest possibilities for improvement, and the 
greatest probability of effective action.
There is no question but that regulation should con­
tinue. The characteristics which placed the industry under 
regulation continue to be significant. In the discussion of 
federal versus state regulation, the writer favors continued 
state regulation. In the face of very wide-spread opposition 
to federal control— both in the industry and among state 
agency personnel— the transfer of control would be difficult 
both administratively and politically. There is considerable 
variation in regulation among the states, but the industry 
has learned to adapt to it. Even though the quality of regu­
lation in some states is poor, there is no assurance that 
federal control would be better.
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
provides a forum for discussion of problems, and a mechanism 
for achieving standardization where necessary. The recently
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completed study of early warning tests is an outstanding 
example. Building on the experience of states such as Texas, 
Illinois, and California, which had been using such tests, 
the lessons from each one could be drawn upon to achieve a 
solution helpful to all.
Such a process shows the strength of the federal sys­
tem. It is possible to approach a common problem in a number
of different ways at the same time. Justice Brandeis, in his
dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,^ stated 
clearly the advantages of such a system:
There must be power in the states and the nation 
to remould through experimentation, our economic 
practices and institutions to meet changing social 
and economic needs . . . .
To stay experimentation in things social and 
economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the 
right to experiment may be fraught with serious con­
sequences to the nation. It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single coura­
geous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experi­
ments without risk to the rest of the country. This 
Court has the power to prevent an experiment. We may 
strike down the statute that embodys it on the ground 
that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capri­
cious or unreasonable . . . .  But in the exercise of 
this high power, we must be ever on guard, lest we 
erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we 
would guide by the light of reason, we must let our 
minds be bold.2
These advantages of a federal system will be lost, 
however, unless there is a mechanism for transmitting valu-
^New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). 
^285 U.S. 262, 311.
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able new ideas throughout the system. The National Associa­
tion of Insurance Commissioners, and the various industry­
wide trade associations provide such a mechanism.
Prom an overall regulatory standpoint, there must
be increasing efforts through the political process to define
the goals of insurance regulation. Dean Kimball writes of
separating goals and of means of reaching those goals.
It may be that we can readily sacrifice some inter­
mediate goals that are in fact only means, in order 
to achieve more nearly the great fundamental purposes 
that we seek, and on which most of us would probably 
agree.1
We know, for example, that we cannot create morals 
and integrity through legislation, yet we know they are 
indispensable in the regulatory process. As expressed by 
Dallas newspaper editor Dick West, "We must have knowledge­
able as well as honest public officials. We must have leaders 
with vigor, drive, vision, and e x p e r t i s e . W i t h  such offi­
cials, of course, almost any regulatory system could be made 
to function satisfactorily. Since some regulatory personnel 
fall short of this goal, the system itself becomes important.
The regulation we have now in Texas is viewed in 
different ways. It is criticized as too loose by representa­
tives of some of the large Eastern companies, and as too rigid
^Spencer L. Kimball, "The Goals of Insurance Laws: 
Means versus Ends," Journal of Risk and Insurance 29 (March 
1962): 29.
^Dick West, Dallas Morning News: Quoted in letter
from Don J. Willmon, June 13, 1972.
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by some of the smaller Texas companies. Board Member Manford 
said Texas was the only state carrying out the provisions of 
the McCarran-Ferquson Act.^
The government of Texas has been largely under the 
control of conservatives for the last forty years, and "big 
business" has wielded considerable influence— big banks, big 
insurance companies, big contractors. The present Governor 
is a wealthy rancer, yet the Chairman of the State Board of 
Insurance whom he appointed is regarded as being "consumerist" 
oriented. Chairman Christie has sought the viewpoint of all 
elements of the industry. The continuation of this process 
of inquiry and study by the State Board of Insurance is strongly 
recommended.
Since Texas was one of the first states to see the 
advantages of the early-warning tests, the revised procedures 
will, no doubt, be eagerly adopted. Wide-spread use of these 
tests will be of great help to regulators in all states, and 
their use is strongly recommended.
Similar approaches must be made in the field of account­
ing, and in the whole process of company examination. At a 
time when the accounting profession is reexamining many of its 
traditional tenets, it is appropriate for qualified members 
of the industry and the profession to work together to devise 
more exact ways of representing the financial position of 
individual firms.
^Interview, Austin, June 21, 1973.
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Some states suffer, as Texas has in the past, from 
an inadequate staff of examiners, both in quality and quan­
tity. This situation can be improved. From a political 
standpoint, the companies must be convinced that proper 
examination is to their benefit. Then they will use their 
influence to secure more adequate funding for the examina­
tion process.^ Some of the efforts of consumer groups could 
well be directed into this channel.
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
recognizes the personnel problem, and is considering a sort 
of "blood bank" of certified insurance examiners who can be 
hired by states without adequate training and funding facili­
ties of their own.^ There is no reason why such examiners 
should not have the training and prestige of bank examiners. 
Adequate compensation would make it possible to secure and 
maintain the caliber of personnel needed.^
^The Austin Insurance Report of February 29, 1972, 
reported a remark of State Senator Murray Watson to Presi­
dent Ben H. Carpenter of Southland Life at a legislative 
committee hearing concerning the idea of a Guaranty Fund.
He said he had never seen Carpenter present to testify 
before the legislative committees in favor of increased 
appropriations for the Insurance Board, and hoped he would 
in the future.
^Letter, Suzanne T. Turner, March 26, 1974.
^When the former Estate Life Insurance Company of 
Amarillo was placed in receivership, newspaper accounts of 
the Hearing before the Insurance Commissioner gave prominent 
mention of an alleged "gift" of $2,000 by the President of 
the Company to the State Examiner assigned to his company 
"who was in financial distress because of illness in his fam­
ily. " (Amarillo Globe-Times, December 19, 1957, p. 1.)
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Much regulatory attention in recent months has been 
devoted to price disclosure, as shown by the testimony before 
Senator Hart's Subcommittee, and the Orders in Arkansas and 
Texas for use of the Interest-Adjusted Cost Comparison Index. 
Yet the evidence presented in this paper shows that price is 
not a prime concern of consumers.
Professor Belth, who has studied the matter of insur­
ance costs and cost disclosure extensively, favors much more 
through disclosure. He recognizes the difficulties involved, 
which he attributes to ignorance on the part of buyers and 
agents, complexity of the product, and apathy on the part of 
buyers.^ Despite these difficulties, he urges the industry 
to precede to implement a thorough disclosure system, although 
on a "gradual basis" because of the significant impact.^
Cost comparison and price disclosure are really parts 
of the same problem— how to enable the consumer to make intelli­
gent decisions in the market place. The industry must take 
cognizance of the desire for more information, and cooperate 
in finding ways to make this information more meaningful and 
readily available. The writer believes, based largely on con­
versation with E. Jay O'Keefe, President and former Actuary
^The Life Insurance Industry, Hearings, loc. cit.,
p. 526.
^Joseph M. Belth, The Retail Price Structure in Ameri­
can Life Insurance (Bloomington: Bureau of Business Research,
Graduate School of Business, Indiana University, 1966), pp. 
239-246.
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of Western National Life of Amarillo,^ that the interest- 
adjusted method of cost c o m p a r i s o n ^  is not satisfactory for 
the purposes intended. It is an attempt to adjust the cost 
of insurance for the time-value of money (interest), but the 
method is unable to account adequately for the various com­
binations of premium and cash value. Nor is it able to 
account for the differences in costs involved in cancelling 
a policy within a few years and in holding it till death.
The search for satisfactory methods of cost compari­
son must continue, however, along with increased emphasis on 
consumer education concerning the complexities of life insur­
ance . 3
Perhaps it is premature to require cost comparison 
and disclosure before product classifications are more stand­
ardized. Some standardization is desirable, but beyond some 
point it will encroach on what is described in the letter 
from the MONY representative as ". . . the freedom to provide 
a diversity of products and benefits."^ Regulators must examine
^Interview, Amarillo, February 12, 1974.
^See p. 59.
Appendix F reproduces a part of Professor Belth's 
statement before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly 
explaining the "package" nature of premiums on ordinary life 
insurance. Much of the controversy about price disclosure 
centers around this concept. The industry largely favors 
one price for the "package" of savings and protection, while 
representatives of consumer movements advocate pricing each 
part separately.
4see p. 212.
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carefully the line they draw between these two goals.
In a similar vein there is a difference between tell­
ing a consumer what he buying and what he may buy. The 
writer recommends that no limitations (other than to prevent 
deceit and fraud) be placed on the type of insurance which 
may be sold. Groups such as Consumer's Union should certainly 
have the right to recommend the type of insurance which they 
think is the "best," but their recommendations should not be 
enacted into law.^
More regulatory as well as industry attention needs 
to be directed to the area of marketing. Faced with rising 
costs in all areas, companies and agents are less interested 
in the small, individual policy, and more interested in "big 
ticket" policies and group sales. Company President O'Keefe 
of Amarillo sees "mass merchandising," with premiums paid 
by payroll deduction, as the only way a company can profit-
p
ably handle small policies. The expenses of handling such 
policies will certainly be less than individual solicitations 
and collections. A similar approach is suggested by Alfred 
Golden, writing in Insurance Magazine, who called mass market­
ing "the wave of the future.
ifhe Life Insurance Industry, Hearings, loc. cit.,
p. 2255.
2
Interview, Amarillo, May 14, 1974.
^Alfred L. Golden, "Mass Marketing of Insurance," 
Insurance Magazine, February 1974, p. 16.
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Oklahoma Commissioner Hunt sees a danger in such a 
procedure. "The big companies," he said, "could lower the 
rates and drive the small companies out of the state, and 
then raise rates at a later date."^
Perhaps increased educational efforts will enable 
a larger percentage of sales to be made "over the counter" 
without so much expense in direct selling. A possible trend 
to this type of selling may be seen in the recent (1970) 
acquisition of the Great American Reserve Insurance Company 
of Texas by the J. C. Penney Co. The second largest general 
merchandising organization in the nation thus joined the 
largest (Sears, Roebuck & Co.) in sponsorship of a life 
insurance company.^ If such a trend continues, increased 
competition could result, and thus intensify the search for 
more efficient marketing.
The entire question of mail-order and similar types 
of sales needs examination. If such methods can lower dis­
tribution costs without sacrifice of safety and policyholder 
service, they merit consideration. The fact that some fraudu­
lent schemes have been promoted through the mail in the past 
should not condemn all such proposals. Some channel must be 
provided for the purchase of small policies by individuals.
^Southwestern Insurance Regional, July 31, 1973, p. 2.
^Best's Insurance Reports, Life/Health, 1973. Sears 
has sponsored Allstate Insurance Company for automobile insur­
ance since 1931, and Allstate Life Insurance since 1957.
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or the industry may be forced to make such provisions on terms 
which it does not find attractive.
The industry must continue the search for less costly 
marketing techniques, and regulatory officials must be respon­
sive. State regulations designed for the traditional methods 
of selling may hinder the development of innovations.^
The writer believes the State Board basically has 
most of the authority and regulatory tools it needs to assure 
sound operation of a company insofar as regulation affects it; 
or to be able to take quick regulatory action if needed. Dili­
gent use of the recommended early-warning tests will detect 
most trouble spots before they reach a crisis stage. Continued 
up-grading of the force of examiners and examining actuaries 
will facilitate the entire process of regulation.
Legislative action is needed to provide a capital 
requirement that is scaled to the operations of the company. 
This is widely (though not universally) regarded as a desir­
able change. Furthermore, the writer recommends that compan­
ies now operating under the "grandfather" clause be required 
to increase their capital and surplus to conform to current 
requirements within five to ten years.
Ipor example, in 1972 the Florida Insurance Commissioner 
brought a complaint against National Home Life Insurance Co. of 
St Louis because of advertisements featuring Art Linkletter, 
who did not have a license to sell insurance in Florida. The 
Company agreed to a $20,000 penalty. ("Florida Calls Art 
Linkletter Unlicensed Insurance Agent," Consumer Reports,
January 1973, p. 51.)
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Legislative action would also be needed to provide a 
series of investment regulations based not on form, but on 
content of the investment. The writer favors such action, 
though recognizing that formulating equitable provisions 
would not be a simple matter.
Even if all these changes were implemented, the 
industry would not be without problems. Life insurance is 
both a product and a service, and it i^ difficult to under­
stand. Consumer ignorance plays a part in the way the mar­
ket functions, and both the industry and regulatory officials 
must work to alleviate that ignorance. The industry does not 
operate capriciously, however, and careful study reveals the 
traits which are distinctive. The fact that the industry's 
market operations do not accord with some of the more commonly 
accepted economic principles does not mean that they are with­
out logical explanation.
With the implementation of the above provisions, a 
good regulatory system would become even more responsive to 
the needs of the industry and the public. A final word is 
necessary concerning entrance to the industry, however.
The writer feels the State Board must be diligent in 
assuring that applicants for a charter have " . . .  sufficient 
insurance experience, ability, good standing and good record 
to render success of the proposed insurance company probable."
^Code, Art. 2.01.
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The memory of past evils is difficult to eradicate, but it 
can be overcome. Insofar as possible, thé organization of 
companies designed primarily to benefit the stock promoters 
must be prevented.
The above provision is a powerful weapon. Its use 
is subject to abuse in the hands of regulatory officials, 
for no law can be written to cover every eventuality. The 
ultimate assurance of wisegËÊNNNNNNNNÊgsapon can come only 
through informed and a ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ | ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B ^ a t i o n  in the 
political process.
F
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can be overcome. Insofar as possible, thé organization of 
companies designed primarily to benefit the stock promoters 
must be prevented.
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W EST TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY
CANYON. TEXAS 79015
oEPARTMCNT OF ECONOMIC* FebrusTy 8, 1974
Dear Rotarlan:
In connection with my study of the Texas Life Insurance industry for my Ph. D. 
dissertation, I am seeking some information about reasons for purchasing speci­
fic life insurance policies. President Tom agreed that it would not be out of 
line for me to use the membership of the Amarillo Rotary Club for a little 
sample survey.
There are a number of factors which determine how we spend our money, and the 
purchase of life insurance seems to be influenced by more "non-market" factors 
than many other expenditures. An analysis of such factors might be of help in 
considering the types of regulation which would be beneficial both to the in­
dustry and to the public at large. (In December, for example, the State Board 
of Insurance called a public hearing to consider the ways in which the cost of 
life insurance is represented to the public by the agents.)
Would you please take a few moments to think back to the last life insurance 
policy you purchased (or the purchase of which you influenced), and try to 
recall just why you made that particular decision. Then check the principal 
reason (or reasons) on the form below and return in the enclosed envelope.
(The Head of the Economics Department has authorized this use of postage as 
part of a proper study in economics, so you won't even be out the price of a 
stamp!)
I will surely appreciate your response. Although this is a minor part of my 
study, I feel it is an important one.
Sincerely,
Allen Early 
Assistant Professor
The last life insurance policy which I purchased (or was instrumental in purchasing) 
was primarily determined by:
_______ the cost
_______  the provisions of that particular policy
_______ the agent
_______ the company
  other reasons (please specify)
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No. 37476 OFFICIAL ORDER
of the
COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE
of the
STATE OF TEXAS 
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Date July 7, 1972
Subject Considered:
TEXAS NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
Dallas, Texas
SUPERVISION ORDER
General remarks and official action taken:
On this day, came on for consideration by the Commissioner of Insur­
ance, the application and consent of TEXAS NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, Dallas, Texas, and after conferring with management of the 
company pertaining to the affairs of said company, the Commissioner 
of Insurance finds that the interest of the public can best be 
served by placing said company under a state of supervision as pro­
vided by the provisions of Article 21.28-A of the Texas Insurance 
Code.
THEREFORE, under the provisions of Article 21.28-A of the Texas 
Insurance Code, the Commissioner of Insurance does place TEXAS 
NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY under supervision. Said company is 
not to do any of the following acts without the prior approval of 
the Commissioner of Insurance:
A. Dispose of, convey, transfer or encumber any of its 
assets (except bank accounts as provided herein) or 
its business in force.
B. Transfer or withdraw any funds from its bank accounts, 
except for such sums as are necessary to pay the debts 
incurred in item F below.
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C. Lend any of its funds except for the making of loans 
required under the terms of its outstanding contracts 
of insurance.
D. Invest any of its funds except by depositing funds 
received in the bank accounts of the company estab­
lished at date of this Order or in certificates of 
deposit at such banks or in obligations of the United 
States of America.
E. Transfer any of its property except as provided herein.
F. Incur any debt, obligation or liability except for pay­
ment of salaries of its employees, agents' commissions, 
ordinary expenses of maintaining its home and branch 
offices (if any) and expenses (including claims) of 
servicing existing policies, all in accordance with 
the level and terms that exist on the date of this 
Order or for lesser amount.
G. Merge or consolidate with another company.
H. Enter into any new reinsurance contract or treaty or 
terminate existing reinsurance contracts or treaties.
CLAY GOTTEN
COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE
Prepared by:
ROBERT P. CLINES 
Attorney
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No. 39053_______ OFFICIAL ORDER
of the
COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE
of the
STATE OF TEXAS 
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Date January 15, 1973
Subject Considered:
UNIVERSAL INVESTORS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
Fort Worth, Texas
ORDER
General remarks and official action taken:
Whereas the Commissioner of Insurance heretofore on October 26,
1970, did place UNIVERSAL INVESTORS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Fort 
Worth, Texas, under a state of supervision as provided for by 
Article 21.28-A of the Insurance Code and did appoint M. L.
Hartwig supervisor and whereas such company has continued in 
supervision and M. L. Hartwig is no longer in a position to con­
tinue as supervisor and certain tranactions need to be consumated, 
the Commissioner of Insurance does hereby enter the following orderi
1. M. L. Hartwig is hereby discharged as supervisor of 
UNIVERSAL INVESTORS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and in his 
Stead Tom I. McFarlinq is appointed as conservator.
2. Tom I. McFarling is instructed to consummate a sale of 
the real property and furniture of UNIVERSAL INVESTORS 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY for $75,000 cash to Thomas I.
Fiedler, Trustee, and to deliver appropriate conveyances 
and enter into appropriate contracts to consummate same.
3. To remove the books, records and property remaining in 
UNIVERSAL INVESTORS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY to Austin,
Texas.
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4. To negotiate and consummate a reinsurance agreement 
with a solvent Texas licensed life insurer for the 
remaining life insurance policies of said company 
(being less than 20 in number) on the best possible 
terms available.
CLAY GOTTEN
COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE
Prepared by:
Robert P. Clines
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APPENDIX D 
OFFICIAL ORDER
No. 40314
of the
COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE
of the
STATE OF TEXAS 
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Date June 1, 1973
Subject Considered;
FINANCIAL SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
Dallas, Texas
APPOINTMENT OF CONSERVATOR 
General remarks and official action taken:
FINANCIAL SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Dallas, Texas, has 
requested, petitioned and consented to the appointment of a con­
servator over the affairs and property of said company, as provided 
under Article 21.28-A of the Texas Insurance Code.
After considering such request and having found that the request is 
properly made and that a conservator should be appointed over the 
affairs and property of said company, the Commissioner of Insurance 
does hereby, under the provisions of Article 21.28-A of the Texas 
Insurance Code, place FINANCIAL SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Dallas, Texas, in conservatorship and does hereby appoint Tom I. 
McFarlinq conservator of said company and directs the conservator 
to take charge of such company and all of the property, books, 
records, and effects thereof (including, but not limited to, bank 
accounts, securities, collections of accounts, rentals and other 
funds due the company, and the control of mail and post office 
boxes) and conduct the business thereof. The conservator shall 
make report to the Commissioner of Insurance of the affairs of 
said company as soon as he ascertains them and shall thereafter 
make report once each month during the pendency of the conservator­
ship, and the conservator shall take all necessary measures to 
preserve protect and recover the assets and property of said com­
pany, including claims and causes of action belonging to said com­
pany and to defend any suit or suits which have been filed or may
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hereafter be filed against said company and to file and prosecute 
any suit or suits necessary or incident to the preservation, pro­
tection or recovery of assets and property of said company.
The conservator shall take charge of said company as above set out 
subject to such further orders and directions as the Commissioner 
of Insurance deems proper and necessary.
CLAY COTTEN
COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE
Prepared by:
ROBERT P. CLINES 
General Counsel
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June 23, 1969
CONTINENTAL INVESTORS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
San Antonio, Texas
CONSERVATORSHIP ORDER
On this day, came on for consideration by the Commissioner of 
Insurance, the affairs and condition of CONTINENTAL INVESTORS LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, San Antonio, Texas, and in particular, charges 
and specifications contained within Commissioner's Order No. 29891, 
dated April 7, 1969.
A public hearing was held on June 16, 1969, as provided for in the 
aforesaid Order, at which hearing appeared persons representing 
the interests of the company. Based upon evidence presented at 
such hearing, the Commissioner of Insurance finds:
1. That the company has not complied with the requirements
of items 2 and 4 of the specifications in that the material 
required was not provided at a time not later than five 
days preceeding the date of the hearing.
2. That the company does not have duly installed officers 
nor a functioning Board of Directors.
3. That the company has not made good deficiencies prohibited 
by the provisions of Articles 3.02 and 3.60 of the Texas 
Insurance Code, and that its capital or capital stock is 
impaired to an extent prohibited by such Articles.
THEREFORE, the Commissioner of Insurance finds that his lawful 
requirements in the aforesaid Order have not been complied with, 
and he does, under the provisions of Article 21.28-A of the Texas 
Insurance Code, appoint Tom I. McFarlinq conservator of and over 
the property and affairs of CONTINENTAL INVESTORS LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, San Antonio, Texas, and does direct him to immediately 
take charge of such insurance company and all of the property, 
books and records thereof, and conduct the business thereof. The 
conservator shall report to the Commissioner of Insurance his
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findings and recommendations concerning the future conduct of the 
affairs of the company, including such steps as may be necessary 
for rehabilitation and his recommendations if rehabilitation is 
not considered feasible for the orderly reinsurance of the out­
standing insurance policies of the company and the liquidation of 
its affairs.
Prepared by:
ROBERT P. CLINES CLAY COTTEN
Attorney COMMISSIONER OP INSURANCE
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APPENDIX F
From Statement of Joseph M. Belth, U.S., Congress Senate, 
Committee'on the Judiciary, The Life Insurance Industry, Mono­
poly, 93d Congr., 1st Sess., 1973, pp. 572-3.
Level-premium life insurance, under which the premium 
remains constant, is a technique adopted by the life insur­
ance industry in an attempt to minimize adverse selection 
and at the same time make it financially feasible for policy­
holders to continue their protection even to advanced ages. 
Such an arrangement requires that the policyholder be over­
charged (relative to mortality costs, expenses, and profit) 
in the early policy years to offset the inadequacy of pre­
miums in the later policy years. The level-premium arrange­
ment and the legislation requiring cash values make life insur­
ance companies major financial institutions and transform 
what otherwise would be an insurance transaction into a com­
bination or package transaction involving both insurance pro­
tection and a savings medium.
Because of the package aspect of cash-value life insur­
ance contracts, it is necessary to distinguish between the 
"premium" for the contract and the "price" of the protection 
element of the contract. To compute the price of the pro­
tection element, it is necessary to separate the protection 
element of the policy from the savings element, at least in 
a theoretical sense. Since the separation involves the making 
of assumptions, no single price figure can be established as 
the price; rather, any price figure must be accompanied by a 
statement concerning the assumptions used in computing the 
figure.
The nature of a life insurance price figure may be illus­
trated by an analogy. Assume that an individual is purchas­
ing a package that consists of an item A and an item B. When 
only the price of the package is given, no single figure can
be established as the price of either A or B alone. To cal­
culate the price of A, it is necessary to make as assumption 
about the price of B, and vice versa. Thus, any figure estab­
lished as the price of A must be accompanied by a statement 
about the assumed price of B, and vice versa.
In life insurance, the two parts of the package are pro­
tection and savings, and any figure established as the price 
of protection must be accompanied by a statement about the 
assumed rate of return on the savings element. Conversely, 
it is possible to make a statement about the rate of return
on the savings element only if an assumption is made about the
price of the protection. In short, the price of protection 
and the rate of return on the savings element are two sides 
of the same coin, and either can be used to make comparisons 
among policies.
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